Edited by
Mehdi Faridzadeh

Philosophies of Peace and Just War

In Greek Philosophy and Religions of Abraham: Judaism, Christianity and Islam



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IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY AND
ABRAHAMIC RELIGIONS:
JUDAISM, CHRISTIANITY, AND ISLAM

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Introduction

By Charles Randall Paul

Thank you very much. Thank you very much Reverend Kowalski. I will now introduce our panel. I'll make my own remarks I think at the end of the day, when you are all very tired and you can sleep during my remarks. But, I will, given the situation today, simply introduce myself as one who a few years ago became very interested in the problem of inter-religious conflict and intra-religious conflict. I saw a very close resemblance between conflicts within a religious group where you had two sides each calling the other heretic, each calling the other impure, out of the motive that the religion should be correct, it should be pure, it should be maintained. I noted that the way they would deal with each other was similar in many respects to the way inter-religious conflicts are engaged where people believe that God is in charge of the world. If there is an impure or incorrect message given in the name of God, it is worse than to have an atheist speak because you are representing incorrectly the divine. Therefore inter-religious conflict can become very heated when people speak for God and the other party believes of course that they are speaking incorrectly for God, or if you will, they are providing a counterfeit religion.

When I looked at these dynamics I realized that when you get together with a human being in a very personal way, you take that person's pulse. You make a judgement on whether that person is an idiot, on whether that person is just naive, or candidly, at times, we may have met people that we think are down right evil, that have just chosen, as we say in America, to go for the dark side. That human judgement that

we make, between individuals, is something that has to be done in our hearts and minds very honestly. We cannot deny the fact that we make that judgment. If we judge that a person is an intelligent person and a person who is not naïve who has the facts and is a person who is good hearted then we are willing to a certain degree to trust that person.

What I work on is bringing people together of very different religious or worldviews that are honestly in deep conflict, and give them a chance in unique, quiet, eyeball to eyeball interviews, to come to the conclusion that their enemy, is not their enemy but is a trustworthy opponent. They are a person they can trust to have a good heart, a good mind and not be naïve, but to disagree seriously over religion, to disagree seriously over their world view. So we try to create peaceful conflicts, where tension can exist between people who understand their differences and of course their similarities. In that sense, we hope today is a meeting where our speakers can speak from their hearts, their minds, candidly, with each other and to the group, so that we can catch their differences that are conflictual and absorb them and consider them as they are given in good faith. The anger need not be there when we have conflicts that are between people who trust one another, and are engaged in good faith. That's what The Foundation for Interreligious Diplomacy is all about. We are not about resolving religious conflicts, we are about creating methods where they can be engaged honorably, peacefully and in a way that will create greater trust between opponents.

I will now introduce our distinguished group today and we're thankful, literally thankful, that they were all willing to come and talk with us today. We'll first hear from Dr. James Turner Johnson, professor of religious studies at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, New Jersey. He has written on the subject, broadly, of 'just war', and understands interrelig-

ious conflicts better than most people. Then we will hear from Dr. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, the University Professor of Islamic studies at George Washington University, a well-published author on the topic of Islam and its role in the world today. After that we will hear from Dr. Rabbi Michael Paley, the UJA Federation of New York director and an adjunct professor at Columbia University and the former University Chaplain at Columbia University.

After those comments from 3 different worldviews we will have some comparative evaluations of those comments. We'll hear first from Dr. William Vendley, the executive director of The World Conference for Religion and Peace here in New York. He has traveled world wide and is one of these unique human beings who has been a pioneer in an effort to bring various religious traditions together to focus on very difficult social problems in Africa and other countries in the world in a wonderful effort at I think what the dean called 'just peace' where we have situations that are difficult with respect to economics and social justice. His work is not just charity, he gets down into the social and religious aspects of societies and tries to get the right players together to make a difference at the grass roots.

Then we have the honorable John Brademas, many of you know him here in New York. He is President *emeritus* of the New York University, the ex-majority whip for the United States Congress and a gentleman and a scholar. He will give us his comments from his perspective both as a politically active leader in the United States and as a road scholar and a thinker in general about the questions of intercultural conflict.

Then we'll have Dr. Gholam Reza A'Avani, professor of philosophy and the director of the Iranian Academy of Philosophy. After Dr. A'Avani we will hear from Dr. Mohom-

mad Shomali, he's the head of the department of religious studies at the Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute in the Islamic Republic of Iran. After that I might make a few brief comments.

I want before we start today to also recognize in our audience a friend of ours and a distinguished guest, his Excellency Dr. Javad Zarif , the Ambassador to the United Nations for the country of Iran. You're down there someplace, there he is in the front row. Thank you very much all of you for being here and we will now proceed.

Western Traditions

A Christian Vision of Peace in Global Conflict

Reverend James A. Kowalski
Dean, Cathedral of St. John the Divine, New York

It is a great pleasure on behalf of the bishop and the cathedral community here at Saint John the Divine, to welcome all of you. I am not among the distinguished scholars for sure, as you are about to find out in my brief remarks. I have been asked to say something about a Christian perspective on our topic.

I'll start simply by saying I come from a particular Christian tradition that tends to take what we would call incarnation or the infleshment of the divine very seriously and literally in human person-hood, which is another way of saying everything I might add to this conference is very contextual. Being in this country right now as a Christian and as a citizen I am very aware of the way that we are waging war, a war with which I have not agreed. I would say I have thought about my remarks from the perspective of my own personal and faith discomfort with two aspects of an international strategy that seem to me to be mostly about issues of retaliation and a quest for security. Both of these are allusive as I try to make sense of a Christian perspective on war and peace with justice.

It is not a new thing that Christians would say that in history various theologies have been used, supposedly from a faith or biblical perspective, either to rationalize or perhaps restrain, but supposedly in some way to inform what we do or don't do around the act of war. We live now at a time when perhaps, as Henry Gustafsen who used to teach here at

Union has suggested, we've become even more confused. We saw so much carnage there seemed to be a pendulum swing after the years of the 20th century, with such violence and such bloodshed, to what some might have hoped for as a period of pacifism. Yet others were arguing that that simply was too reductionist as a way of looking at what a faith perspective traditionally and practically would be for Christians or perhaps for others.

What emerged over a very long period of time is 'Just War Theory', with which I'm sure most of you are very familiar and perhaps comfortable, which has been the dominant approach that most of us who are practitioners have taken. As much as we might wish to be pacifists we've tended to see that there may be such hideous situations that get so completely out of control that some action has to be taken. So the question of under what circumstances or to what end such action would be taken gets into play. That war would only be waged as a last resort. That it would have to be waged by legitimate authority. That it would have to be deemed by the large of society as legitimate. That it would truly redress wrongs suffered. That it would be considered for a just cause. That it would have some reasonable chance of success. That it would be used to reestablish peace not just to keep war going. That it would be proportional to the injury suffered. That it would be limited in its objectives. That it would be able to discriminate between combatants and non-combatants. I think all of us are familiar with these ways of looking at how if it must be waged, war should be at least contained.

Whether we are comfortable with any kind of war making or not, it seems to me many Christians have said that as a last resort such a war should at least not be used to cause more harm than good. They have said that there needs to be some clear definition when war is waged of who the enemy is. There has to be clear evidence that this adversary has actually

been identified as guilty of some kind of crime or action of which he or the society has been accused. Within the Christian tradition, assassinations of any kind have mostly been forbidden. We have some extraordinary exceptions, for example, Bonhoeffer in his attempt on the life of Hitler.

So many of these basic principles in the theology with which I am familiar have been either treated very elastically or abused in some of what is going on now, within a context where something else that you are very familiar with is happening culturally within this country. In this country there is a real division between so called conservative religious groups under the Christian umbrella and those who might be less conservative, and in alignment of many political figures and even political parties perhaps and those running for office, with certain groups who have somehow helped yet again, not for the first time. Certainly we have much evidence in the third rike. We have evidence in apartheid in South Africa, that Christian theologians have built a case, a theology, upon which often actions have been taken that do not meet many if most of these standards of what would be considered a moral war, or a 'Just War'.

In his writing, *A Just Cause not a Just War*, Howard Zimms says, "I believe two moral judgements can be made about this present war. The September 11 attack constitutes a crime against humanity and cannot be justified, and the bombing of Afghanistan is also a crime which cannot be justified." Here it seems to me many people of faith feel the moralization of this complex issue has gotten completely out of control. They feel that the undercurrent issues of who was responsible for what and what it is that we are trying to achieve also seemed to have been terribly inarticulate at best, if not contrived and manipulated for other purposes. That we would be retaliating and that we were doing this suppos-

edly to be more safe may be fundamental oppositions of what has really been going on. Retaliation in of itself, supposedly from a theological perspective not a justification, and the question of how you become safer by maintaining a strategy that keeps this kind of warring going without even being able to clearly identify who the enemy is. This can't be argued as self-defense. It does not seem to protect people who are innocent nor does it seem to identify the wrongs that were necessary to proceed. It does seem to seek revenge and now the allegations are that those who are in power are putting in place what could even be defined by some as tyrannical rule.

These are fundamental questions that really go to the heart of a theology that the catholic bishops have espoused consistently and very recently in a letter to President Bush on Iraq. In it they wrote, "We conclude, based on the facts known to us" and this was written in September of 2002 before the war in Iraq, " Based on the facts known to us that a preemptive unilateral use of force is difficult to justify. We fear that resort to force under these circumstances would not meet the strict conditions in Catholic" they mean perhaps Roman Catholic, but I think one could argue this is widely somewhat Christian teaching, " for overriding the strong presumption against the use of military force." Is there clear and adequate evidence of a direct connection between Iraq and the attacks of September 11 or clear and adequate evidence of an immanent attack of a grave nature? Do we know that there is a probability of success even or that this has even been proportional? Would the use of military force lead to wider conflict and instability?

We are being told in these past few days that things are getting better and yet many in this country and I would submit around the world wonder whether that is true at all. Is this really a way to build a just and stable order, or to undermine any coalitions that could have been created that could

have worked against terrorism? It seems to me that what we are really faced with now is a question of how we would regain what might be argued as a Christian perspective on Just Peace. Making peace and transforming initiatives that are political, economic, and humanitarian, designed to foster justice in parts of the country, emphasizing those situations that when they deteriorate into horrible environmental, political, and social atmospheres, create the possibility of genocide, civil violence, international conflict, rather than working for what would better the lives of people who could then create the peace that we say we believe in. In initiatives even from the general assembly of the United Nations have not, it seems to me, been brought to bear by good religious people who have said that they serve in our tradition the one who came in peace.

I have no answer to these questions of what it is that we think we're doing, I do know that at the end we will be judged by the harvest of the fruits that are born by the strategies we've put in motion. If we believe that we can do whatever we need to do in order to be safe, it would seem to me that we are defying one of the most basic tenants of what I would understand the Christian faith to be. That total security comes simply from believing that God will provide for us, not in a sentimental sense. As we come back into that very early understanding of what it means to be human in our lives together on one planet, in a world that is ravaged by the disparity between the haves and the have-nots. In a world which terror and hatred, and violence, and war, continue to thrive, these are the things that we might be able to work against.

This cathedral has tried in its own modest way for over 110 years to be a part of that in this country, a sign of that hope, and perhaps as a beacon of hope internationally. So we are very much honored to have a group of people here strug-

gling with an issue that brings faith to bear on what it is that we could do to make peace real in a world that's right now being torn apart by war and increasingly destabilized. I know that you'll benefit from the scholarly perspectives and the in-depth insights that you'll be a part of a today, but make no mistake about it, each of us will be called to act, whatever our traditions of faith may be. We must align what we say we believe in with what it is we are doing. I know, as a citizen of this country and as a Christian, right now I am deeply troubled by what I say I believe in and what I see happening, supposedly on my behalf. I commend to you our time together, I may need to leave a little bit early into the afternoon, but I know that the work that we begin today can be immeasurably important to the welfare of the world. Thank you.

Theoretical Context of Studies on Peace and Just War

James Turner Johnson
Rutgers University

My purpose in this brief paper is to provide something of a historical and political context for thinking about the relationship of religion in the three Abrahamic traditions to the use of violence on behalf of the political community and the relationship of this to the pursuit of peace. These traditions have much in common; they also have significant differences. One of the things that they have in common is that they all have a vision of peace at the end of days. Real peace only comes to the world then, and it will be because of the action of God. In the meantime though, we humans have responsibilities as well. The fundamental question regarding violence is just how we exercise our responsibilities with regard to the goal of peace while at the same time confronting the possibility of needing to use violence to combat evil in the world. I will discuss these traditions in the chronological sequences in which their normative positions on war and peace originated. Thus I will begin with Judaism, whose normative position on war and first took shape in the rabbinic commentaries making up the Talmud. I will then talk about Islam, whose core tradition on this subject began in the eighth and ninth centuries of the Common Era, during the early Abbasid period. Following that I will talk about the Christian just war tradition. Some scalars would trace it back to Augustine in the fourth and fifth centuries, but I prefer to date as beginning in the twelfth century, that is during the Middle Ages, when a coherent doctrine on just war came together.

There is one more thing to say before I begin this historical survey. There is a tradition of pacifism in Christianity which has its roots in the earliest church and which has maintained a presence in Christian thinking and in Christian communities ever since that time. This is a tradition, which in the West was carried in the Middle Ages by the monastic orders. Within Protestant Christianity it has been carried by various sectarian groups, which have moved more closely into the mainstream in the contemporary period. This is not, however, the mainstream position of Christianity. That mainstream position has been the tradition of the idea of just war. So in this paper I do not specifically discuss Christian pacifism but rather examine peace in the context of its place in Christian tradition on just war.

Let me begin, then, by discussing the position of Judaism, which is in many ways a very interesting case. Michael Walzer comments on the Jewish tradition on war as follows:

> The text from which the arguments [in rabbinic thought] begin is Deuteronomy 20, written (so we are told by contemporary scholars) in the seventh century in a literary/religious genre that requires the pretense of Mosaic authorship. Hence the wars immediately referred to in Deuteronomy 20 were fought, if they ever actually were fought, some five centuries earlier; the wars proposed, as it were, for the future had been fought some two or three centuries earlier; and it is impossible to say what impact King Josiah's wars, fought presumably in the lifetime of the Deuteronomist, had on the writing of his texts. Present-mindedness is at no point a feature of Jewish writing on war. The crucial categories are rabbinic, but they are never adapted to the experience of the rabbis themselves. They are meant to explain the wars of Joshua and David. (Walzer 1996: 95)

So what were the rabbis trying to do? Fundamentally, the purpose of what they said about the idea of war was to explain, to interpret the meaning of the biblical text. When they did so, they found themselves defining certain categories as normative. As they understood it, warfare within the Jewish tradition breaks down into two kinds: commanded wars and discretionary wars. The former, commanded wars, were really the most important wars in the rabbis' eyes, because these were the ones which in the first place had been directly authorized by God and in fact led by God in some instances. Joshua's war of conquest against Canaan was one of these, and the war against Amalek was the other main commanded war. Also placed by the rabbis in the category of commanded war, but not directly authorized by God, was the idea of defensive war, which was authorized by the king in response to an attack. Then there is the category of discretionary war. A discretionary war, as defined by the rabbis, was authorized by the king with the consent of the Sanhedrin or parliament for reasons of state.

The rabbinical tradition laid down certain obligations and exemptions. War was a very rule-governed activity, as the rabbis understood it, with the rules laid out in the Deuteronomic text, and these included certain requirements having to do with how the enemy was to be dealt with. But let us recall Walzer's comment: the rabbis were interested in understanding the wars of the era of Joshua and David, not in laying down ethical parameters for the conduct of war in their own time. They did not extend their understanding of the biblical position into a doctrine on statecraft. This remained the case through most of Jewish history, during which the Jews have had no state. Since the foundation of the State of Israel, however, there have been efforts at making the rabbinic tradition on war into a normative position on contem-

porary warfare. At the end of this paper I will return briefly to these efforts.

Having described the origin of the Jewish tradition on war and sketched its basic thrust, let me now move on to the Islamic tradition. Here the critical category is the category of the jihād of the sword. As a form of jihād, striving in the path of God, this is a subordinate category. We see this in the story of the prophet Muhammad when he tells his followers, after returning from a major battle, " We now have returned from the lesser jihād [warfare]; we go on to the greater jihād [that is, the jihād within, the self's struggle to conform with God's will]." This tradition is in many ways as old as the prophet Muhammad himself. There is no mention of jihād in the sense of the using of the sword in the Qur'an itself; the term used there for warfare is *qital* (fighting). But there is mention of jihād of the sword in the stories of the prophet.

Certainly jihād of the sword was a feature of the early caliphates, but a coherent tradition did not emerge on this until the very early origins of the schools of jurisprudence during the early years of the Abbasid Caliphate. This is an important period. Even though there was already by this time a division between the Sunni and Shi`a, that division did not extend to the degree that it later did, and in fact the early Abbasids had significant Shiite support. The Shi`a saw in that caliphate the possibility of an abode of Islam governed by a just ruler, one who would do justice to religion as well as to the demands of statecraft. Therefore what the early jurists laid out as the fundamentals of their understanding of the world, and the place of warfare in it, provides a core idea throughout Islam, one which Shi'a and Sunni share in its basis.

The jurists looked at the world and saw there a world of strife, a world of violence, a world of threat, all around the *dar al-Islam* - the abode of Islam. This was one of the polar conceptions from which they drew their ideas. The other

polar conception was the idea of the peace that will come at the end of days when finally God's purpose has been realized in the world. They described that other world, the one outside the *dar al-Islam*, as an abode of war (*dar al-harb*) because of all the violence they saw there, as members of that abode fought with one another and as they directed violence towards the Islamic community. The jurists conceived the *dar al-Islam* under the rule of a just ruler, as they perceived the early Abbasid caliphs to be, as an abode of peace. This was not the peace that will come at the end of time but a peace that is certainly tolerable in the meantime, the sort of peace that comes when God's law is being obeyed in the larger community.

So as the jurists of the early Abbasid period conceived the role of warfare in this community, the abode of Islam, they thought of it in the first place as a defense against all of the threat which came from outside, from the territory of war. They thought of it in second place as a way by which the Islamic community could extend obedience to the will of God, the law of God, in the world as long as history lasts. They described a form of war, a form of jihād of the sword, which was deeply rule-governed. It had to be authorized by the leader of the community, and for the Sunni this meant the caliph. For the Shi`a after the split became definitive this meant the Imam.

Thus this form of warfare was understood as being in the first place defensive and in the second place a way of extending the obedience of God's rule in the world, and these were fundamentally in the jurists' eyes the same purpose, not purposes that were in anyway in conflict with each other.

This was warfare on behalf of the community as a whole, the community of Islam, to protect it and to advance its aims, but it was warfare that was fought by the commu-

nity, authorized by the proper head of that community. Islam did not countenance warfare fought by individuals for their own reasons. It did not countenance warfare authorized by anyone other than the head of the community itself. This kind of jihād of the sword was a community duty, a community responsibility, and within the community different people had different roles. Not everyone was called to fight; others had different roles in support of the community at large. A further aspect of this rule-governed definition of jihād of the sword was that it had very specific rules on who could be the proper targets of fighting. Limits on fighting non-combatants were traced back to the words of the Prophet Mohammed himself and were amplified to some degree by the jurists. So the end result was a conception of war authorized by the leader of the community, the person whose leadership is in the line of that established by the prophet Mohammed. It is warfare on behalf of the good of the community, understood as a community that is trying to be faithful to the law of God. It is a form of warfare, which is meant to extend the peace that prevails within that community, but at the same time understanding that peace to have only a temporal character. Finally it is a form of war that has very real limits on how it is to be fought so that it is not a war of all against all. It is not a war in which the armies of the *dar al-Islam* fight totalistically, destroying their enemies as if they were nothing before them.

For both the Sunni and the Shi'a traditions a crisis in this fundamental view of authorized war comes later on. For the Shi'a tradition this comes with the occultation of the twelfth Imam. For the Sunni tradition it comes at one of three times in the history of the caliphate: either when the Mongols took Baghdad and drove the Abbasids out, when the last Abbasid caliph died and the Turks took over the caliphate, or possibly when the Turkish sultanate ended in 1924. Arguments have been made for all three dates. Though no

friends of the Ottomans, contemporary radical Islamists tend to use the last of these dates as the most definitive end to the caliphate. In any case, whichever of these dates is chosen, after this there is no longer a caliph and thus, for the political theory of classical juristic Islam, since there is no leader present in the world who is in the line of the prophet Mohamed, subsequent Islamic political communities do not meet the test of the classic *dar al-Islam.*

This raises the question of how such a political community might justifiably engage in warfare. Two fundamental answers to this question have grown up within the broader Islamic tradition. One answer is connected with the idea of the *ghazi*, the warrior who gains his authenticity by success in war showing therefore that God has blessed him. The other is the model of the great Saladin (*Salah al-Din*) who, as a leader, was not a caliph, was not even the designated deputy of the caliph, but was rather a regional emir or commander. His leadership against the armies of the second crusade was, in terms of the classical juristic theory, simply that of an organizer. On the terms of this theory Saladin was an organizer of individual Muslims who were responding to the invasion by the crusaders and who were fighting against them in a condition of emergency on their own responsibility because of their own individual duty.

For Sunni Islam after the end of the caliphate, as for Shi'a Islam after the occultation of the Twelfth Imam, these two models provide a way to describe legitimate leadership of the Islamic community. Whether explicitly based on one or both these models, though, there is a significant history, a practical history, of statecraft in the Islamic world that should not be forgotten. In this context the position on war has been summed up very well, not just for the Shi`a but for the Sunnis also, by Abdulaziz Sachedina in his book on the just ruler in

Shi'a Islam (Sachedina 1988): that in the condition that the Muslim world is in now, in the absence of a leader in the heritage of the prophet, the only kind of justified war is the war of defense.

Let me move on to the just war tradition. The deepest roots of this tradition reach back into the Hebrew Bible and to the normative views on political order and the use of force found in classical Greece and Rome. Many contemporary theorists would say that Augustine, the great Christian saint of the fourth and fifth centuries, is the first just war theorist, and in fact in certain ways he was. Yet Augustine never wrote a coherent treatise on just war. To provide an illustration of the way he treated the subject of just war, among his many books are three whole treatises on the subject of marriage, but his comments on war are scattered throughout a variety of works on different topics and are never more than a paragraph or so in length. Their importance, though, outweighed their mass, and in the Middle Ages, specifically in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, when medieval Christian Europe began to think seriously about the role of war in the practice of statecraft, it was to Augustine that the theorists turned. Augustine's very few comments were taken and made into a coherent theory of just warfare (*justum bellum*). This was a theory which, like Augustine's own thinking, was fundamentally not about religious power, but about the power of the secular ruler, for here the rule of the state had early on been given over to the temporal sphere.

The medieval theorists of just war did not think of war as to be waged on behalf of the church or by the authority of the religious leadership. Rather, they conceived war as a tool that might be used in the service of order and justice by the political community under the authority of those political leaders who had no temporal superiors, that is, sovereigns. As they developed this theory of just war in the Middle Ages,

they did it around four ideas, all originating in Augustine but adapted by medieval theorists to explain a broader theory of political community and state craft within that community. Thomas Aquinas's discussion (*Summa Theologica* II/II, Q. 40, "On War") epitomizes this classic understanding of just war.

In line with the medieval theory of just war more broadly, Aquinas required in first place that there be sovereign authority for the use of the sword. This requirement was an attempt at the same time to limit the resort to force and to channel it to the public good. Because the sovereign has responsibility for the public good, Aquinas and medieval just war theory as a whole placed the possibility of using force within his toolbox for possible use to ensure the public good. This also implicitly denied the right of recourse to force to every person not in a position of sovereign authority. Use of force by such private persons was *duellum,* duel, and not *bellum,* war. The latter might be just or unjust, depending on whether the remaining conditions were satisfied; the former was always unjust.

The second requirement Aquinas and medieval just war theory as a whole laid down was that of just cause. Here too thinking of the political community and maintaining its good, just war theorists looked out at the possibility that another society or private miscreants within the society or outside it might attack it, and so they provided that the sovereign might resort to force in defense of the common good. This conception of defense was not the right of self-defense as allowed in contemporary international law, which focuses on the right of response to an armed attack by another state. It was a broader concept, defense of the common good, both of the sovereign's own community and of the broader framework within which individual political communities might

coexist and prosper. The second possible just cause for which force might be used was to retake that which had been wrongly taken, with the theorists thinking of the possibility of criminal activity within the society or of raiding on the community's borders.

The third just cause for which the sovereign might use force was to punish evildoers, in accord with a much-cited New Testament text, Romans 13:4, "For [the sovereign] is the minister of God to you for good. But if you do evil, be afraid, for he does not bear the sword in vain; he is the minister of God to execute his wrath on the evildoer." This provision, like the others, then, focused on all those who would disturb the community's good: other political communities, which might menace or attack, and criminals, brigands, and rebels within the sovereign's own community.

After the requirements of sovereign authority and just cause, Aquinas and his contemporaries required that a just resort to force should proceed from a right intention. In the first place, this meant the avoidance of wrong intentions, such as bullying, coercion, implacable hatred, the desire to dominate, and the effort to show one's own prowess. In the second place, fighting out of right intention meant that just uses of force must serve the end of peace. Though the medieval thinkers identified this as an aspect of the requirement of right intention, later just war theory typically treats the end of peace as a distinct requirement. Taken all together, then, what is necessary for a just war is that it be undertaken on sovereign authority, have a justifying cause as described above, be undertaken out of right intention, and be oriented to the end of peace.

In addition to these moral requirements for resort to armed force, the canon law beginning in the twelfth century had put in place certain limits to be observed in fighting a just war: lists of classes of persons who did not normally take part

in war. These persons included women, children, the aged, the infirm, clerics of all sorts, townspeople, merchants innocent travelers, and peasants on the land, as well as the lands and personal property of all these. Beyond this, there was an effort to outlaw certain types of weapons deemed indiscriminate or too likely to cause deadly wounds–siege weapons, bows and arrows, and crossbows. These were also types of weapons generally used not by knights but by commoners, and so this restriction on weapons was also an effort to limit war to the hereditary warrior class. These *jus in bello* provisions found in church law came together in the era of the Hundred Years War (from the mid-fourteenth through mid-fifteenth century) with a secular theory, drawn mainly from the ideas of chivalry, to define a very complete idea of non-combatency and the immunity owed to non-combatants, and to establish the idea that there are some weapons in war that ought not to be used because of their indiscriminate or disproportionate harm. Poison was one such weapon, to take an example.

Now, all three of these religious traditions look to the future to a time when God will bring a full and final peace to the world. But they assume that in the world as it is now, the use of force must be a possibility for the political community on behalf of the good of that community, and on behalf of a partial, but very real, peace in the world as it stands.

One of the major issues in contemporary just war theory is figuring just what this means for contemporary purposes. This has also been a problem in the effort to bring the classical rabbinical theory of warfare in to present discourse, and it is equally a major problem for contemporary Islam. In conclusion, let me sketch the major issues for each of these three traditions.

First, within Judaism two of the categories of mandatory war, Joshua's wars of conquest against the seven Canaanite nations and the war against Amalek, clearly belong to the past; yet the third form of mandatory war, that of self-defense against an attack, whether already launched or clearly intended, remains relevant. Such self-defense is allowed in the rabbinic tradition. The second major type of war, discretionary warfare, requires to be rethought because of the difference between the polity assumed by the rabbis–a king and a sanhedrin or council of notables–and that to be found today in the state of Israel and other contemporary democratic states. But such rethinking has been done, and as one contemporary scholar (Kimelman, 1991: 265-78)) sums up the contemporary majority opinion, a discretionary war must satisfy the certain requirements. It must be declared by the chief executive, must have parliamentary approval, must take into account the people's good, must be in response to a genuine threat, must be likely to produce more good than harm, must not be the result of a vendetta or for self-aggrandizement, and must be fought within moral limits–no direct, intended attacks on noncombatants, and no wanton destruction.

As for the case of Islamic tradition, the major problem with the classic juristic theory has already been noted: the lack today of a *dar al-Islam* as conceived there, and especially the lack of the sort of ruler in the line of authority of the Prophet Muhammad as required by the jurists. The chief answers have also been noted: restriction of justifying cause to the case of self-defense, alternative ways of defining the legitimate authority to lead Muslims collectively in warfare. But a special problem comes as a result of the adoption and co-optation for their own use by radical Islamists of the classic juristic idea of the emergency jihād of individual duty. This was treated by the classic jurists as a genuinely exceptional case, with the norm being the case of the jihād of collective

duty authorized by the Caliph/Imam. It allowed individual Muslims in the *dar al-Islam* to fight, on their own authority and as an individual duty, to repel an attack from the *dar al-harb* when the forces of the community under the authority of the Caliph/Imam were absent. In such an emergency not only the men of military age should fight, but also all those classes that were normally noncombatants: women, children, the aged and infirm. Nor did children have to get their parents' permission, nor did wives have to get that of their husbands: the duty was individual, binding on them all equally. Radical Islamists have remade this emergency type of jihād into the norm for their own conception of jihād of the sword, defining all Western presence and/or influence in the historic Islamic lands as aggressive attack and calling on all Muslims, as individuals, to fight all westerners, who are represented as equally guilty of the aggression, so that there are no noncombatants among them. Though juristic authorities in important cases have challenged this conception, it remains a feature of radical Islamist thought and practice. One result is that the main line of the jihād tradition as defined by the early jurists has often been forgotten, so that the jihād of the sword is understood to mean what the radicals make it to mean.

Within just war tradition as it has developed over the last four decades much attention has been paid to the matter of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as to the destructive potential of all forms of modern war. As a result, influential religious just war theorists have emphasized this tradition's focus on limitation of resort to force more than the permission it also allows for resort to force. The stated position of the United States Catholic Conference is, accordingly, that the just war idea begins with a "presumption against the use of force," and that the just war criteria are to be understood as rules governing when that

presumption may be overridden. Also found in the Catholic bishops' version of just war theory is an emphasis on three prudential criteria added to the four deontological requirements put in place during the Middle Ages. These prudential requirements are that use of force be a last resort, have a reasonable hope of success, and be expected to cause more good than harm. Coupled with the idea of a "presumption against war," these new requirements set very narrow limits on the resort to armed force.

Such developments are in some tension with the classic form of just war theory as defined above, and much of current just war debate has to do with sorting out the differences and seeking a resolution.

The contemporary development of these treatments of justified warfare within the three Abrahamic traditions thus importantly reflects contemporary conditions and movements, as well as the historical forms of the traditions. Both historically and in the contemporary debate there is much in common among these three approaches to understanding when and how warfare is justified. But there are also important differences, and it is incumbent on persons of good will from within each of the traditions to attempt to resolve the resulting problems.

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Peace and Judaism

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In his essay on violence, Walter Benjamin says "Divine violence, which is the sign and seal but never the means of sacred execution, can be called sovereign violence" (Die göttliche Gewalt, welche Insignium und Siegel, niemals Mittel heiliger Vollstreckung ist, mag die waltende heissen). In his commentary on this passage Derrida says "But who signs? It is God, the Wholly Other, as always...God is the name of this pure violence...Authority, justice, power and violence all are one in him" (p.293). Although many people in contemporary society will emphasize the gentle side of religion, it is the harder and violent side that is just as significant, and that has often been prioritized in Judaism, and also in other religions. Many religions value the personal sacrifice involved in obeying God's will, of the willingness to obliterate the self in the ultimate gift of one's own life to the divine command (*fi sabil Allah* on the path of God or *kiddush ha-shem*, in sanctification of the divine name). Within Judaism a caution has arisen about the concept of *milhamet mitzvah* or *hovah*, commanded or obligatory war, especially after the disasters of the revolt of 66 CE and the Bar Kochba rebellion of 132 CE (*Mishnah Sotah* 8.7). On the other hand, in his commentary on Maimonides' *Book of Commandments* (positive commandment 4), Nahmanides claims that " it is a positive commandment for all generations obligating each individual even during the period of exile" that the Land of Israel is conquered and settled. So there seems to be a permanent challenge to peace at least during the period of exile.

Conflict resolution in any system of thought is linked with the general attitudes to the role of humanity in the world. What is important in Islamic thought is the role of human beings as *khilafah* or representatives of God on earth. It is clear from the *surat al-baqarah* (30-39) that God intends human beings to take charge not only of themselves but also of the world as a whole. The angels quite correctly pointed out that if human beings were allowed to be free this would result in corruption and bloodshed. Yet God still put humanity in charge since he knew that we had the innate ability to manage our affairs appropriately. He provided guidance to human beings, which they required even more when they were consigned to this world, and their ability to sin became even greater, since in this world they were partially at least under the influence of Satan. We are free but we need to constrain ourselves, and if we do not then violence can easily result. In fact, Satan refers to enmity as being something that is going to characterize life in this world. When Adam and Eve are excluded from the Garden of Eden God makes it clear that they would now experience both death and hardship. We should recall that they are excluded for exercising free choice, for doing what they were forbidden to do. The interesting question that arises is how one can reduce the subsequent suffering and conflict that seems to arise naturally from life in this world and what it involves.

In the theory of conflict that we find in the Qur'an and the rest of Islamic literature there is, as one would expect, a variety of approaches to acquiring peace. Some of the *ahadith* in particular stress the importance of reconciliation while several Qur'anic passages emphasize the need to be aggressive and take decisive punitive action. It certainly is not the case that Islam is all about peace and reconciliation. Even those interpretations of the religion which stress meekness and humility accept that there is a role for muscular activity both in

defense of Islam and by analogy in defense of the state if the state can be linked with religion.

Exactly the same situation characterizes Judaism. It is difficult to find a religious text that recommends so much violence as the Jewish bible. Some of the instructions by God to the Jews involve not only killing all the human beings in particular communities, but their animals as well! Some instructions to kill are more limited, and even quite reasonable, and there is also often a stress on reconciliation and peace. The messianic age is described as a time of perfect peace, with the lion lying down with the lamb, a period of complete justice, and is the state of affairs towards which history is working, however slowly. In the end all conflicts will be resolved, by divine fiat, and some Jews are prepared to wait patiently for this time to arrive. For example, there are Jews who see their major function as studying and praying while awaiting the messiah, and who take no realistic steps at all to resolve any conflicts which may persist between them and the gentile world. This is a position thoroughly satirized in Kafka's short story 'Jackals and Arabs', where the Jews are the jackals who constantly complain but do nothing to help themselves.

There is a theological school of thought in Islam, which has become important as part of the Hanafi legal tradition, the Murji'a, whose very name comes from the Arabic *irja'* or delay. They argue that we cannot say of anyone that he is a believer or not, the decision has to be postponed until God decides. We should, they argue, use the same principle when considering the acceptability of political revolt against the secular authorities. Only God can really know whether a regime is legitimate or not, and so we should not allow any conflicts to arise between any regime and us, however apparently oppressive it may seem to be. The Murji'i tended as a result to

be politically quietist, on the basis that only God could decide which political conflict was worth initiating, and only God would know how to resolve any conflict.

Both religions also advocate the significance of conflict resolution in personal affairs, and here we start to get a better handle on the topic. For example, in the courts in Israel which consider divorce there is often a great stress on the promotion of *shalom ha-bayit*, peace in the house, and wives will often be obliged to try yet again to put up with the objectionable behavior of their husbands. Similarly in the *shari`a* courts which regulate Muslim marriages, there is often a tendency to do everything possible to preserve a marriage and resolve conflicts in a way which favors one partner over the other, generally the man over the woman. This brings us to an aspect of conflict resolution, which we must note. Conflict resolution is frequently skewed in terms of serving particular interests; the justice of a particular case may have to make way for what is taken to be wider issues of justice. These issues may be thoroughly unjust in what they think of as the normal relationships between individuals and groups of people.

There is then no one very general principle of conflict resolution in any religion, and certainly not in Judaism, that represents some final rule about how issues in this area should be resolved. There are indeed a variety of principles, and these often point in separate directions, and have to be applied differently on distinct occasions, and this is what we would expect. A religion that is based on clear and distinct general principles would not be a religion worth having, it would not mesh with everyday experience nor with the very complicated messes which human beings get into from time to time. Religions require a system of conflict resolution that reflects the conflicts of everyday life, and Islam and Judaism certainly have this. An interesting question would be whether

these systems are so flexible in their attempt at linking up with the facts of everyday life that they become incapable of embodying wider principles of justice, and just become ways of bringing conflict to a temporary pause. That is, are they all about establishing cease-fires, or about bringing into operation final arrangements for peace? It might be argued that the best we as human beings can do is to bring about a cease-fire, and leave the final arrangements to the Almighty, in whose hands all decisions are finally placed. On the other hand, a cease-fire may merely bring to a temporary halt a conflict and may even institutionalize it, so that the parties come to feel that the justice of the situation remains unresolved in favor of particular parties to the conflict. If a building is unsound, papering over the cracks will preserve the appearance of the building temporarily but will not preserve the building ultimately. The methods of conflict resolution in Judaism and Islam may be criticized for concentrating on the smaller and more manageable aspects of such conflicts, leaving the final issues and permanent arrangements to another and more ultimate authority, i.e. to God.

Before the emphasis on conflict resolution in religion carries us away we need to recall that Judaism and Islam, like many religions, are thoroughly imbued with violence and conflict. Judaism in particular often recommends getting one's retaliation in first, the Book of Esther for example positively gloats over the number of Persians killed when the Jews attacked them before they attacked the Jews. What is interesting about this book is that the name of God does not figure even once in it, and the implication might be that when God is not directly involved, then strenuous measures are perfectly acceptable with the aim of self-preservation. But there are also plenty of casualties even when God is directly involved, and in part of the daily morning service Jews recite a song which celebrates the overcoming of the Egyptians and their

drowning with the words, "God is a man of war "(Ex. 15.2). There is a midrash according to which the angels in heaven cheered at the defeat and destruction of the Egyptian army, and the Almighty is supposed to have chided them at their pleasure over the death of some of his creatures. But it has to be said that God did destroy a large number of his creatures in Egypt even before this event, the death of the first-born, presumably the vast majority of whom were entirely innocent of any persecution of the Israelites and/or involvement in Pharaoh's policy towards them. So it is not clear what is meant by this midrash. Perhaps God was suggesting that all human life is valuable even when it needs to be taken, and this is an action that should be carried out reluctantly and certainly not made into an event to be celebrated. Islam also is a hard-nosed religion, it recognizes that there are people in the world who need to be resisted, and insists that when appropriate they be resisted.

It is sometimes suggested that these rather harsh aspects of religion apply to an earlier and less enlightened time, and are hardly appropriate today. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Judaism and Islam spend a lot of time talking about the sorts of creatures we are, and make clear that we are not normally saints or angels. God could have created us as such, but chose not to do so, for the very good reason perhaps that it is more interesting to get us to try to make our way through a difficult environment in which others seek to frustrate our efforts. Not being perfectly good we have freedom of choice and so earn merit through making the right decisions.

The Jewish bible often links peace with justice. In the 34th Psalm there is the verse: 'Depart from evil and do good Seek peace and pursue it' (15). The link between peace and justice is often made, and in this passage an interesting term is used for "pursue". *Radfehu* is the verb, which has as its cognate noun *rodef*, pursuer or aggressor. A *rodef* is someone

who disturbs the peace, who seeks to harm us and who may perfectly legally be resisted. This verse works by contrasting notions like good and evil, peace and aggression, and suggests that peace should be sought as aggressively as its enemies are resisted. It does not actually suggest that one should never be violent, only that peace is the eventual outcome for our actions. We are familiar with people arguing that they only use force in order to bring about peace.

There are times when enemies do need to be identified and vanquished. There is a discussion in Jewish theology about why the Bible starts with the account of the creation of the world and not with a list of the commandments. For the rabbis it might seem to be the commandments, which are more significant. The answer is, or an answer is, that the creation of the world and the commandments are linked. Rashi's commentary at the start of *Bereshit* (Genesis) on *Bereshit Rabbah* 1.2 links the creation of the world with the displacing of the original inhabitants of the Land, the Amorites, since the creator of the world could give whatever he wanted to whomever he wanted. This act of violence is apparently linked with justice, a relationship that as we have seen is repeated rhetorically time and time again. We return to the observation of Derrida that violence and justice are part of what we mean by God. This has for thousands of years been very much a theme of Judaism, and provides some indications as to the route by which any form of plausible conflict resolution acceptable to Judaism will take place.

God in Genesis is at first not that involved in the wars of the chosen people, as we can see when Abraham sets out by military means to rescue his nephew Lot and enters into an alliance with some of the local kings to carry out this end (Gen. 14). By the time of Exodus the situation has completely changed and God's intervention is decisive. Moses tells the

people, no doubt much to their relief, that God will fight for them (Ex 14.14) against the Egyptians, although we are told that they were armed when they left Egypt (Ex 13.18). As we have seen, the famous Song of the Sea that is part of the Morning Service in Judaism describes God as a man of war (Ex. 15.3; see also Josh. 17.1, Judg. 20.17, ISam. 17.33, 2 Sam. 17.8, Ezek. 39.20). There are many military references to God. The messenger of God to Joshua comes as a soldier with drawn sword and describes himself as a general in God's army (Josh. 5.13-14). God's violence against the Egyptians takes on the form of a campaign, the systematic destruction of the country, the first born in it and eventually the army in the Sea of Reeds.

Does this mean that the Israelites are not supposed to do anything in their own defense? It looks like it, when God says 'The Lord will battle for you, you hold your peace' (Ex. 14.14), yet this verse is immediately followed by 'Why do you cry out to me? Tell the Israelites to advance' (14.15). There is a midrash which says that it was only when the first Israelite went into the sea until his head was covered that the waters parted, for that represented an exercise in perfect faith in God's providence. Once they escape the Egyptians they are confronted by Amalek (whom they will have to fight in each generation -- Ex. 17.16) and are now very much on their own, having to fight this indefatigable enemy. When later on Joshua selects fighters and goes out with them to battle, Moses holds his hands up, and while they are up the Israelites win, and when they come down they lose. In the end his hands are actually propped up, and so victory results. What this is often taken to mean is that the people have to take their own future into their own hands, and can no longer depend absolutely on the direct participation of God in their affairs. Not only is war permissible on outsiders but after the event of the Golden Calf Moses asks the tribe of Levi to kill

those who took part in the revolt against God and Moses' authority (Ex. 32.25-28). It is hardly surprising that out of this retelling of history the issue of how wars are to fought and peace established became an important source of law in Judaism. It is quite possible for a religion to value peace and also to be realistic with regard to it. Even when the Gibeonites deceived Joshua into signing a peace treaty with them, Joshua nonetheless adhered to its terms, and much later the Israelite attack on the Gibeonites in violation of the pact was regretted by King David. His regret was translated materially in the form of compensation. Oaths and treaties should be respected, and if they are broken that is a crime to be assessed and for which payment is due.

The other two parts of the Jewish bible, the Prophets and the Writings, really emphasize the significance of peace. Justice and peace come to represent God's plan for his world (Isa. 2.1-4, 11.6, 45.7; Job 25.2; Micah 4.1-5, Pss.96, 98). The Book of Amos is very critical of war and it has often been pointed out that this is a repetition of Jacob's critique of Simeon and Levi (Gen.49.5-7) when they used violence against Shechem (Gen. 34.30). Peace becomes the ideal state towards which history is marching; the implements of war will be converted into tools of peace. Even King David, who is often represented as the paradigm of royalty, is condemned for his involvement in violence (1Chron. 22.8)

This is not to say that there is anything pacifist about the Jewish tradition. War is acceptable if it is obligatory, permissible or carried out in self-defense, especially when used to frustrate someone who is intent on causing one harm, a *rodef* or pursuer. On the other hand, one is not permitted to kill the pursuer once his act is over in order to punish him, he may only be killed to prevent more violent actions on his part. Force must be proportional, and no innocent third party

should be killed, even were this to be part of a policy of saving life in general. As one might imagine, these rules have been cited recently in criticism of the legal basis of actions of the IDF. Even in Deut. 20.10 we are told that when besieging a city you should start by calling for peace, and only if that is rejected can the siege start. Once the siege is underway the civilian inhabitants should be given the opportunity to leave, and this applies even to the soldiers. Once this offer is rejected then the civilians need no longer to be seen as civilians because they have decided to stay and be part of the resistance to the siege. If they are then killed, provided that there is no primary intention to kill them, this is legally acceptable. This has been much cited recently in the accounts of what follows from the IDF's blockade of Palestinian cities. On the other hand, both Maimonides and Nahmanides argue that behind all the rules is a blanket ban on cruelty to the enemy, and it has been argued that the treatment of the civilian population is liable to increase their suffering. On the other hand, the IDF says that they are acting on the basis that peace was first offered to the other side, and was rejected. Civilians were given the opportunity to leave the area of fighting and were not intentionally targeted. The IDF would also point out that since the start of the Al-Aqsa intifada less than 3% of the Palestinian casualties are women, whereas almost 30% of the Jewish casualties are female.

According to *Leviticus Rabbah* 9.9 "Great is peace, for all blessings are contained in it... God's name is peace" and "The whole Torah was given for the sake of peace, and it is said, 'all her paths are peace' [Prov. 3.17]" (Gittin 59b) and Numbers *Rabbah* 19.27 "it is written 'Seek peace and pursue it' (Ps. 34.15). The Law does not command you to run after or pursue the other commandments, but to fulfil them on the right occasions." By contrast, peace has to be pursued on every occasion and in every place. As the wife of Rabbi Meir

pointed out, we should not pray for the death of sinners but of their sins. Beruria (*Berakhot* 10a) refers to the end of the verse in Ps. 104.35 where it says 'and let the wicked be no more' and suggests that once they repent they will no longer be wicked. Rabbi Meir then prays for their repentance and they repented, and he goes on to refer to stories about Aaron, who is famous in Jewish tradition for his love of peace. Aaron is supposed to have been pleasant to evil people and intimidated them as a result, leading them to improve their behavior. As Hillel recommends, "Be of the disciples of Aaron, loving peace and pursuing peace" (*Pirkei Avot* 1.12). There is another passage in *Genesis Rabbah* 76.2 where the phrase 'Then Jacob was greatly afraid and distressed' is considered, where it is asked why there is this repetition, since is not fear and distress the same? The explanation is that he was afraid that he would be killed, and distressed that he would kill Esau. It is also worth pointing out that some of the most important prayers in the repertoire such as the Amidah, the kaddish, the grace after meals, and the priestly blessing (in some synagogues terminating the service) all conclude with an invocation of peace.

The word in Hebrew for war, *milhamah*, is actually related to the word for bread, *lehem*, and it is sometimes suggested that there is a connection between (lack of) bread and violence. In *Pirkei Avot* it says that " The sword comes into the world because of justice delayed, justice perverted and because of those who render wrong decisions" (5.11). And there is also "Not by might nor by power but by my spirit says the Lord" (Zech. 4.6). This is part of the Shabat Hanukah haftorah, and suggests that the military victory of the Maccabees is not what is important about the festival. On the other hand, this passage should not be taken to be obviously critical of violence. It could mean that might and power are

not sufficient conditions of success, only God fulfills that category, but they could still be necessary conditions, and as such essential. Indeed, it could be that power would only be successful if the divine spirit motivates it. This verse should not be taken to have only a pacifist interpretation.

That brings us to the leading difficulty with describing *the* Jewish position on peace, because there is no such animal in the theological menagerie. There are positions, not just one position. Before the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated there was a lively correspondence in some circles as to whether he should be regarded as a rodef or aggressor given his peace agreements with the Arabs. As we know a *rodef* is an acceptable target, or may even be a target one is obligated to attack. This is not *the* Jewish view, although it was undoubtedly *a* Jewish view. In the contemporary politics of the Middle East some Israelis regard the actions of the IDF as perfectly proper, as satisfying the rules of dealing with an enemy. Peace was offered and rejected, civilians are not targeted directly, people have the opportunity to leave cities when there is heavy fighting, and the overall motivation of the soldiers is to pursue justice. The Arabs are intent on destroying the Jewish state and individual Jews, and they have the status of aggressors and Jews are entitled, indeed obligated to resist them.

Others would find this legal analysis misleading. The peace that was offered was not a just peace, since it involved a Palestinian state that would always be at the mercy of a more powerful Israeli entity. Although the Israelis claim not to target civilians, they are prepared to target combatants with reckless regard for civilian life. It is not true that civilians can escape from a siege, in fact the main Palestinian cities are often equivalent to prisons. Finally, the ban against a besieging army destroying fruit trees, because these represent the continuity of economic life for the local population, has been vio-

lated by the destruction of the local economy by the Israelis, both directly and indirectly. So it cannot really be argued that their actions are in accordance with the halakhikc principles of conflict. The sort of peace that Israel has in mind is one where their enemy is totally overwhelmed and humiliated, and this does not accord with the respect that Jewish law applies to the enemy during war.

Which is the Jewish view? It has to be said, neither and both, and a vast variety of other views can also be justified legally. That is how religious law works, it is flexible enough to interpret a situation in various ways, and so in court the prosecution and the defense both have room to argue. There is a well-known story about a rabbi being visited by a man and his wife. The man tells the rabbi about the terrible things that his wife did, and the rabbi nodded his head and agreed with him. Then the wife told the rabbi a totally contrary story about how she had done none of those things, and the rabbi agreed with her. The husband became exasperated and said to the rabbi 'But we cannot both be right!'. The rabbi replied by saying 'You're right too'. This brings out what might be called a highly realistic attitude to peace in Judaism. There are plenty of wars in the bible, and the rules of war are pretty pragmatic. The whole basis to God's support for Israel is the latter's observation of the covenant, the obedience to God's commandments. Once the Israelites abandon these rules, disaster follows, as the end of Deuteronomy predicts. But the covenant persists, so that if the Jewish people return to their previous state of good behavior, God will restore them to their land.

This brings in what might be called the more metaphysical aspects of peace, what it is about peace that makes it so desirable. The Hebrew term is closely linked with the term for completeness and wholeness, and there is the idea that a state of peace is valuable because it brings about a state of

affairs in which one is fully oneself, as it were. The descriptions of the messianic age must have seemed delightful to communities of Jews who were suffering greatly at the hands of hostile countries in which they were such unwelcome inhabitants. On the other hand, the desire for a messiah often led to mistaken enthusiasms bringing about yet more disasters. This inspired Maimonides to argue that the messianic age would be little different from an ordinary state of affairs, with the sole difference that the Jewish people would once more be living in their own land. As against this, some commentators such as Isaac Abravanel interpreted the messianic age as an entirely different form of life as compared with the present state of affairs. It is not just a matter of a Jewish state, but a reevaluation of life, as we know it, and a change in the whole nature of international relations. Interestingly, that debate has brought about a linked debate in Zionist philosophy over the nature of the State of Israel. Some follow Maimonides and say that what is important about it is that it is a Jewish state, and it does not have any function apart from that (although Maimonides would no doubt insist on messianic intervention to bring it about in the first place, he would probably argue that the Zionists had jumped the gun). Others would argue that the State of Israel can never be just another state among many others, it has to be a light to the nations and can only survive if it is the precursor to a new way of living both internally and externally.

Another thinker who argues like Abravanel that the peace of the messianic age must prefigure an entirely different form of human life and action is Levinas. Violence is the negation of action, according to Levinas, because it suspends morality and alienates human beings from each other. As a result what we often see as being a period of frantic action is in fact its reverse, since what is done bears no relation to what we are, how we could be and the basis in our nature to

bring about significant and positive change in the world. He focuses on the way in which violence destroys us not so much physically as morally, and since morality is the whole context within which we are who we are, the absence of peace defines us as incapable of living authentic lives. Levinas could not be further from the cynicism of Ambrose Bierce's definition of peace in 'The Devil's Dictionary' as 'In international affairs, a period of cheating between two periods of fighting'. Peace is not a matter of cease-fires and temporary agreements, nor is it the absence of conflict because of the mutual threat of force. This is not peace, this is the (temporary) cessation of violence, and it brings with it the inability of human beings to live the lives they should be experiencing. Only in a radically different future can we genuinely experience peace, and whatever forms that future takes, it must be very different from our present. As with Abravanel he sees real peace as not a continuation of the sort of life to which we have become accustomed, only a bit better. It is an entirely different sort of life altogether.

Maimonides is not convinced of this. He agrees that peace has a defining relationship to the way in which we live our lives. Maimonides comments on the story of the four Jewish sages who entered Paradise (Hagigah 2.3-4), where only Rabbi Akiva emerged unscathed. According to Maimonides, Akiva entered, but was not really affected by what he saw there, since his soul was already so calm, as a result of his having reached the heights of moral and intellectual enlightenment. Similar accounts are provided by the kabbalists of Abraham entering Egypt (seen as a demonic realm) and Noah living safely through the Flood. Maimonides also refers to Moses' death being equivalent to a kiss, in that the distance between his life and his death was as slight as a kiss and the transition was as easy. These individuals were all at peace, and as such they found it easy to survive any difficulties in which

they might find themselves. It is important to note, though, that their state of being at peace was founded on a solid basis of knowledge and virtuous behavior. This was not just an attitude or mental state that they managed to adopt, it came about as a result of their having achieved a balance in their lives by orienting themselves appropriately with respect to the nature of reality. This, as we shall see, is very much a theme in Jewish accounts of peace. Peace by itself is not of great significance, it has to be linked with other aims. This comes out in the story of the four sages entering Paradise; they all had different experiences because they had each achieved different levels of understanding and perfection. Akiva who had really perfected himself was able to enter in peace and leave in peace, and the impression one gets is that it is only possible to leave in peace if one can enter in peace. Of the other sages, one died, one became a heretic and one went mad!

Let us concentrate here on the nature of life in a state of peace. Would it not be very boring? One of the features of many of the novels and films about utopian life is that it often comes over as tedious, in that life no longer has much flavor if it is entirely safe and regulated, and if ordinary antagonisms are dissipated. Of course, it might be preferable to live a peaceful and risk-free life to a bellicose and dangerous life, but the advocates of peace do not argue that this is a better state of affairs than its contrary. They argue that this is the perfect state of affairs where we live a complete and wholesome life, where we become who we really are, as it were. They could argue that perhaps we should get used to a level of boredom, that this is natural, and a small price to pay for safety. Yet it is difficult to think of oneself being charged a price at all during the messianic age, and if a charge was to arise then in what respects is the age messianic at all?

Maimonides' account of the messianic age has the advantage of being about a society that we can all recognize,

since it is so much like our society. The laws of nature are all the same, the laws of religion remain the same also, and all that has changed is that the Jews have returned to their country. The peace that would eventuate is then a peace that we can understand, since it is precisely the same sort of peace with which we are currently familiar. It is coming home from a hard day at work and relaxing in front of the fire or TV, it is looking forward to the annual vacation, it is the quiet in the evening when the children are in bed and the road outside is not busy for a while. The sort of perfect peace that Abravanel advocates is difficult to understand and make agreeable. It involves such a radical change in human nature and the corresponding practice of politics that we do not really know what it would mean. More importantly, would it leave enough of the trials and excitement of everyday life to make the resulting respite desirable? We often say that it would be wonderful if people stopped fighting and cooperated totally. There is a Hebrew song with the lines 'Wouldn't it be pleasant if everyone acted as though they were brothers?' Of course, brothers do not make a particularly good account of themselves in the Bible, one thinks of Jacob and Esau, of Joseph and his brothers, of Cain and Abel (the first brothers), even of the later relationships between the descendents of Ishmael and Isaac. But putting this to one side, suppose that love and harmony characterized human relations at every stage. Would this be desirable as part of a state of total peace? It might well be better than a state of nature in which everyone was violently opposed to everyone else, and yet the opposite of that state is not necessarily an environment in which everyone loves everyone else. A bit of antagonism in public and private life, like a pinch of salt in one's food, often adds spice and flavor to human affairs.

This suggests that as so often Maimonides has a more appropriate grasp of the topic than many of his critics. The

idea that the messianic age is going to be rather similar to our age does reflect what might be regarded as the realism of Judaism. Maimonides is particularly clear on a criterion for a false messiah as being someone who advocates even a tiny change in halakhah, Jewish law. Halakhah will persist in its present form in the messianic period since the basis of relationships between human beings, and between God and us, will remain the same. So peace in the messianic period will maintain its connections with states of affairs that are conflictual, and preserve its status as being a contrast with those states. The sort of wholeness involved in peace is not then a total state of perfect wholeness, this presumably is not attainable in ordinary human society, but will always be partial and imperfect. But its imperfection is what makes it have the characteristics it does have, and so we have to see peace as really having a relative rather than absolute status.

Like many religions, Judaism places a lot of emphasis on distinctions, distinctions between the sacred and the profane, between the Sabbath and the rest of the week, between the Jew and the Gentile, and between peace and conflict. What is interesting about distinctions like this is that each polarity relies on the other to work. That is, if there are no ordinary days of the week, then there is no Sabbath. The whole point of the Sabbath is to contrast with the other days of the week. Even the study of the Torah itself is not supposed to be the exclusive activity of those who wish to live a worthwhile life, they are encouraged to combine that study with earning one's living through ordinary activities. The study of Torah should be *lishmah*, done for its own sake, and not carried out in order to earn money or a living. Why is this? Surely if the Torah is such an important source of information and spiritual guidance Jews would be best advised to spend all their time concentrating on it. What could be more important that studying it, and why should one do anything else? Studying the Torah

is of course important, but it is not all-important. If one studies it to the exclusion of everything else one will not really understand it, because one needs to understand the world that it describes in order to appreciate it fully. To understand that world one has to participate in its daily activities, one has to involve oneself in what ordinarily takes place in that world.

One might say the same sort of thing about peace. Peace is important, but it is not all-important. There are other significant aims of human activity apart from peace, and one would not be able to understand or appreciate peace if that is the only guiding principle of one's life. A state of perfect peace would not be agreeable unless it contrasted with periods of conflict, just as the Sabbath would lose its flavor unless it contrasted with ordinary days of the week. So while Judaism values peace, it adopts a realistic attitude to its implementation and to its role in the notion of the worthwhile life. There are certainly claims that look ambitious. For example, in the Talmud *Perek Hashalom*, we are told, 'Great is peace, for God is called peace (Judges 6.24). The Messiah is called peace (Isa.9.5). Israel is called peace' (Zech. 8.12). But we are also told: 'The world rests on three things; on justice, on truth, and on peace '(Pirkei Avot 1.12). Notice the links between these three concepts. Peace without justice and truth is not worth having; hence the three principles are conjoined. It is this trend of realism that runs throughout much of the thinking in Judaism about peace, and it is a trend that we should bear in mind when trying to understand the various claims that are made on this topic. Like other religions Judaism values peace, but it does not value peace exclusively and it connects the value of peace with other important values. When we discuss the views of a religion on peace surely this is the way forward, to forego the lofty sentiments and empty phrases and instead to concentrate on linking peace with

other human goals. Only in that way will our thinking on the topic have real content.

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Peace and War in St. Thomas Aquinas

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The reflections offered in this essay were first presented in briefer form under the assigned title "War and Peace: On Aquinas" at the International Conference on Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Fordham University, Lincoln Center, 31 October-2 November. Further meditation called for a revised title: "Peace and War in St. Thomas Aquinas." To be sure, it would have been attractive to preserve a literary echo of Tolstoy's great book *War and Peace,* but to do so would put the primary accent in the wrong spot.[1] Accordingly, I

[1] In volumes 2 and 3 of the 54-volume set *Great Books of the Western World*, (Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, 1952), we find a massive index entitled *The Great Ideas: A Syntopicon*, edited by Mortimer J. Adler, comprising 102 chapters, each devoted to an alphabetically ordered Great Idea. Chapter 98 is entitled "War and Peace." It begins with an essay surveying various landmark treatments of the issue, provides an outline of topics under eleven main headings, which are then subdivided into as many as seven subheadings. Then References to specific passages from the authors represented over the centuries are keyed to these headings and subheadings, giving volume, page and quadrant references to specific passages by the various authors on the same topic or subtopic, followed by Cross-References to related issues under the other 101 topic headings. Additional readings are suggested under two headings: authors represented in the collection, and authors not represented in the collection. Some famous and important authors are not considered, because they do not fall within the scope of the collection; *The Art of War* by the great Chinese thinker Sun Tzu, for example, falls outside the "Western" World and is nowhere to be found in vol. 3, p. 1037. In an age of what is called "globalization," however, must we all start from scratch, as though no one before us has ever had anything worthwhile to say? Is there to be some

shall present this treatment under three main headings. I should like first of all to point to the primacy of peace in the thought both of Aquinas and even of his great pagan predecessor Aristotle (*Commentary on Aristotle's Ethics*, Book X, Lectio 11). Then I should like to examine a few texts from the *Summa Theologiae*, where Aquinas offers his only *ex professo* treatment of war (ST II-II, q. 40) and to re-contextualize the essential elements of that teaching within the setting of the primacy of peace (ST II-II, q. 29); hence the second main heading deals with peace, and the third and final heading, with war. I should like to show that though peace has a sort of primacy in Aquinas, this primacy does not make him into a

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"clash of civilizations" or might there be other, more satisfactory options, perhaps "dialogue amongst civilizations"?

In the essay that follows I am under no illusion that war is impossible. I would, however, suggest that a respectable fraction of what is spent on security systems, weaponry, etc., might be much more fruitfully invested elsewhere. I recall hearing as an undergraduate student at St. John's College in Annapolis that if what it cost for a single Vietnam-era fighter-bomber had been added to the College endowment then, every one of its three hundred or so students would have had a full scholarship ever since. Looking back over what has been gained and lost over the past century, I wonder again whether it might not be worth investing in goods of the soul today.

I am convinced, however, that a small contribution from a great Western thinker may encourage others to join the conversation, and perhaps some truth may be heard. The current situation in the West seems perverse: everyone has the right to speak, but no one seems to have the right to be heard or listened to. Could this situation have arisen because we have forgotten that one of the most important functions of speaking is to communicate the truth? I sometimes wonder whether the truth is more likely to show up in a conversation than in a declamation, precisely because the parties to a conversation are talking *with* each other than *at* each other. In this essay, I have attempted particularly to provide entry-points for the educated public to gain access to this important field and have therefore included some carefully selected references to scholars who can provide a useful introduction to the beginner.

pacifist, and to call attention to some of the more recent scholarly literature addressing the place of Aquinas in the just-war tradition.

As a preliminary remark, let me note that this presentation immediately followed a discussion of another paper in which the Muslim notion of *jihād* was mentioned. Occasionally Muslims are presented as though they were merely warriors and Christians as though they were merely bearers of peace. Real life is usually more complicated.[2] For the moment, I should be satisfied to dispel such oversimplifications. It might be a good idea to read the *Encyclopedia of Islam* article on *jihād* or more generally *ḥarb* and related notions and to compare and contrast that notion with "the good fight" (*ho kalos agōn*) fought by the Apostle St. Paul (2 Tim. 4, 7).[3]

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[2] See, for example, *Chronicles of the Crusades: Eye-witness accounts of the wars between Christianity and Islam*, edited by Elizabeth Hallam (New York: Welcome Rain, 2000), pp. 22-25: By al-Maqrizi's account, the hitherto peaceful interactions between Christians and Muslims in Palestine were ruptured in 1009 when Al-Hakim, the Caliph of Egypt, began a bizarre series of persecutions of Christians and Jews starting with the destruction of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem and ending with the Caliph's being assassinated by a Muslim. Whether the dryness of Al-Hakim's brain or some other accident provoked his capricious behavior, the objective injustice of it made its victims very angry and they called for and received help from outside. This does not, however, mean that outsiders could always well distinguish between their strange-looking co-religionists and the equally strange-looking non-co-religionists, or that the outsiders might also have had agenda of their own.

[3] "I have fought the good fight, I have finished the race, I have kept the faith" (2 Tim. 4, 7 RSV) uses the notions of fighting and racing figuratively. The English index to Johannes P. Louw and Eugene A. Nida, *Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament Based on Semantic Domains*, 2nd ed., (New York: United Bible Societies, 1989), vol. 2, p. 290 relates "fight/ing" to **39**.23-32 (under Hostility, Strife) and **55**.2-6 (under

It would be stupid to pretend that discussions of the "semantics" or "meanings" of such terms makes no difference to how people actually behave toward each other. If there were as many meanings and concepts of "war" as there are people, why bother to have a common word? For if there were no discernible distinction between a soldier and a pacifist, then all wars would be equally praiseworthy or blameworthy, and rational resolution of disagreements would be in principle impossible. On the other hand, if there were only one concept of "war," how could we explain the fact that people argue about it? Thus, it would be as naïve to assert a single univocal concept of "war" or "peace" as it would of Aristotle's classical example of "healthy."

The Normative Primacy of Peace over War

Let us start with the simpler example of what is called "healthy." We might call this year's Mr. Universe healthy, say that he has a healthy urine sample, and also say that apple juice is healthy. Though the word "healthy" is the same in all three instances, the animal body, the urine sample, and the juice are not simply interchangeable. Apple juice, for example, is a beverage that can contribute to the health of an animal body; urine, however, is called healthy not as a cause but as a sign of health in the animal body. Aristotle suggests that the primary place to look for healthy things is in animal bodies; the urine and the apple juice are called healthy secondarily, by relation to the animal bodies, as sign and as cause, respectively.[4] In the medical arena, a competent physician can sort out the differences between healthy and unhealthy bodies,

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Military Activities) and "race (competition)" to 50.4,5 (under Contests and Play).

[4] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Γ 2 (1003a33); Thomas Aquinas, *In Metaphys.* IV, lect. 1 (ed. Cathala-Spiazzi, nn.535-543).

beverages, and secretions, between the orderly and the disorderly, between the normal and the abnormal.

In the political setting, by way of analogy, a competent statesman should be able not only to distinguish or diagnose political order and disorder,[5] but also, like the physician, should be able to do something to restore, preserve or advance the right order of the regime and to recognize when action or intervention would do no good. Political order, then, is achieved through human action and indeed through human interaction; it does not arise spontaneously as a growth of nature; it is not a mere product of human thought, like a speech or a concept; it is not even an exterior artifact, like a house standing independently of its builder. These four orders are geared to human reason: a moral order, a natural

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[5] Aristotle's critiques Socrates's teaching about political unity as described in Plato's *Republic* (IV, 423E, V, 457C, 462B, by pointing out that a city does not have the intense numerical unity that Socrates ascribes to it, as though the city were some single substance like the man called Socrates; indeed too much unity would destroy a city, which cannot exist as a city without a variety of parts. (*Politics*, II, 2, 1261b6-10). Of the four types of unity that Aristotle discusses elsewhere (*Metaphysics* Δ, 6, 1015b16-1017a6), then, the city would seem to have not the unity of a substance, nor that of species, or genus, but merely that of a relation. Accordingly, Aristotle's city cannot be regarded as a Hobbesian *Leviathan*, where the human individuals are merely replaceable or interchangeable cells of the one political substance, the State. In his introductory remarks in his *Commentary on Aristotle's Ethics*, Aquinas underscores this pluralistic dimension of Aristotelian politics (Book I, Lect. 1, ed. Spiazzi n. 5): "One should note, however, that the 'whole' which a political group or a household family constitutes, has *merely a unity of order*, i.e. a unity according to which something does not count as one without qualification" ("Sciendum est autem, quod hoc totum, quod est civilis multitudo, vel domestica familia, habet *solam unitatem ordinis*, secundum quam non est aliquid simpliciter unum").

order, a logical order, and a technical or productive order.[6] There is thus something normative or determinative about rational activity.

Even failure is conceivable only in reference to a goal: why even attempt to treat 'birth defects' if there is nothing normal against which we could judge some congenital condition to fall short of?[7] Thus, Aristotle boldly begins his *Nicomachean Ethics* with the assertion: "Every art and every teaching, and likewise both action and choice seem to aim at some good."[8] Initially, Aristotle sketches out what the ultimate target of human striving seems to be: we all want to be happy. Whatever that might be, being happy seems to be a good reason for doing something. On the other hand, happiness does not seem to count as a means to other goods; other goods are always chosen for the sake of happiness. I am not happy so that I may brush my teeth, but the other way around. Indeed, Aristotle even gets around to offering a preliminary definition of happiness in terms of its genus and specific difference: Happiness, generically, is an activity of a human being. More specifically, there are two features distinguishing happiness from other human activities. First, happiness is rooted in the very principle of human life, the special sort of soul that makes a life a human life, the rational soul. This means that happiness involves the use of human reason or at least cannot be achieved apart from the use of our reasoning. Not just any use of reason will do: reason must be

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[6] Aquinas distinguishes the worlds of moral, natural, logical, and productive order to contextualize ethics, economics, and politics within the moral order (*In Ethic.*, I, Lect. 1, ed. Spiazzi n. 1-6).

[7] For a survey of some of the problems leading to an assertion, a denial, or a neglect of a 'what for' dimension in reality, see *Final Causality in Nature and Human Affairs*, edited by Richard F. Hassing. Catholic University of America Press, 1997.

[8] Aristotle, EN, I, 1 (1094a1-2).

used well, and so the use of reason must be measured according to its goodness. If there is just one measure of goodness, this virtue will specify what happiness is; if more than one, then the best of the virtues will give us the primary meaning of happiness. Second, continuity and perpetuity "as much as possible" will also be required. Thus, Aquinas concludes, "happiness is a human being's proper activity with respect to virtue in a perfect life."[9]

If this is so, Aquinas can quite reasonably take the central body mass of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (from the end of Book I and all of Books II through IX) to be dealing with the virtues, which are the means to happiness. In Book X, however, Aristotle returns to the issue of happiness in order to determine which sort of virtue is highest or most determinative or most characteristic of human activity. And it is in exactly this context that Aristotle introduces the example of war and peace to point to ultimate human felicity:

> And happiness is thought to depend on leisure; for we are busy that we may have leisure, and make war that we may live in peace. Now the activity of the practical virtues is exhibited in political or military affairs, but the actions concerned with these seem to be unleisurely. Warlike actions are completely so (for no one chooses to be at war, to provokes war, for the sake of being at war; any one would seem absolutely murderous if he were to make enemies of his friends in order to bring about battle and slaughter); but the action of the statesman is also unleisurely, and ... aims at... a happiness different from political action, and evidently sought as being different. So if among virtuous actions political and military actions are ... unleisurely and aim at an end and are not desirable for their own sake, but the activity of reason, which is contemplative, seems

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[9] Aristotle, EN, I, 6 (1097b21-1098a21); cf. Aquinas, *In Eth.*, I, lect. 10, ed. Spiazzi nn. 118-130

> both to be superior in serious worth and to aim at no end beyond itself, and to have its pleasure proper to itself..., and the self-sufficiency, leisureliness, unweariedness..., and all the other attributes ascribed to the supremely happy man are evidently those connected with this activity, it follows that this will be the complete happiness of man, if it be allowed a complete term of life....[10]

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[10] Aristotle, EN X, 7 (1177b4-25; Oxford translation); cf. Aquinas, *In Eth.*, X, lect. 11. There is a valuable essay by Josef Pieper explicating this notion of leisure (Greek, *scholē*; Latin, *otium*, but here rendered *vacatio*). The point of the essay, namely that a happy life is a sort of holiday or, more precisely, a holy-day, is somehow blunted in the American English title *Leisure, the Basis of Culture*; the original German title *Muße und Kult* i.e. *Leisure and Worship* does not lend itself to be thought of in quite so utilitarian a fashion.

Perhaps the point can be resharpened by way of the anecdote of an Oxford undergraduate accosted by a cranky old woman during World War I: "Young man, why aren't you out in the trenches fighting for civilization?" "Madam," he answered, "I *am* civilization." This says nothing against those in the trenches, but makes very clear the essential order of ends and means: wars are sometimes necessary as a means to establishing peace.

When ends and means are inverted, however, or "transvalued," things may develop in other ways. Consider for example Friedrich Nietzsche's aphorism 793 from *The Will to Power*: "*My 'future'*:--a rigorous polytechic education. Military service; so that, on an average, every man of the higher classes would be an officer, whatever else he might be" (tr. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdate; New York: Random House 1967). It might be instructive to compare Nietzsche's observations about European militarism after the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 with those in the *Postulatum* proposed to Vatican Council I and with the American President Dwight D. Eisenhower's remarks on "the military-industrial complex" almost a century later. Wars do not occur in a vacuum.

At an anecdotal level, the point can be made in another way. In 1976 the author of this essay fell into conversation with an Iranian in Tehran who refused to believe that I could be an American, even when I showed him my U. S. passport. He insisted I was British or Canadian. Pressed to explain this assertion of his, my friend said: "You don't work

Accordingly, Thomas Aquinas can follow out Aristotle's analogy—unleisurely activity is to leisurely activity as war is to peace, or as imperfect life is to perfect life.

Aquinas on Peace (ST II-II, q. 29)

Having taken this clue from Aquinas's *Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics* of Aristotle, let us consider how he deals

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for the Air Force. You don't work for Bell Helicopter. And you are interested in our culture." The absence of an American equivalent of the scholarly Franco-Iranian Institute library in Tehran suggests that Americans in general do not know how to project "soft power." Interestingly, the scholarship under which I was then working was an Iranian, not an American initiative.

This incapacity to project "soft power" seems to be structural and not dependent upon which political party is in power. A generation later in January 2004, when I asked one of the speakers at a State Department-funded seminar on teaching about Islam and Middle Eastern culture how future more successful cultural and educational exchanges might be fostered, my Jordanian informant said, "You'd need different criteria for the selection of your ambassadors and cultural attachés." When the U. S. Ambassador was asked about a profile of his daily priorities, he mentioned the current war in Iraq and assisting business deals; apparently cultural contact and exchanges are not even on the daily priority list.

A final observation about the tensions in this area: on the one hand, the U. S. Agency for International Development has provided funding for work in archaeological excavation, preservation, and presentation of important cultural sites in Jordan, so as to encourage tourism. On the other hand, during my visit, which included three resort hotels, I was struck by the absence of American tourists, even while there was a marketing exhibit by an American automobile company. I felt entirely at home in Jordan throughout the three-week seminar, even when going off on my own with very limited oral Arabic, to travel by taxi. If anything, deeper and more permanent personal solidarity between Americans and the various peoples of the Middle East seems to me an extremely important desideratum, and, like it or not, such openness does involve some vulnerability on both sides.

with the notion of peace in his *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 29. The question on peace is divided into four articles: (1) Is peace the same as concord?[11] (2) Do all things desire peace?[12] (3) Is peace an effect of charity?[13] (4) Is peace a virtue?[14]

(1) According to Aquinas, peace includes the notion of concord in its definition and something else besides. Hence, wherever there is peace, concord is present as well; but it is not conversely true that wherever there is concord, there is peace. The reason for this is that concord, properly speaking, is relational, i.e. directed to the other fellow, inasmuch as the wills of two diverse hearts converge on one point of consent or agreement.[15] It also happens that the heart of one human being can tend to go off in various divergent directions. This divergence occurs in two ways. First, the one heart can be moved with respect to diverse appetitive powers; thus, the sense appetite often tends to go against the rational appetite. "The flesh lusts against the spirit" (*Galat.* 5, 17), as St. Paul puts it. The second sort of divergence arises to the extent that one and the same appetitive power has tendencies to divergent objects of appetition that cannot be achieved simultaneously. (Here one is reminded of the Roman proverb: He who chases two rabbits catches neither.) Hence there must arise a

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[11] There is a parallel passage in Aquinas's early work on Peter Lombard's collection of *Sentences*, Book 3, Distinction 27, question 2, article 1, reply to the 6th objection (*Sent.* 3, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1 ad 6).

[12] Parallel passages at *Sent.*, 4, d. 49, q. 1, a. 2, quaestiuncula 4; *De Ver.*, q. 22, a. 1, ad 12; *De div. nom.*, c. 11, lect. 3.

[13] Parallel passages in ST I-II, q. 70, a. 3 and opusculum IV *De duobus Praec.*, on the two Great Commandments.

[14] I have not found a parallel passage.

[15] The Latin word *concordia* is derived from the neuter noun *cor, cordis*, meaning 'heart'; the prefix *'cum'* or *'con'* connotes accompaniment or 'with-ness', which clearly implies some sort of relation.

struggle back and forth between the motions of the appetites. The union of these motions of the appetite does have something of the character of peace; for a human being does not have his heart fully at peace so long as he does not have what he wants: and if if he does have something that he wants, there nevertheless still remains something for him to want which he cannot have at the same time. This sort of union, however, does not have the character of concord. Concord, then, involves a union of the appetites of various parties each with an appetite of its own; but peace, over and above this union, also involves a union among the appetites of the appetitive agent in his or her own unity.[16]

Thus, there are two sorts of union, the union of one person with another, and the union within one person just by himself. Commenting on Augustine's saying that "Peace amongst human beings is an ordered concord,"[17] Aquinas explains that Augustine is talking about the peace that obtains between one man in relation to another. Augustine calls this peace a concord, not just any concord, but an ordered concord (*ordinata concordia*), because one of them concords with the other with respect to what is agreeable to them both. If it is not agreeable to them both, i.e. if the one man concords with the other not by his own free will, but as it were compelled by fear of some evil threatening him, such a concord is not true peace, since the order of each of the two agents of concord is not preserved, but is disturbed by the one provoking the fear. This is why he first states, "peace is the tranquility of order." This tranquility consists in all of the

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[16] ST II-II, q. 29, a. 1, c.

[17] *De civit. Dei*, 19, c. 13 (PL 41, 640).

appetitive motions in one human being coming to rest together.[18]

(2) Do all things have an appetite for peace? Four possible exceptions are advanced: things that are devoid of knowledge, contraries, an evil peace, and the things of this world. On the other hand, both Augustine[19] and pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite,[20] stand as theological authorities saying that all things crave peace. Aquinas claims that it follows from the very fact a human being craves something that he craves the achievement of his desire and consequently also the removal of things that might impede his attaining what he desires. The attainment of a good that one desires can be blocked by a contrary appetite, either of the desirer himself or of someone else, and each of these, as we have seen in the previous article, is eliminated through peace. So every craver must necessarily crave peace, at least to the extent that everyone who craves anything also yearns to arrive at what he craves and to do so with tranquility and without let or hindrance. This is exactly what the notion of peace, as defined by Augustine, consists in: the tranquility of order.[21]

Accordingly, the first putative exception, namely things that lack knowledge, are not really an exception at all. For peace involves a union not only of the intellectual, rational or animal appetite at which there can be shared feeling, but also the natural appetite. This is why Dionysisus says that peace activates both shared feeling and the shared nature that un-

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[18] ST II-II, q. 29, a. 1, ad 1. This Augustinian definition of peace is the theme of a whole book by George Weigel, *Tranquillitas Ordinis: The Present Failure and Future Promise of American Catholic Thought on War and Peace* (Oxford, 1987).

[19] *De civit. Dei*, 19, c. 12 (PL 41, 640).

[20] *De div. nom.*, c. 11, §1 (PG 3, 948).

[21] ST II-II, q. 29, a. 2, c.

dergirds the shared feeling,[22] so that the expression "shared feeling" (*consensus*) contains the notion of a union of the appetites that proceed from knowledge, whereas "shared nature" (*connaturalitas*) carries the idea of a union of natural appetites.[23]

As to contraries, it might seem that not all people desire peace, since a craving is not directed to opposites at the same time and there are many who crave wars and dissensions. To this second objection, Aquinas says that even those that seek wars and dissensions desire precisely the peace that they think they do not have. The justification for this claim is that, as has already been said, there is no real peace if anyone forms an agreement with another person contrary to that which he wants even more. This is why human beings seek to break this sort of agreement by waging war, on the ground that the agreement in question is deficient in peace, so that they go on toward a peace in which there is nothing repugnant to their will. Hence all those who are engaged in war seek through their wars to arrive at a more perfect peace than the one they had before.[24]

Some have brought forward the notion of an evil peace. They would argue that only the good is worth desiring. Since, however, Christ said "I have not come to send peace" (Matt., 10, 34), some sorts of peace are bad.[25] Hence not all things crave for peace. Here Aquinas responds that peace consists in a quieting and union of the appetite. Now just as there can be a desire for what is good without qualification or for some

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[22] *De div. nom.*, c. 11, §1 (PG 3, 948): "pax est operativa et consensus et connaturalitatis."

[23] ST II-II, q. 29, a. 2, ad 1.

[24] ST II-II, q. 29, a. 2, ad 2.

[25] ST II-II, q. 29, a. 2, obj. 3: "Sed quaedam pax videtur esse mala." It is worth asking whether Aquinas would deny this claim by the objector.

apparent good, so too there can be both true and apparent peace. True peace can be present only regarding a desire for the true good; the reason for this is that everything evil--even if it should appear good in some respect, whereby it partially quiets the appetite--nevertheless has many defects, from which the appetite remains restless and disturbed. Hence true peace can exist only in good objects and belongs to those that are good. The peace belonging to those who are evil, on the other hand, is an apparent, not a real peace.[26] Thus, Scripture says, "Those living in the great war of unknowing call so many great evils 'peace'" (Wisd., 14, 22).[27]

The last putative exception to the claim that all things desire peace distinguishes between a this-worldly peace and an otherworldly peace. That which all things desire is the highest good, which is the ultimate end. Since, however, our Lord commanded his followers to "have peace amongst yourselves," he could not have been talking about the real, otherworldly peace, but about the sort we can enjoy in this life, which, it would seem, not everything aims at. Aquinas's responds to this as follows: Since true peace is concerned only with the good, it follows that just as the true good can be had in two ways (viz., perfectly and imperfectly), so too there are two sorts of true peace. One sort is perfect, and this consists

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[26] ST II-II, q. 29, a. 2, ad 3: "Pax autem quae malorum est est pax apparens et non vera." It would appear that Aquinas does not reject the objector's claim; indeed, he seems to feel obliged to explain the fact that we can sometimes be fooled by what looks like peace, but in fact is not. See James Turner Johnson, "The Broken Tradition," *The National Interest*, Fall 1996, pp. 27-36. Johnson reasserts the claims of the just-war tradition against more recent Catholic moral teaching that starts from a "presumption against war," which he traces back to the *Postulatum* presented to Vatican Council I; in that article, however, he does not address the structural problem of militarism or of economic interests vested principally or excessively in products for military use.

[27] ST II-II, q. 29, a. 2, ad 3.

in a perfect enjoyment of the highest good, an enjoyment through which all the appetites are unified so as to rest in one good; this is the ultimate end of the rational creature "who has established your borders in peace" (Ps., 147, 3). The other sort is imperfect peace, which is had in this world. For here, even though the principal motion of the soul rests in God, there are, however, certain elements of struggle both interior and exterior that disturb this peace.[28]

(3) The key article is the third: Is peace the proper effect of charity? The first objection is that even pagans had peace; but charity results from sanctifying grace, which presumably the pagans lacked, and so it might seem that charity is irrelevant to peace.[29] On the other hand, Psalm 118, 17 says "May there be much peace for those who love Your law."[30] The body of Aquinas's personal position comes down to this: As was said in the first article, there are two sorts of union involved in the notion of peace. Of these, one is a union with respect to the ordering of one's own appetites toward one object; the other involves the union of one's own appetite with that of the other fellow. Charity accomplished both. As to the first, charity brings about a unification of the appetites toward their one destination to the extent that God is being loved with one's whole heart, so that we relate everything back to Him; in this way all our appetites are referred to that one object. Charity brings about the second sort of union to the extent that we love our neighbor as ourselves, from which it comes about that a human being wants to fulfill the will of his neighbor just as he does his own. For this reason one of the marks of friendship is that each friend makes the same

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[28] ST II-II, q. 29, a. 2, ad 4.
[29] ST II-II, q. 29, a. 3, obj. 1.
[30] ST II-II, q. 29, a. 3, contra.

choices, as Aristotle claims,[31] and, according to Cicero *On Friendship*,[32] it is a mark of friends that they want and don't want the same thing. Thus charity unifies my many scattered desires by leading them all back to the one God, when I love Him with my whole heart; secondly, charity unites my desire with the desire of my neighbor, when I love my neighbor as myself.[33]

From this it is clear how to answer the first objection: the only reason anyone lacks sanctifying grace is due to sin, whereby a human being is turned away from his proper end and made to stand in some unfitting end. In this situation, his appetite does not principally stick with his true final good, but with a merely apparent good. This is why without sanctifying grace there cannot be true peace, but only apparent peace.[34]

One might object that Aquinas should not be invoking charity as the cause of peace at all. Some would rather assert that peace is an effect of justice than of charity, and they even have Isaiah to speak on behalf of their claim: "The work of justice is peace" (Isaiah, 32, 17).[35] Aquinas does not budge, however, but explains that peace is the work of justice indirectly, as removing an obstacle to peace. But peace is a work of charity directly, since charity causes peace with regard to its proper notion. The reason for this is that love is a unifying force (*vis unitiva*)[36] and peace is the union of the appetitive inclinations.[37]

(4) The final article is concerned about whether peace is a virtue in its own right. Aquinas thinks not. For when several

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[31] EN, IX, iv, 1 (1166a7).
[32] *De amicitia.*
[33] ST II-II, q. 29, a. 3, corpus.
[34] ST II-II, q. 29, a. 3, ad 1.
[35] ST II-II, q. 29, a. 3, obj. 3.
[36] Dionysius, *De div. nom.*, c. IV, §12 (PG 3, 709).
[37] ST II-II, q. 29, a. 3, ad. 3.

acts proceeding from an agent with respect to the same notion all follow from each other, all such acts proceed from one virtue, and they do not each of them have special virtues from which they proceed. Transposing Aquinas's example into modern terms, we note that some plastics melt when heated and others harden. Fire, however, merely makes things hot; it has a power or "virtue" of heating. In Aquinas's example, it is not as though there were additional powers of liquefying or expanding over and above the power of heating. In like fashion, peace is caused by charity with respect to God and neighbor, and so peace is not itself another virtue over and above charity.[38]

Aquinas on War (ST II-II, q. 40)

Interestingly, unlike Aquinas's treatment of peace, his treatment of war in *Summa Theologiae* II-II, question 40 seems to have no parallel in his other earlier writings. Like the question on peace, however, the question on war is subdivided into four articles: (1) Is any war licit? (2) Is it licit for clerics or bishops to wage war? (3) Is it licit for those who wage war to use traps? (4) Is it licit to wage war on feast days? To restrict ourselves to the essentials, we shall deal only with the first of these four articles.

(1) Is any war licit?[39] After four objections concluding that all war is illicit or a sin, the theological authority of Augustine is invoked for the contrary position: If Christianity

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[38] ST II-II, q. 29, a. 4, corpus.

[39] See the cautionary historical comment on the authenticity of the headings for the articles of the *Summa Theologiae* in Gregory M. Reichberg, "Is there a 'presumption against war' in Aquinas's ethics?" *The Thomist* 66 (2002) 337-67, note 41. The heading "Is waging war always a sin?" is a later addition in the textual tradition.

found wars entirely blameworthy, the Gospel message should have been to give up arms and leave military service. The actual message is 'Do not beat people up...be content with your pay'. When you tell a soldier to be content with his pay, you are not telling him to give up soldiering.[40] So clearly waging war is not essentially unjust without qualification. Aquinas begins the body of his own response by laying out the conditions required for a war to be just. There are three requirements: (a) the authority of the leader at whose command the war is to be waged, (b) a just cause, and (c) the right intention on the part of the fighters. Let's look at each in greater detail.

(a) There has to be a legitimate political authority; Aquinas calls it the authority of the one in charge (*auctoritas principis*), by whose command the war is to be waged. This is necessary for several reasons. It does not belong to just any private person to start a war, since such a person always has the right to appeal to the judgment of someone higher. Likewise too a private person cannot issue a summons to call many people to assemble together, and that is exactly was must be done in wars. Since, however, the care of public affairs (the *respublica*) has been entrusted to those who are in charge, it is their job to watch out for the public welfare of the city, kingdom, or province given to their charge. Just as they licitly defend their charge using a physical sword against internal disturbers of the peace when they punish evildoers,[41] so too is it their job by means of the

[40] Augustine, *Epist.* CXXXVIII *Ad Marcellinum*, cap. 2 (PL 33, 531).

[41] Here Aquinas invokes the authority of the Apostle Paul: "For he does not bear the sword without cause; for he is God's minister, an avenger to bring wrath upon him who does evil deeds" (Rom. 13, 4).

sword of war to protect the public welfare external enemies.[42] These basic duties would seem to be recognized in the presidential oath of office, to defend the constitution against all enemies foreign and domestic.

(b) There has to be a just cause (*causa iusta*), so that those who are fought against deserve to be fought owing to some fault of their own. This point Aquinas explains by appealing to Augustine: 'Just wars are usually defined as those that avenge injuries, say if a tribe or city is to be beaten up because it has either neglected to repair what has improperly been done by its own men or to return what has been wrongfully taken'.[43] We may note that since justice involves giving the other party what he has a right to,[44] there is a certain public or objective character to this criterion.

(c) The intention of those waging the war must be right (*intentio bellantium recta*), i.e. it must be intended to promote what is good or to avert what is evil. Aquinas then appeals to two passages of Augustine, one to illustrate right, and, the other ill, intent. "In the view of true worshippers of God those wars are not sins that are waged not from greed or cruelty but from zeal for peace, so that the evil may be constrained and the good re-

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[42] Here again Aquinas calls upon Scriptural authority: "Rescue the poor , and free the needy from the hand of the sinner" (Ps. 81, 4).

[43] *Quaest. in Heptat.*, IV, qu. 10, on Joshua 8, 2 (PL 34, 781).

[44] For a useful introduction to the Thomistic notion of justice, see Josef Pieper, *The Four Cardinal Virtues: Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, Temperance*; the paperback edition originally published in 1966 by Notre Dame University Press was assembled from several translations, but suppressed the valuable references and notes; more recent editions include them.

> lieved."[45] On the other hand, "a hankering for causing harm, cruelty in taking vengeance, unrelenting and unquenchable anger, wild rebellion, a desire for domination, and suchlike things are rightly blamed in war."[46] Though the other required features (legitimate authority and just cause) may be in place, wicked intent (*prava intentio*) may render the war unjust.[47]

The just-war tradition seems to treat these three Thomistic requirements as essential elements for a right to wage war at all (*ius ad bellum*); later additions address the further requirements for how to wage a war rightly once we are engaged in one (*ius in bello*).[48]

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[45] See Augustine, *De civit. Dei*, 19, c. 12 (PL 41, 637); cf. Gratian, *Decretum*, P. 2, causa 23, q. 1, ca. 6 Apud veros.(ed. Richter and Friedberg) I, 893.

[46] *Contra Faustum*, 22, c. 74 (PL 42, 447).

[47] ST II-II, q. 40, a. 1, corpus. It is noteworthy that Aquinas seems to regard the three criteria as essential requirements:

> Good intentions are not enough. Someone might wish the fight between the Israelis and the Palestinians to come to a peaceful resolution. Even granting that he had the neo-Babylonian authority to relocate both parties to separate locations, say metropolitan New York and metropolitan Miami, this good intention could not be executed without harming the current inhabitants. Further, if justice really is a public fact, neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians would be given justice simply by depriving both claimants of what each claims as his own, unless both opposing claims were simply false and groundless.
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> Legitimate authority by itself is not enough.
>
> Even just cause by itself is not enough to make for licit warfare.

[48] For a recent book-length treatment dealing with Aquinas's doctrine of just war and his ethics of peace, see Gerhard Beestermöller, *Thomas von Aquin und der gerechte Krieg: Friedensethik im theologischcen Kontext der Summa Theologiae* (Köln: J. P. Bachem Verlag, 1990). Bibliography, pp. 232-260. For a concrete look at Aquinas and the military functions of

By way of concluding remarks, we may note that Aquinas seems to take war and peace as somehow going together. These notions are found in the interior war of each individual person's passions against each other, as well as in the more proper context of social interaction. War seems somehow to mark a disorder or a privation of due order, but, as in surgery, the use of force in a just war is aimed at restoring order, to get things back to normal. The fact seems to be that the world is constantly changing and that there is therefore also a constant need to struggle to get things back on track. I am reminded of the surviving fragment of a great pre-Socratic thinker: "...the first principle of existing things is *the unlimited*; ... but into those from which the existing things have their coming to be, do they also pass away, *according to necessity; for they give justice and make amends to one another for their injustice, according to the ordering of time.*"[49] The fundamental point of similarity is that things sometimes get

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his family by a former Army Air Corps chaplain and President of the Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, see Edward A. Synan, "St. Thomas Aquinas and the Profession of Arms," *Mediaeval Studies*, 50 (1988) 404-37. Let me close by referring to two important recent articles on the place of Aquinas in contemporary discussions of war: Gregory Reichberg, "Just War or Perpetual Peace?" *Journal of Military Ethics*, 1 (2002) 16-35, and Gregory Reichberg and Henrik Syse, "Humanitarian Intervention: A Case of Offensive Force?" *Security Dialogue*, v. 33, n. 3 (2002) 309-322. Reichberg is to be offering a summer National Endowment of the Humanities seminar at the U. S. Naval Academy in 2004; his articles indicate that he is associated with the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo. The former article is of particular importance in bringing to light alien Enlightenment ideas that graft none too easily into the marrow of the just-war tradition.

[49] Anaximander of Miletus, translated by K. Freeman in the *Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers* (Oxford, 1948), quoted by Joseph Owens, *A History of Ancient Western Philosophy* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1959), p. 13.

out of order, and there is a need to set them right. For Aquinas, this restoration to order, called peace, is never quite simply perfect in this life, but it is at least imperfectly attainable even now. The "perpetual peace" that Kant wanted, however, is attainable only elsewhere, and, if Aquinas is right, requires an openness to some Person or Persons beyond ourselves.

Islamic Tradition

Islam and the Vision of the Universal Peace

Hojjatol Islam Mahmood Mohammadi Araghi
President of the Organization of Culture and Islamic Relations

In the name of God, most compassionate most merciful. Felicitations to the world on the occasion of the auspicious birth anniversary of the Awaited Savior of Mankind and the Universal Redeemer who shall establish peace and divine justice on earth!

Mr. Chairman, His Excellency Dr. Zarif, Professor Nasr, distinguished delegates, friends, I would like to begin by greeting all the honourable participants of this symposium with "*Salāmun Alaykum*" (Peace unto you!). The word "*salām*" shares common roots with the word "Islām". Interestingly, Islam, or the religion of peace (*silm*) by surrendering and submitting one's soul to God (*taslīm*), teaches its followers to open their conversations with the word "*salām*", which is a call for peace, both internal and external.

This greeting of peace is not just a worldly form of greeting. The inhabitants of Heaven and the angels also greet each other with the word "*Salām*". The Qur'an says:

> Those who believe and do good, their Lord will guide them because of their faith: beneath them will flow rivers in Gardens of Bliss. (This will be) their cry therein: "Glory to Thee O Allah!" and "Peace" will be their greeting therein! And the close of their cry will be: "Praise be to Allah, the Cherisher and Sustainer of the Worlds!" (10:9 & 10)

Commenting on the above verses, A. Yusuf Ali writes: "A beautiful piece of spiritual melody! They sing and shout with joy, but their joy is in the Glory of Allah! The greetings they receive and the greetings they give are of Peace and Harmony! From first to last they realize that it is Allah who cherished them and made them grow, and His rays are their Light".

Elsewhere, the Qur'an again refers to the greetings of the people of Heaven in the words:

> But those who believe and do good will be admitted to Gardens beneath which rivers flow to dwell therein for aye with the leave of their Lord: their greeting therein will be: "Peace!" (14:23)

Regarding the greetings of the angels, the Qur'an says:

> There came Our Messengers to Abraham with glad tidings. They said "Peace!" He answered "Peace!" and hastened to entertain them with a roasted calf. (11:69)

In yet another verse, the Glorious Qur'an reveals the rewards of those who exercise patience in all areas of their life, saying:

> Gardens of perpetual bliss: they shall enter there as well as the righteous among their fathers their spouses and their offspring: and angels shall enter unto them from every gate (with the salutation): "Peace unto you for that you persevered in patience! Now how excellent is the final Home!" (13:23 & 24)

Moreover, even God the Almighty greets the pious with salutation of peace:

> Peace! A Word (of salutation) from a Lord Most Merciful! (36:58)

Interestingly, the Qur'an tells us that not only are the believers greeted with "Peace!" in this world and in Heaven, but even during their transition from this world to the next, that is, at the time of their physical death, the angels greet them with "Peace!" The Holy Book says:

> Those whose lives the angels take in a state of purity saying (to them) "Peace be on you; enter ye the Garden because of the good which ye did (in the world)." (16:32)

Thus, those who die in a state of purity will be received into happiness with a salutation of Peace. The angels greet them with the salutation of Peace; they congratulate them; and they welcome them in. (See also 39:73)

The Qur'an teaches us that the salutation of Peace has been the greeting and the slogan of all the Divine Prophets and is not exclusive to Islam. For example, even the Prophet Moses and the Prophet Aaron (PBUT) said to the Pharaoh:

> Verily we are apostles sent by thy Lord: send forth therefore the Children of Israel with us and afflict them not: with a Sign indeed have we come from thy Lord! And peace (salām) to all who follow guidance! (20:47)

The Prophet Jesus (PBUH) said shortly after his birth:

> I am indeed a servant of God: He has given me revelation and made me a prophet;
> And He has made me Blessed wherever I be and has enjoined on me Prayer and Charity as long as I live;
> (He) has made me kind to my mother and not overbearing or miserable;
> So Peace (salām) is on me the day I was born, the day that I die, and the day that I shall be raised up to life (again)! (19:33)

The fact that "Peace" has been the slogan of all the divine Prophets as well as angels and the believers can still be witnessed in different cultures and among people of different faiths. We can see that the Jews still greet each other by saying: "*Shalom*". The Christians call Jesus the "Prince of Peace" and chant in their places of worship "Pacem, pacem, pacem". [1]

A large number of the chapters from the New Testament, too, begin and end with greetings of peace and grace like Timothy, Philemon, 2 Thessalonians and many others from which let me quote this beautiful greeting:

> Now may the Lord of peace Himself give you peace at all times and in every way. The Lord be with all of you." (2 Thessalonians: 16)

It is believed that the oldest passage in the Qur'an that contains the word *salām* is the verse 97:5 which states: "It (the Night of Measure or the *Laylat al-Qadr*) is peace until the coming of the dawn". This verse characterizes the Night of Measure or the Night of Power and Grandeur, which is the most important night for Muslims in the whole year. It is said to be "better than a thousand months" and is "the blessed night", "in which the Qur'an was revealed" as *salām*, "peace". The Night of Measure is a "heavenly" night during

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[1] Goldziher believed and quoted passages from poets in support of the view that "salām" was already in use as a greeting before Islam. The corresponding Hebrew and Aramaic expressions, which go back to Old Testament usage (cf. Judges xix, 20, 2 Sam. xviii, 28, Dan. x, 19, 1 Chron. xii, 19), were also in use as greetings among the Jews and Christians. A very great number of Nabataean inscriptions further show the use of s-l-m to express good wishes in Northwestern Arabia and the Sinai Peninsula. (Extract from the *Encyclopaedia of Islam* CD-ROM Edition v. 1.0 © 1999 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands)

which Muslims try not to sleep and instead spend the entire night in worship so as to witness and experience this peace.

Of course, a permanent and universal state of peace shall be witnessed only in Heaven, which is also called "Abode of Peace" (*Dār al-Salām*). The Qur'an says:

> This is the way of your Lord leading straight: We have detailed the Signs for those who receive admonition.
> For them will be the Abode of Peace in the presence of their Lord: He will be their Friend because they practiced (righteousness). (6:126 & 127)

Now the question that arises is why so much emphasis has been put on "peace". And secondly, how would it be possible to acquire and sustain peace in this world? These two questions are indeed inter-related and finding the answer for each helps to answer the other.

We human beings are created such that this material life can never satisfy us completely. There are many desires deep within us that find no satisfaction in this world unless we are able to understand our position in relation to our Lord. The desire for absolute and infinite beauty, power and love can only be satisfied with the knowledge of and closeness to God, the Absolute, the Infinite. The Qur'an says:

> O man! Surely you must strive (to attain) the Lord, a hard striving, until you meet Him. (84:6)[2]
> Those who believe and whose hearts find satisfaction in the remembrance of God: for without doubt in the remembrance of God do hearts find satisfaction. (13:28)

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[2] Commenting on the above verses, A Yusuf Ali writes: "This life is ever full of toil and misery, if looked at as empty of the Eternal Hope which Revelation gives us. Hence the literature of pessimism in poetry and philosophy which thinking minds have poured forth in all ages, when that Hope was obscured to them".

This natural human yearning for gaining closeness to God, without which man remains restless, is also well-expressed in many Islamic supplications. Imam Ali ibn Husayn (PBUH) says:

> "Nothing will cool my burning thirst but reaching You; quench my ardour but meeting you; damp my yearning but gazing upon Your face; settle my settling place but closeness to you."[3]

Thus, man's yearning for peace is, in reality, yearning for God. It may be mentioned that, indeed, one of the names of God in Islamic literature including the Qur'an itself is PEACE (*al-Salām*). We read in the Qur'an:

> Allah is He than whom there is no other God, the Sovereign, the Holy One, the Peace, the Giver of Safety, the Guardian, the Majestic, the Irresistible, the Supreme: Glory to Allah! (high is He) above the partners they attribute to Him. (59:23)

The real peace that man seeks and aspires for, knowingly or unknowingly, is spiritual peace. This peace can and should be maintained under all conditions. The Qur'an praises a group of people "whom neither business nor trading distract from remembering God, keeping up prayer, and paying the welfare tax". (24:37) Imam Ali and other members of the household of the Prophet (PBUT) call on God in these words:

> "My God! Make me completely cut off from all else but You and enlighten the vision of our hearts with the radiance of looking at You until the vision of our hearts penetrates the veils of light and reaches the Source of

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[3] *The Psalms of Islam*, pp. 251 & 252.

> Grandeur and set our spirit to be suspended at the glory of Your sanctity."[4]

To be cut off from everything other than God means to be freed from reliance on anyone or anything other than God and to see everything as His sign and as the manifestation of His power and grace. The true servants of God whether they are rich or poor, powerful or weak, famous or unknown, in ease or in adversity and whether they live in isolation or within society and among people, they are totally mindful of God and remember Him constantly and, therefore, experience absolute peace. In this context, Prophet Jesus (PBUH) instructs Israel in the following words:

> "Hear, O Israel! The Lord our God, the Lord is One. Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind and with all your strength." (Mark 12:30)

However, in order to create a pleasant and conducive atmosphere in which a greater number of people and the masses can have enduring peace and a better chance to take care of their spirituality and to improve themselves, all people of good faith must strive for the establishment of a just society with a fair distribution of means and without any sort of injustice, oppression, discrimination, invasion or aggression. This is why Islam calls for the prosperity of human beings, both, in this world as well as the Hereafter, and asks its followers to strike a balance between the material and the spiritual and to work for a peaceful and prosperous world.

Now, let me turn to the second question. How is peace to be acquired and maintained in this world? Addressing the

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[4] "*Al-Munajat al-Sha'baniyah*" in *Mafatih al-Jinan*.

People of the Book (including the Christians and Jews) the Qur'an introduces itself as follows:

> There has come to you from Allah a (new) Light and a clear Book. Wherewith Allah guides all who seek His good pleasure to ways of peace and leads them out of darkness by His Will unto the light and guides them to a Path that is straight. (5:15 & 16)

So what are "the ways of peace" that the Qur'an has undertaken to guide us to? To study the Qur'anic ways of peace we would need to enter a detailed discussion on the Qur'anic plan for human life, which falls beyond the limits of our present discussion. I would, however, like to highlight upon one of the recommended "ways of peace", which is, sincere dialogue. Interestingly, this point is also mentioned in an address to the People of the Book:

> Say: "O people of the Book! Come to common terms as between us and you: that we worship none but Allah; that we associate no partners with Him; that we erect not from among ourselves Lords and patrons other than Allah". (3:64)

The Qur'an itself has taken practical steps towards ensuring the unity of the believers in God by asking Muslims to declare their faith in the previous prophets (PBUT) and revelations:

> Say: "We believe in God and in what has been revealed to us and what was revealed to Abraham, Ishmael, Isaac, Jacob and the Tribes and in (Books) given to Moses, Jesus and the Prophets from their Lord; we make no distinction between any of them and to Him do we submit". (3:83)

The Qur'an also teaches us to be open to others and to appreciate their lofty qualities. For example, the Qur'an

praises the Christians as "humble and truth-seeking people" who, on hearing the divine verses, "tears of happiness begin to roll down their faces" and it introduces the Christians as "the best friends of the Muslims" (5:82 & 83). Dismissing all accusations against the Virgin Maryam (Mary) (May God's peace be upon her), introducing her as a perfect role model for all believers and righteous people, the existence of one complete chapter in the Qur'an under the name of Mary and on her status, are all other practical steps towards unity. Indeed, the Qur'an introduces Islam as the religion of all prophets and considers all the Abrahamic faiths as one family. A Muslim is not in need of denying or fighting against other religions and it is in fact, obligatory for a Muslim to believe in all the previous divine revelations.

Considering all these factors, the necessity of dialogue and the co-operation of all believers becomes very clear. A powerful dialogue could play a significant role in identifying and establishing common grounds and overcoming prejudices. Both parties in dialogue should, however, share mutual respect to truly get to know each other and should strive to wipe out any bitter memories of past events and misbehavior of some ignorant groups. Religious leaders must not look at each other as rivals or enemies and should rather consider each other as colleagues and supporters in facing the contemporary challenges that threaten mankind. Let us here take a lesson from the 37th Psalm of David (PBUH) in which he says:

> "Consider the blameless, observe the upright: there is a future for the man of peace."

Keeping these brief points in view, it is hoped that this symposium leads to subsequent gatherings and paves the way for further dialogue, co-operation, and collaboration of a

practical and serious nature. I have no doubt that such sincere and concerted efforts could lead to a better understanding and result in peace and happiness in our world.

I conclude with an invocation of peace for all our dear participants and for mankind:
Peace be unto you and the mercy of God!

The Islamic Vision of Peace: Divine and Human

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Bismi 'Llāh al-Rahmān al Rahīm.

I was asked to speak for about forty-five minutes on the philosophy of peace and war in Islam. Especially with the presentation already made, which laid out very lucidly certain comparisons between the three monotheistic traditions as far as the actual legal aspect of war and peace was concerned, I wanted to emphasize especially the question of the philosophy of peace and war before turning to its practical applications.

Let's first of all ask ourselves a question, because we keep talking about peace and war. Why are we so concerned with peace, when human life is marked by strife? Where does our thirst for peace come from? This I think is a very fundamental question, which is often times, skipped over in contemporary discussions. In the west, going back to Jean-jac Cousteau and certain thinkers of the 18 th century, the idea that the fall is not significant and that man by his nature is peace loving has come to the fore. Therefore it's considered that the normal state of the human being is peace and somehow we have to explain why there is war. Actually it is the other way around and all religions have had to cope with this, whether it is in the language of the original sin in Christianity, or the fall (hubūṭ) in Islam, and the same in Judaism. They have all had to come to terms with the fact that the ordinary external reality of human life is based on constant strife.

At the same time we have a very profound yearning for peace and I want to start to ask this theological philosophical question, where does this come from? The answer of Islam to this is very clear. Of course everything comes from God, but more specifically, peace belongs to God, it doesn't belong to us, and the Koran says that it is He who made the divine peace (sakīnah) to descend upon the hearts of the believers. The words sheninak and sakinah in Hebrew and Arabic are sister words, meaning the same thing. Therefore, peace is made to descend from God into the heart of believers, which means that we have to gain peace, it just doesn't come with the human territory. To be human doesn't mean you are going to live in peace.

Of course the name of peace itself is one of the names of God, that is salaam and the word God is peace. Not only does he bring peace but he is peace, in the deepest sense, in the same way that in Islam, not only is God just, but he is justice, especially since we are living in this holy month before the month of Ramadan on the Islamic calendar. The Muslims in this group know very well the famous saying of Ali, the first Imam of Shi'ism and the fourth Sunni Caliph.

In Islam it is said that God is both *'ādil* and *'adl.* That is, not only does He posses that quality of giving justice but he is justice itself. This is the same as peace, which is really inseparable from justice and from the philosophical and theological point of view is not only something that is given from God to us but that it is part of the divine nature. Therefore to have this nostalgia for peace is really a deep down nostalgia which we have for God, for the spiritual world, and that is why in fact all religions teach that there is no peace possible without God. To try to live at peace in a world in which the hands of God are cut off from daily affairs is the worst kind of illusion that you can imagine. I should think that the his-

tory of the 20th century should have at least taught us that, but it is hard for people to learn this lesson.

Many people still go around and say if only we will get rid of religion we will live in a peaceful world, which is like saying if we would only get rid of our head than we would see straight. It's a contradiction in terms. Now from this theological, philosophical point of view we are thrown into a world in which there is contention, opposition, disequilibrium and strife. From the moment we come out of our mother's womb, there is already a tremendous change from the ambience in which we lived to the new ambience to which we are born. The very first breath we take is itself a great challenge to try to overcome, an obstacle, and the first milk of our mother's breast that we suckle in again marks a struggle. Therefore Islam sees the whole of life as an attempt to gain peace through constant struggle. The struggle, of course, striving, is what jihād is.

The world jihād has to be re-explained over and over again especially since the tragic events of two years ago in this city. Its now one of the favorite words of the English language. I say jokingly that if you want to have a best seller try to fit in the word jihād, as some might stick in the place of the word *tao*. A few years ago we had tao of this tao of of that, you might have a best seller, now we have jihād of this jihād of that, and the poor word has been massacred in the process. So many books have been written on jihād. I didn't know there were so many experts in the United States on this subject but there are apparently, and it's a word that has lost its significance, where as ultimately it means to strive. It cannot be translated as war. If you want to specify that as war sometimes people call it jihād of the sword, some people call it external war, but the word jihād itself is life, to be alive. To seek peace is to have to carry out jihād, there is no peace

without jihād, in the human condition in which we live. We don't live in paradise, before the fall.

We live in a world in which imperfection is a characteristic of this world, in which everything is in dis-equilibrium unless we are about to bring about equilibrium and the reason for it is that we are in dis-equilibrium within ourselves. The world of nature without us marks a remarkable harmony, a remarkable peace, but New York City and Teharan and Cairo do not. These are humanly created ambiences, which are marked by dis-equilibrium. We live in an ambience, which reflects dis-equilibrium within ourselves.

So I come back to this fundamental, theological and philosophical assertion that contention, strife, as well as the yearning for peace, are both characteristics of all human life and therefore every religion has had to come to terms with it. It is really the worst kind of hypocrisy, hypocrisy of the worst kind, to call one religion a religion of war, and claim oneself to follow a religion of peace, while one is throwing daisy bombs on top of the other side's head. We are living in the worst period of human history in hypocrisy, if you want to prove there is such a thing as progress you have to look at hypocrisy, we are progressing very rapidly in hypocrisy. In the old days every country used to have a ministry of war, now nobody has war everybody is defending. We all have ministries of defense. Where does the offence come from?

This is pure hypocrisy in which we live and it is very sad and bitter now to see that this has become an art form, the way that things are tortured and turned around. Therefore the first thing that is important is to stop this holier than thou attitude and to realize that every religion has had to deal with war and peace. The history of every religion has been marked by both realities. Every religion asserts centrality of peace, limiting ourselves to the Abrahamic family because we have the same thing in Hinduism and Buddhism other religions,

but we'll just limit ourselves to the three great monotheisms associated with the prophet Abraham, may peace be upon him. You have Christianity, this founder is called the prince of peace, everyone looks upon Christ as the bringer of peace, and he lived a remarkable life in which he preached peace. Whether you go from the prince of peace to onward Christian soldiers marching on to war, that's the same tradition. You have in Judaism the great rabbinical teachings, the great Talmudic teaching about peace, some of the most beautiful pages written, but you also have houses being blown up.

To understand the philosophies of war and peace in an objective manner you should realize the imperfection of the human state marked by what each religion describes in its own particular way, whether it be the question of the fall or the question of original sin, or any other language that is used, that necessitates the presence of struggle and war. Every religion has been there to try to limit that and to try to satiate the deep need that we have for peace.

Now let me turn specifically to Islam. As I mentioned the name of the religion is related of course to two fundamental concepts: The concept of salaam, which means peace in Arabic, and the concept of taslim, which means surrender. You must have heard this elsewhere but I need to repeat it here. I have said it often times myself cause we have many people from other religions present today, but you can summarize the whole message of Islam as follows: In order to gain peace or salaam you must surrender to God or taslim. That's it. That's really the whole of Islam. So the idea of surrender, of surrender to Gods will, and following his laws in this world is considered by Islam to be the only condition for the gaining of peace. Now that doesn't mean that you are going to gain it immediately, it maximizes the human possibility for equilibrium.

No classical Islamic thinker has ever been utopian, utopianism is really a modern invention. We do not have time to go into that class, into its root, but it is very interesting that the word utopia, coming back to the famous book of Thomas Moore, comes from two Greek words, a and topos. The famous *nā kujā ābād* of the great Persian philosopher, Suhrawardī, says that the land of perfection is the land which is beyond space, *nā kujā* in Persian means no-where, and *nā kujā ābād* means utopia. Etymologically the two words are the same. Classical Islamic thought always identified that land, as being beyond this physical world, so to try to claim to have perfect equilibrium in this world is not to understand what the world is.

The world is always the world and God is always God, and we have killed hundreds of millions of people in the last two centuries in trying to establish a pseuo-paradiso state on earth. There was the great utopianism's of Marxism, of fascism, and all of those horrible, horrible events of the 20th century, and in more moderate forms some of the things that we do trying to have perfect equilibrium by pressuring and forcing human imperfections upon others as peace.

Look what we are doing right now. As Dean Kowalski just said, we are killing people in the name of peace, nobody is working for war everybody is working for peace, but that is also based on a misunderstanding. Even if we lived well in this world, it is not possible to have perfect peace in this world. Christ said, "My Kingdom is not of this world." That is, the other world is better for you than this world. This worldliness cannot achieve peace in principle but there is a maximization of equilibrium of the maximization of peace and the diminishing of the opposite, which in fact Islam like every religion tries to bring about. In the case of Islam it comes about through divine law and submission to Gods law. It is of course more difficult than that. There is an inner as-

pect to it. We cannot submit to God's law unless in a sense we have made our own inner being a Muslim because that is the rebellious nature that we have within our passions, unless you have been able to control that. It is much, much easier to go to the mosque every Friday morning and look very pious then to inwardly have control over all of the different passions that drive us. Therefore this obeying of God's law also implies an inner purification which is even more difficult to come by.

Anyway, speaking about the external aspect of it, what the philosophy of peace is in Islam is to try to go in a hierarchy, first of all starting with the individual. One of the great mistakes that is being made by many so called reformers in the Islamic world today, in which they are repeating the classical mistakes of Carl Marx and others without even being aware of it, is to try to perfect things from the outside. They try to create the perfect society, on the bases of which the individual will become perfect. Well that will never happen. All religions have begun with a few individuals perfected by the founder and spread from there, it never came from the other way around. It always started from the small unit and built up. Therefore, in the Islamic perspective, peace must first of all begin within us.

The person who is at peace with himself or herself is at peace with the world and the person who is not at peace with himself or herself can never be at peace with the world. So it starts with the individual, with the relationship between the human being and God. That's extremely difficult even in the daily prayers. It is very difficult to be at peace with God for only two minutes, because of the chaotic nature of the human soul, of the mind. Therefore the question of peace is much more than a political agenda out there, it is spiritual and psychological before anything else. Just test it for yourself. See if you can have peace of mind for sixty seconds by just concen-

trating on the nature of Christ if you are a Christian, or if you are a Jew on the teachings of the psalms. Whatever it is you concentrate on you see how difficult it is, it is very, very difficult.

The goal is, first of all, to create inner peace, and that is to put the different elements of the soul in order. We all have chaotic souls, by virtue of who we are and what world we live in, of fallen human beings, and therefore to be able to set one's inner house in order is the first order of the day. Peace starts there.

The next unit is the family. The emphasis of Islamic law and Islamic religion upon the family is that that is the little island in which we can create peace, before we create outward peace. One of the great paradoxes of our day is that everybody talks about peace while this little unit is also being decimated and destroyed, more and more every day, because the first unit which is the individual human being is becoming more and more chaotic. So the family which reflected as, for centuries, a little island of peace, even amidst invasion, external wars, it gave protection of a psychological, emotional order, social order and so forth, is now atomized, often times endangered. Islamic law in contrast tries to fortify the family unit as a unit in which the laws of God, the question of justice, the question of relationships, of responsibilities, will create some kind of peace. All of you of course come from different families, you know how difficult that is. It is so easy to talk about it, family feuds are most often times the bitterest feuds, and we have that in every religion. But we also know that this is somebody's family, there is somehow a bond that transcends the ordinary contentions and tension which human life presents to us.

From the unit of the family, traditionally Islam has tried to build step by step, larger and larger social units in which some kind of equilibrium would be established between vari-

ous forces, of various needs, various tensions that human life presents and to create balance and equilibrium. It is really quite unfortunate that usual histories, whether written in Arabic and Persian in classical times or by modern western historians of the Islamic world, in fact of other worlds, are usually histories of contentions and strife.

When you read the history of the Peloponnesian Wars, let's say, you don't read the history of the villages in which it was very quiet and nobody was doing anything rash, you always read the histories of strife. When you read the history of Islam you go from one battle to another, the people are fighting all the time. In fact, this idea of total war, is a modern invention. Even in Europe when the Hundred Years War was being carried out between England and France for a hundred years, in many villages things were very peaceful. It isn't like today when modern technology has made war total. So Islam, much more than the textbooks reveal, succeeded to a large extent in creating a peaceful society.

I always give this example. You read over and over again that people have been fighting in the Middle East forever. This is a total lie. The Beqaa Valley where this woola has supposed to have come now, was supposed to have been a place where people are fighting all the time for centuries. In fact I had some of the most peaceful picnics in my life in 1964 when I was established chair of Islamic studies at American University of Beirut in the Beqaa Valley. I used to go to a very, very peaceful side where there were Muslims and Christians were living together, and nobody had any contention.

People do not think that the kind of world in which we live today, in which this strife is all over, was not necessarily so in days of old, especially in the Islamic world. Although dynasties came and went, there were wars. Except for the Mongol invasion which devastated the eastern lands of Islam

up to the Sinai Peninsula, by and large Islam has succeeded in going from the smaller unit to the greater units. There was to a large extent a great deal of peace in various parts of society. Still they never succeeded completely in abrogating or removing from human life the totality of contention and tension and strife and war. Without that there would be no human life and in fact religion would have no role to play. In fact if all human beings always lived at peace there would be no need for religion anyway. God knew his own creation, which's why he sent revelation. That is why we need his help in this matter.

Now, coming back to the question of jihād. Having said all of these things, Islam had also to think about jihād in an external sense. I will not say much about the inner jihād I just said a few words about it and if I have time I will come back to it at the end, but let me speak about the more external jihād, that is, the question of war. What about war? If the philosophy of peace is what I said than what about war? First of all in Arabic we have to distinguish between the word harab and the word jihād, even the lesser jihād, or the jihād of the sword, to which Professor Johnson referred. The word harab in Arabic is the ordinary word for war and as he said among the classical jurists, especially the Sunni jurists, the world was divided between dar-al-Islam and dar al harab. I do not believe that this is exactly how many people in Turkey interpret it. Why do they call the abode outside Islam the abode of harab? Because they thought that since the Sharia was not being applied, that ordinary contention within human life had nothing to set a limit upon it. What was going to control strife? That is why they call it the dar al harab. Not that Islam should always be at war against dar al harab.

If that was the case why didn't it happen? Even when there were very, very powerful Islamic states it did not automatically happen. Many times Islam lived with powers of the

dar al harab in peace. This idea that we have that it is incumbent upon all Muslims to carry out war upon people in dar al harab, this is not at all true. The vast majority of cases of jurists, both Sunni and Shi'a, are a few extremist voices who have said that, but they are a very, very minority voice. The mainstream of Islamic society has not believed that you should carry out war, physical war, outside of the abode of Islam because it happens to be outside of the abode of Islam. Nor that you should carry out war against the people who are now interpreted as being infidels, and that itself is a very major issue I will come to in just a second, nor necessarily force Islam upon people outside by war. This is a very, very important issue to which I want to come. Let me turn to all of these three.

First of all, fighting a war against outside of the abode of Islam. Even if you use the word jihād, which is not every war but war which is fought for religious purposes, it was not an automatic matter, it was not the duty of every Muslim to fight against every non-Muslim he or she could find. Secondly, to fight against infidels. Now the word infidel has a long history. It has been very nicely maligned and misused along with the word jihād and martyrdom in the American media, which now unfortunately has the service of over a million experts on Islam who do not know A from B of the Arabic alphabet but are all great experts. They keep using this over and over again which is very unfortunate. Now the word infidel, of course in English, comes from a word in Latin, which means lack of faith, to lack faith. Today it means faith, the prefix in- is negation; infidel is someone who lacks faith. The Arabic world kafir comes from the Arabic root kafir, which means to cover over. Therefore the meaning of the Arabic term is a person who covers the truth over.

In the Qur'an some Muslims who claim to be Muslims are called kāfir, and not all non-Muslims are called kāfir. It is

not correct to equate automatically all Muslim with kafir, that is with infidels, and all Christians and Jews with infidels. That's totally false. There are many, many references to this and the everyday usage of it is very different from the theological usage. Like you say, for example, the word pagan or pagany, in Latin and Greek that was used in the Christian context, or the word heathen, but this was a general term that had to be later on defined theologically. Therefore the idea that every non-Muslim was an infidel was not theologically and juristically accepted and that is why the Muslims were ordered by Islamic law, by the Qur'an, to protect the Jews and Christians within the Islamic world.

I hear unbelievable things sometimes among contemporary Muslims. I am at a moment in my life when I am only afraid of God. I've always been only afraid of God, but suddenly now when I was in Pakistan speaking in front of an audience of a thousand people and I brought this up people got very, very unhappy. I said if you say that all non Muslims are infidels and they will not go to heaven they will go to hell, the fact that Islamic law requires the protection of the property and their lives and their livelihood by Muslims means that God wants to help us to keep people protected to go to hell. This is blasphemy against God's justice and against his mercy. After that everybody shut up because there is really no answer to this. No one can answer this, if anyone has an answer please some fanatical Muslim come and present it to me so that I can learn something, but it is very difficult to answer this.

The fact the Qur'an and the Hadīth and Islamic law require Muslims to protect the property, the lives, the livelihood, the manner of living of Christians and Jews, the *ahl ab kitāb* leaves it open, later on Hindus and Buddhists and others were included, does not mean that every ruler followed this. It doesn't mean that at all. It meant the theologically

and juristically the carrying out of a war against these groups is really forbidden. Therefore the Ottoman sultan, when the many Jews that fled from Spain along with Muslims came to Istanbul, did not have a juristical right as a Muslim to say 'cut off their heads cause they are infidels', to fight against them. That is against Islamic law. This is also a very, very important matter to remember.

So every harab, every war, is not necessarily jihād, even of the external kind. There are many, many wars that have been fought in Islamic history for the sake of booty, of military power, of egotism, of economic advantage, all of the factors which are still present when one country goes to war against another. Now we paint them over with all kinds of sweet tasting slogans. In the old days they didn't bother with that. The propaganda machine was not as strong in the old days as it is today, but that's beside the point, those are really the main reasons.

Now, so all war is not, every harab is not, jihād, but if there is a jihād, which is very rare in Islamic history, has been declared extremely rarely, as professor Johnson said, there are certain conditions, and I want to elaborate even more on what he said. First of all not everyone can declare jihād, and there are two kinds of jihād, defensive jihād and offensive jihād. Shi'a law, 12 Imam Shi'a law, all jurists, all mujhe hadis throughout Shi'a history have found no exception, maybe one could have been found somewhere, but certainly 99% majority voice is that the only jihād that is permitted to Muslim is defensive, a jihād Al Dafa'ah in Arabic. That is, offensive jihād, according to Shi'a jurists, is an oxymoron, in a certain sense. That is jihād must only be used for the defense of your home, of your religion, of your property, if somebody attacks you, and it is what's called *difā'ī*, defensive. Now most Sunni jurists have also accepted that.

A few Sunni jurists have said you can carry out offensive jihād only in certain cases where the best defense is an offense, what you are observing now in the United States, and that's very doubtful. Most, even Sunni jurists, spoke against this, but there are some voices amongst Sunni jurists. Amongst Shi'ite jurists there is unanimity that only defensive jihād can be carried out once, as I said, you are threatened loss of your family, of your property, of your religion, of your culture, of your way of life, then you have a right to defend yourself. If you get into this struggle, if such a thing occurs, first of all who can declare it? As we just heard, sorry I don't want to take your time to repeat it, in traditional Islamic society it could be declared by a head of the Islamic State, that is the caliph. When you had a sultan who really exerted power in place of the caliph like in the Seljuq period, the sultan would do it with the support of the caliph, as the great Seljuq rulers who ruled over most of Western Asia. They always tried to get the Shi'a legitimacy from the Abbasi caliphs who physically are very weak but still represented symbolically the legitimacy of rule in the Islamic world for the Sunni world. There would also be consultation with the *'ulamā'*, that is the people of "binding and unbinding" according to Sunni law.

In Twelve Imam Shiism, it had to be of course when the Imams were on earth. Only the Imam could declare jihād and most jurists believe that in the absence of the Mahdi who's birthday was yesterday, the fifteenth of Sha'bān, no one could declare jihād. If something urgent occurs, it should be the olaman, the muga heads who representing the Imam on earth had the power to do it. Now, if such a thing is declared, once it is declared then what are the conditions that are set upon it? Now here Islam developed a theory external jihād or I might say a theory of war which has certain similarities with the doctrine of 'just war' about which we just heard which was really developed to its fullest by saint Thomas Aquinas.

The 'just war' theory began in the 12th century with a few little sentences from Saint Augustine as just heard, but really flowered in its fullness in the thirteenth century. Now Saint Thomas of course had read Islamic texts, he also knew a lot of philosophical arguments, but his whole theory is based on another presupposition namely the legitimacy of a secular authority in the west along side that of the papacy. That is, although there were many similarities between Islamic civilization and Christian civilization there was one difference, in Islam there were not two parallel authorities, of the papacy and the empire, the two were suppose to be welded together. In practice they were very similar, but in theory this difference existed. So in Christian civilization, to justify a war really addresses, as he said, not the church, but the secular authorities. Now in Islam we did not have the same secular authorities, obviously. Therefore the conditions are somewhat different, but the actual rules are not that different. The question of justice, the question of opposition to evil doers who bring evil upon the community and the duty of the ruler to protect the welfare of the community against evil doers and so forth, all of this is not really that different.

There are a few points that are very much emphasized in all classical Islamic theories of jihād. Not harab, which is just based on, as I said, those instincts and passions of human beings, but jihād, which is religiously accepted. First and foremost, which has been murdered tragically in our times, I use this term advisedly, is the question that non-combatants should never be attacked or engaged in any form of jihād. Thanks to modern bombs, modern technology, that is now gone. The idea of total warfare in which you throw a bomb on a city in which woman and children as well as men in the army and old people all die together is a modern invention and has also made the Christian theory of just war very, very difficult. How do you explain dropping the bomb on Hi-

roshima? No matter how just it was with all the fault of the Japanese who attacked Pearl Harbor, still how do you explain this even nowadays?

The doctrine of 'just war' from the point of view of the Islamic law of jihād has its parallel for all religious people, also for the Jewish people. Many Jewish theologians have very, very question because you cannot prevent armies today from using lethal weapons, humans being what they are, lethal weapons no longer give you the discernment that the lance and the sword gave you in old days. But nevertheless the principle is still there. This is also one of the main reasons why, in contrast to what you hear on the media often times, almost all the major Muslim voices in both the Sunni and the Shi'a world have opposed in the strongest terms the terrorist actions that have gone on in the last two years, the worst one in this city, precisely because it involved innocence, the non-combatants. There is no way to justify that at all according to classical Islamic theories. I have often times lectured on this and they say, " Why don't Islamic voices come up and speak?" They speak but they don't reach CNN, just turn on Al-Jazeera you'll hear what they said. They just don't reach the American media. That is really the main argument that was given by Shaykh al-Azhar, by the grand Mufti of Egypt, of course by the great oliman of Iran, by the grand Mufti of Syria, Sheykh Ahmad Kuftaru. There are many, many of the leading theological and juritical voices within the Islamic world.

Secondly, and that's also very significant, especially standing in front of this wonderful cathedral which has tried to open the conscience and conscienceness of Christian people to the environment, to God's nature, is that nature should not be destroyed purposefully in any form of jihād. The prophet gave instruction that trees should not be destroyed in the middle of a war. Element orange in Vietnam or poison

gas or burning of forests, which we have been very good at since the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, are totally forbidden according to the doctrines of jihād.

Thirdly, and this is very close to the view of St Thomas Aquinas, every form of jihād, even if it is defensive for your own home, for your own family, should be with the purpose of establishing peace as soon as possible. As soon as there is a possibility, stop the action and try to sue for peace. This is a very, very important principle. So to just go on and on, that is not religiously acceptable. This is one of the very difficult questions I came up with in Iran after that catastrophic Iran-Iraq war which killed and maimed a million young Iranians and Iraqis, one of the great tragic wars of the latter part of the twentieth century. A question a theological question came up of where do we stop? Where do we stop? There were voices, different voices, on both sides, but the issue was very crucial. Just don't go on and on like the British Empire was conquering the world one country after another in the 19th century. Without a final, final end what are you fighting for?

Finally there is this very important question. On the bases of the verse of the Qur'an "*lā ikrāh fi'l-dīn*", that is there is no coercion in religion. According to all classical writers it is not correct to fight a jihād in order to force people to accept Islam. That was only in the age of Jahilyyah within Arabia. That's a very different situation. If you look at the history of Islam, there have been individual rulers who have done terrible things, like Sultan Mahmood who plundered the temples in India, but by and large this has been followed to a large extent. The idea that war has been an instrument in the history of Islam always to bring about conversion is not true. There have been instances but those instances are no more than the Spanish navy landing in Manila, killing over forty thousand Muslims and forcing the rest of the Philippines to

convert to Catholicism and those that didn't fled to Mindinao. Five hundred years later they are still trying to fight for their independence and they are called terrorists. I'm not saying there have been no episodes, there have been episodes, but this is not part of Islamic law.

Of course, the 64000-dollar question for all of us who try to follow religion is to what extent do people follow these teachings. This is a very important issue. It is important to avoid extremes. No one can say that in Islam everyone has followed every teaching of the prophet of Islam anymore than in Christianity or Judaism everyone has followed every teaching of Moses or Christ; that is absurd. But it is also false to say we have all always fallen short nobody has ever followed these things, that is also false. Human nature being what it is, I do not judge other religions, I do not give myself the right, but as far as the Islamic world is concerned, much of this was realized to a large extent but was never realized fully.

Paradoxically, at this difficult moment in human history, when in fact the question of war and peace is literally a matter of life and death, it is essential more than ever before to remember the authentic teachings of religion

Other forms of violence come and go but it is essential to remember that the killing of innocent people is against Islamic law, but it is true that people who are in despair do desperate things as human beings and not primarily as Muslims or for that matter Jews, Christians or agnositics. One can understand it psychologically, a person who has nothing but his or her own body and has no interest in living anymore is a very dangerous person because they use that instrument. You see these tragedies that are occurring all the time in Palestine and Chechnya and other places, in Israel, all over the place. Now this is understandable psychologically but not acceptable religiously. Islam forbids this.

It is very, very important at this moment not to have only the theoretical discussions in conferences like this but also to try to bring out what really the philosophy of peace and war are in all of these religions. I think people who are followers of these religions, with a love for God, for the unity of God, for his prophets, have to cut across this terrible hypocrisy which today is destroying the possibility of mutual understanding. But I'm one of the last people to ever be in despair. I have a great deal of hope because I always believe that the last word is with the being who sent all words, the last word is always with God. Thank you.

Islamic Vision of Peace and the Platonic Tradition

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There is much talk today about peace and justice and we should ask why in our epoch there is so much universal concern about these issues. It might be that humankind has grown into a new awareness of the supreme values of peace and justice. But if this were the case, there would not be so much tribulation, agitation and injustice to be seen all around. There are many and plentiful counter-examples to be found in our present global scene to refute this claim.

It may be that this real concern about peace and justice is due to the fact that we miss them in ourselves and in our surroundings. Consequently, we feel their lack innately in our beings as when we talk about health, when diseased, or speak of joy when aggrieved.

Physicians warn us that we cannot talk about disease unless we have already gained an evident knowledge of health. Again certain philosophers are wont to tell us that disease is not something positive, but rather it is a lack or a privation, that is of health. Disease ensues when conditions conducing to health are lacking. In the same vein it could be argued that injustice is a privation rather than a positive quality, justice and peace on the contrary being positive qualities, that is, qualities in the nature of things.[1]

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[1] One, on the contrary, might argue that injustice far from being a privation, is a positive quality and like all contraries has an existential status. But this does not invalidate our claim that as some logicians have asserted,

In order better to explain the ontological nature of these two qualities, we should emphasize that we do not mean by these two terms, some sort of psychological dispositions in which case their ontological and epistemic values would be underrated if not completely obliterated. Let us leave the psychological terms to psychologists. When metaphysical and existential entities are reduced to psychological states they are emptied of their spiritual content and are relativized to the point of becoming individual and subjective states[2].

In my understanding, that peace and justice are the ontological qualities embedded in the very nature of things is more or less a common belief in all religions and it is on this basis that religions promulgate these two virtues in the cosmic, social and the individual scales[3].

The great founders of religions whether Moses or Jesus, Buddha or Prophet Muhammad have been the harbingers of Divine Peace and Justice to the human race; and in my esti-

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affirmation is prior logically to negation, even if in a certain sense, the two are correlatives. One corollary of this argument would be that to know the nature of injustice would be impossible without knowing the nature of justice.

[2] It is necessary to interpolate this premiss in order to preclude the psychologistic and on the whole, the reductionist accounts on this issue.

[3] It is worthy of note that in the traditional accounts of the theory of justice what we might call the ontological or the cosmological justice, is given a due emphasis, rarely found in recent and contemporary accounts. Farabi, perhaps the most eminent political philosopher in the land of Islam, almost always starts his political treatises with metaphysical and ontological considerations such as the "degrees of being", "the necessary and the contingent being", "the attributes of being qua being", and so on. This fact bestows on such positive qualities as justice an ontological and cosmological significance. The same could be said *mutatis mutandis* of a Plato, an Augustice, Aristotle, Avicenna, or a Mulla Sadra. As an example see Mulla Sadra, *al-Asfar al-Arba'ah al-aqliyyah*, Vol. 4, p. 117 and Vol. 9, p.289 of the Muzaffar edition.

mation if there is ever to be peace and justice on the surface of the globe, it is only possible through a sympathetic and metaphysical understanding of these supreme world religions.

As a preliminary remark I would like to say that the word "religion" is not a homonymous (one name for quite different meanings) term but a synonymous (one word used exactly for the same meaning) term as when for example we use the word "human" for David, Jack, Mary and all other human beings, male or female alike. If this were not the case it would not be logically permissible to talk of religion in the plural or of the plurality of religions. World religions, in order not to be homonymous must be essentially the same, with, of course, many accidental and contingent differences[4].

With this proviso in mind I shall proceed to discuss very briefly some of the metaphysical presuppositions of peace and justice in religions with a special emphasis on the religion of Islam.

First of all, if we look for the ontological source and fountainhead of peace and justice, we shall find them nowhere else than in the source of all being called differently in

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[4] The argument is as follows: the word "religion" is not a homonymous term because homonyms such as *shir* in Persian or *'ayn* in Arabic or butter (a dairy product and he who butts) in English happen to be homonyms and are used homonymously in one single language to the exclusion of all other languages. For example the three meanings of *shir* (milk, lion and faucet) are not found together in any other language. So "religion" is used synonymously in all languages. Now we use a word synonymously only when it possesses a single essence shared by all individuals participating in that essence, otherwise the term would be homonymous. The insertion of this premiss was meant to point out that religions, if the word is used properly, have *mutatis mutandis* the same essence and what we argue here in the case of Islam, with some reservations might apply to other religions as well. For an elaboration of this thesis see for example; *Frithjof Schuon, The Transcendent Unity of Religions*, Faber and Faber, London, 1953.

different religions as Yahwah, Elohim, Allah, God, Heaven and the like. In all religions peace is an attribute and a gift from Heaven and can only be found in one's reconciliation with Heaven and in one's making peace with the source of all being. In Islam peace and justice are among the most beautiful Names of God.

> *He is Allah than whom there is no other God, the Sovereign Lord, the Most Holy One, Peace, the Keeper of Security, the Guardian, the Majestic, the Compeller, the Superb, Glorified be Allah from all that they ascribe unto Him*[5]

This means that His Attribute of peace, due to His quality of *al-Latif* (The All-Subtle) has penetrated everything[6].

Again religions view the being of the cosmos and of man in a different light which give peace and justice a different shade of meaning.

In religions, what we generally call being, is conceived also in different terms. In the Holy Qur'an we seldom hear the word being. The Qur'anic expression for this term is the Divine Mercy (*Rahmah)* and as a matter of fact, one of the most comprehensive Divine Names, next to the Holy Name of Allah, is the Name *al-Rahman* or the All-Merciful.

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[5] Holy Qur'an LIX:23

[6] In the Holy Qur'an much emphasis is laid upon Divine Attributes as it is attested to by the immediately preceding verse. ***And God taught Adam all the Names*** (II:31) signified that man as the vicegerent of God on earth (*Khalifah*) and as a being created in the image of God, has virtually in himself all the Divine Attributes, including peace and justice.

> *Say, call Him by the Name of Allah or by the Name of al-Rahman (All Merciful) by whichever Name you call Him to Him belong all the Most Beautiful Names.*[7]

> *My Mercy has encompassed everything*[8]

So it can be safely said that every thing in the universe is an expression and a manifestation of Divine *Rahmah,* or the All-Embracing Mercy of God[9]. In addition, from the same root, there is derived another attribute of God, *Rahim* which usually is rendered in English as the All Compassionate and designates the special Mercy of God to believers and the folk of faith. It connotes the special Grace of God to believers, from which the disbelievers are deprived. Again *Sakinah* or inward peace is one of the concomitants of faith and a token of Divine Grace[10].

> *It is He Who sent down the Sakinah (Inward Peace) into the hearts of believers that they might add faith unto their faith.*[11]

Inward peace and serenity are among the intrinsic features of Islam. The word "Islam", which is usually rendered into Eng-

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[7] Holy Qur'an XVII

[8] Holy Qur'an VII: 156

[9] This, more or less applies to all other religions. For example in Hinduism what we simply call "being" is associated with the ternary *sat* (being), *chit* (consciousness) and *ananda* (supreme bliss). In other words these are three different aspects of the same reality. In the traditional religions perspective these three intrinsic aspects of reality are not to be separated. See S.H.Nasr, *Knowledge and the Sacred,* Crossroads Publishing Co., New York, 1981, Chapter One.

[10] In Sufism these two aspects of the Divine Mercy are associated with the two arcs of descent *(qaus-i-nozool)* and of ascent *(qaus-i-şo'oud)*

[11] Holy Qur'an XLVIII:5

lish as "submission" is derived from the Arabic root *Silm* (peace) and means to "make peace". Islam is not only to submit oneself to the Will of God, it is also to make peace with everything in the universe; it is to be in harmony with all creatures and with all fellow beings. Moreover, the word of greeting and salutation in the Islamic Community is *Salamun Alaykum* (or peace be upon you" and according to the Holy Qur'an, "peace" is the word of salutation of the people of paradise.[12]

Again one of the epithets of paradise in the Qur'an is the "Abode of Peace" (Dar as-Salam), evidently because there the Divine Peace reigns supreme. "*Therein they shall hear no idle talk, no cause of sin, only the saying 'peace, peace*".[13] Moreover, Allah calls forth all people to the Abode of peace. All believers are enjoined to enter the peace of God: *Believers, enter the peace, all of you, and follow not the steps of Satan; he is a manifest foe unto you.*

Time an again it is emphasized that God is not an unjust dealer with his servants[14], and that He disapproves of the unjust[15]. Again it reiterates that God does not guide the unjust people[16]. There is a close association between the Divine guidance and the realization of justice. In one context the term justice (*'adl*) is conjoined to the term *sidq* (Truthfulness), with regard to the fulfillment of the word of God, *Perfect are the words of thy Lord in truthfulness and justice; no man can change His words*[17]. Still in other contexts it is associated with *Haqq* which means truth and reality and in fact is

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[12] Holy Qur'an XIV:23
[13] Holy Qur'an X:25
[14] Holy Qur'an III: 182, VIII:51, XX:10, XLI:46
[15] Holy Qur'an III:57, III:42, III:40
[16] Holy Qur'an XXVIII:50, LXI:7, LXII:5
[17] Holy Qur'an VI:115

one of the Beautiful Names of God[18] a term which commentators such as Baydāwi have construed to mean as truth, wisdom and measure[19].

Disbelievers show belligerency and make corruption on earth, but if they incline to peace, the Prophet is commanded to incline to peace and to put his trust in God.[20]; again believers are commanded not to be faint in calling for peace[21]. Jesus Christ is alluded to as a paragon of Divine Peace: "*And peace be upon him the day he was born, the day he shall die and the day he shall be resurrected.*"

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Before starting our discussion on justice we should cast a cursory glace at the idea in the philosophy of Plato, who has written extensively on the subject and the subtitle of whose *magnum opus* the *Politeria* or the *Republica* is *On Justice* (peri dikaiosyne). This is very significant for our discussion with regard to the fact that all Abrahamic religions, in their historical development had an encounter with Greek philosophy and with Plato, in particular[22].

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[18] Holy Qur'an XIV:19, XVI:3, XXXIX:5, XLVI:3, LXIV:3

[19] Baydawi, Anwar al-Tanzil under the quoted verses; Majid Fakhry, *Ethical Theories in Islam*, E.J.Brill, Leiden, 1991, p.P.16

[20] Holy Qur'an VIII:61

[21] Holy Qur'an XLVII: 35

[22] We have singled out Plato for a discussion about justice in Greek philosophy, first, because of his vast and extensive treatment of this subject in his dialogues especially in the *Republic*; second, because he was known as "Divine Plato" by such Muslim sages as Farabi, Suhrawardi, Ibn Arabi and Mulla Sadra (Aristotle being deprived of the epithet), third, because Aristotle was a late comer in the philosophical stage in these three sister civilizations especially in Christianity.

In Platonic philosophy there is a parallelism or rather a metaphysical correspondence between the microcosm and the macrocosm, between man and the universe on the one hand, and between man and the state on the other. So here we shall proceed on a very brief discussion of justice in the human being and for brevity's sake forego the discussion of justice in the state and the cosmos mainly because according to Plato justice in the state is the same as justice in the human being but "writ large" and perhaps in the cosmos "writ the largest".

Plato's scheme of virtues, needless to say, is based on the tripartite division of the soul, each virtue being the sum-total of one of the three longitudinal levels in the hierarchy of the soul, justice being the culmination and the consummation of these three virtues.

According to Plato the lower part of the body is the locus of the appetitive faculty which like a greedy horse voraciously devours everything at its disposal and impedes the soul from taking flight toward the heaven. The irascible faculty is seated in the breast and the highest faculty of the soul, that is the intellective is lodged in the head and due to its nobility is separated from the rest of the body by the neck; Demiurge having taken utmost care that it should not be mixed and intermingled with the rest of the body[23].

Now according to Plato each faculty of the soul has its distinctive virtue; the virtue of the appetitive faculty is temperance (sophrosyne) or self mastery which enables the soul to overcome the lasciviousness of the appetitive faculty. The proper virtue of the irascible faculty is courage (andreia)

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[23] This tripartite division of the faculties of the soul and their corresponding virtues has been preponderant in the ethical theories among Islamic moral philosophers. See for example, Majid Fakhry, *Ethical Theories in Islam*, E.J.Brill, Leiden, 1991, p. 64.

which is not blind insolence, but the right use of this faculty in accordance with the verdicts of the Divine intellect. The virtue proper to and distinctive of the intellective faculty is *Sophia* or the Divine Wisdom which causes the soul to ascend to the vision of the Idea of the Good in the Realm Yonder, speculating the eternal archetypes of things earthly in the sphere below, contemplating the primordial ideas in the intelligible universe, attaining to the real and absolute knowledge by beholding the eternal prototypes in the Divine Realm. Justice (dikaiosyne) according to Plato is not possible without the possession of virtues and particularly without the mastery and realization of wisdom; because if justice is to put everything in its right and proper place, its realization, is impossible without knowledge of the highest kind, that is without philosophy in the Platonic understanding of the term. Justice, in the true sense of the word can only be realized when the intellective faculty reigns supreme in the human being dominating wisely the appetitive and the irascible souls. Justice in Plato's view whether political or ethical is impossible without the realization of virtues; Farabi, one of the greatest political philosophers of Islam has extensively dealt with this issue in his numerous works especially in his *Ideas of the Inhabitants of the Virtuous City (Ãra' ahl al-madinah al-fãdilah)*[24].

Justice in the state according to Plato is only realized when either true philosophers become rulers or rulers by a sort of Divine providence turn into philosophers. Only philosopher-kings can safeguard the supremacy of justice in the state; the other two castes of the community, i.e. the Guardians (representing the irascible soul in the state) on the one

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[24] Farabi, *Kitab Ārā' ahl al-Madinah, al-Fadilah,* ed. By al Bir Nasri Nadir, Dar al-Mashriq, Beirut, 1991.

hand and craftsmen, farmers and merchants (representing the appetitive soul) on the other, should be the auxiliaries of the philosopher-king (representing the intellective soul) in the state.

From the Islamic viewpoint, justice, like all other perfections manifested in the world, is a Divine Attribute and according to some Muslim sages and theologians *ʿadl* (justice) is the most conspicuous of the Divine Attributes so much so that even some of them have made belief in Divine Justice one of the articles of Islamic faith[25]. According to the Islamic sources the Justice of God is manifest in everything and according to the Muslim sage-philosophers *ʿadl* or justice is one of the attributes of Being qua Being and according to a saying attributed to the Holy Prophet: "It is by justice that the heavens and the earth were created and are maintained." Concerning social and political justice, the Prophet of Islam made the following observation which constitutes one of the essentials of the Islamic political theory: "Political authority (lit. kingdom=*al-mulk*) can be maintained with disbelief, but never with injustice."

Much emphasis is placed on justice in the Holy Qur'an and plenty of verses enjoin the virtue of justice both in theory and in practice. In Chapter 42, Verse 15, the Holy Prophet is commanded to establish justice among the believers. In another verse, believers are enjoined to be the securers of justice and witnesses for God and should not let the detestation for a people provoke them not to be just and equitable, because being just is nearer to God-fearing.[26] One should speak justly even if it be against oneself or a near kinsman.[27] To practice

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[25] Such is the case with Mu'tazilites and the Shi'ite theologians who have made belief in Divine Justice an obligatory article of faith.

[26] Holy Qur'an V:8

[27] Holy Qur'an VI: 152

justice is to fulfill God's covenant[28]. To deliver trusts back to their owners and to judge among people with justice is again a command of God incumbent on all believers. The Holy Prophet is bidden to be just in his judgments: *...and if thou judgest, judge justly between them; verily God loves the just.*[29] Believers again are commanded to be just in their weights and measures.[30] Most perfect are the words of the Lord in Truthfulness and justice; no one can change his words[31] . The highest branch of knowledge which is attestation to Divine Unity belongs only to those Divine scholars who are upright and just". *God bears witness that there is no God but He – and the angels and men possessed of knowledge upholding justice.*[32] *In the Day of Judgment the Balance of Justice is set up*[33]and finally God has sent down with the prophets, the Book and the Balance, that people might set up justice. These are only some among the many verses related to the issue of justice and equity in the Holy Qur'an.

The question now arises whether peace and justice are interrelated? In Platonic terms one might say that, peace is the aspect of serenity and tranquility arising from rhythm and beauty of the world ordered by Divine Wisdom and justice. Some sufi metaphysicians might say that peace and justice are two aspects of the Divine Attributes, the former belonging to the aspect of beauty *(Jamāl)* and the latter to the aspect of rigor *(Jalal).* According to some Sufis such as Ibn Arabi the attribute of justice reigns supreme even among the Divine Qualities, to bring about harmony and equilibrium among the

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28 *ibid*
29 Holy Qur'an V: 42
30 Holy Qur'an VI: 152
31 Holy Qur'an VI: 116
32 Holy Qur'an III: 18
33 Holy Qur'an XXI: 47

Divine Attributes, so that they might not transgress their proper bounds[34].

Again it should be emphasized that according to Muslim sages, the realization of justice is not feasible except on the basis of real knowledge or in other words sapiential wisdom[35]. This is true both in God and in human beings, justice and wisdom not being homonymous terms in God and human beings. Justice and wisdom can only be stipulated when the validity of the epistemic and intellective faculty (the intellect or noesis in Plato) has already been taken for granted. There can be no justice without gnosis (*ma'rifah*) and intellection. That is why the staunch antagonists of the idea of justice in religions are the adherents of the anti-intellectual and the anti-rational trends such as fideists, voluntarists, and the casuists[36].

"The supreme knowledge" leading to the authentication and realization of peace and justice is possible in two ways and the rule of *tertium non datur* finds a very good exemplification here. Such knowledge can be gained either through the noetic and sapiential wisdom of the great sage- philosophers of the Hellenic, Hellenistic, Judaic, Christian and Muslim traditions exemplified by such figures as Plato, Aristotle,

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[34] For a discussion of Divine Names as related to Divine Justice see the introduction of Qaysari to the *Fusus-al-Hikam* of Ibn Arabi, Chapter 2.

[35] Justice, of any order, Divine, metaphysical, cosmic, social or ethical, presupposes knowledge related to that order, especially knowledge of a more primordial nature, that is sapiential wisdom. This is significant because certain schools of philosophy and theology have denigrated, disavowed or simply repudiated the role of knowledge in the problem of justice.

[36] By fideists are meant those who stress the role of faith at the expense of either the reason or of the intellect. By voluntarists are signified those who give priority to the human or the Divine Will, at the expense of knowledge and wisdom. A casuist is one who sticks to the literal meaning of the word to the point of killing the spirit. These three anti-rationalist genres have not been and are not lacking in religions.

Plotinus, Philo, St. Augustine, St. Thomas, Farabi, Ibn Arabi, Avicenna, Suhrawardi, Mulla Sadra, Maimonides and the like, or through the teachings of the founders of great religions such as Moses, Jesus, Prophet Muhammad, Buddha, the writers of the Hindu sacred texts, Confucius, Lao-Tse and the like, provided that their teachings are construed and interpreted esoterically and in accordance with the sacred doctrine inherent in the inner logic of the said religions and the related sacred texts.

One of the greatest achievements of the Abrahamic religions, which is of particular significance and relevance in the world today, is the reconciliation of these two trends, that is the sapiential philosophy of the mentioned traditions and the *hikmah* (Divine Wisdom) of religions attributed in the Holy Qur'an to all the revealed books, prophets, sages and the saints[37].

As the last remark, I would like to stress here that philosophy as a way for the attainment of truth is not meant for all, but is destined for a few élite, whereas religions are meant for the collectivity including, of course, the elite. Does this mean that revealed religions make sapiential philosophy preposterous and redundant? Not at all; sapiential philosophy permits us always to break the shell and penetrate the very core and kernel of the revelation, in whose absence we would only cling to the circumference and the periphery.

In the end, I would like to draw my final conclusion from all the premisses stated above, that global peace and justice are impossible without a sapiential understanding of world religions as such and without the mutual and reciprocal

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[37] One of the ironies of Divine providence is that this encounter was made possible in the matrix of the Abrahamic religions. The science of revealed theology *(ilm-i-Kalam)* was also the fruit of such an encounter.

understanding and collaboration of religions through coming to the realization that it is the vocation of religions to save mankind by the practice of virtue, love and attainment of truth and by binding him once again to the Grace of Heaven.

Value of Life in Islam

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No doubt life in its all forms enjoys a very high status in Islam. Life is a divine quality and a gift of God. It is only God who can bring into life and again it is only Him who can put an end to the life of living beings. Human life is one of the most sacred beings created by God. Therefore, it must be appreciated, respected, protected, and taken care of. Human life must not be manipulated: neither in its beginning, nor in its end. Reproduction must occur in the context of a legitimate and stable family. Human life must be regulated according to divine instructions, that is, to its best and towards a *fully* human one. Murder, abortion, euthanasia and suicide demonstrate lack of respect for human life and are morally wrong.

Among God's attributes and names in Islamic scriptures, "the Living" (*al-ʾayy*) is one of the most obvious and outstanding one. The Qur'an says:

> And put your trust in the Living one who dies not, and glorify His praise... (25:58)
> He is the Living, there is no God but He, therefore call on Him, being sincere to Him in obedience. All praise is due to God, the Lord of the worlds. (40:65)

Who is the giver of life and death? This is one of the basic questions in bioethics, which can entirely influence one's approach towards life and its treatment. If one believes that life is created by chance or that man can create it himself, then it

would lose its sanctity and the result would be that it could also be destroyed by chance or by man. But if life is a gift of God then who are we to take it away?

God is the only source of life. In other words, He originates all forms of life. This is an idea on which the Qur'an puts special emphasis. For example, we read:

> Verily, it is God who causes the seed-grain and the fruit stone (like date-stone) to split and sprout. He brings forth the living from the dead, and it is He who brings forth the dead from the living. Such is God, then how are you deluded away from the truth? (6:95)
> And a sign for them is the dead land. We give it life, and we bring forth from it grains, so that they eat thereof. (36:33)

Thus, life is a gift of God, for which we are held responsible. Not only is it only God who gives life, but also it is only God who brings life to an end. For example, we read in the Qur'an:

> There is no God but He. It is He who gives life and causes death – your Lord and the Lord of your forefathers. (44:8)
> ...You bring the living out of the dead, and you bring the dead out of the living. And You give sustenance to whom You will, without limit. (3:27)
> It is He who gives life and causes death. And when He decides upon a thing He says to it only: "Be!" – and it is. (40:68)
> Say (to them): "God gives you life, then causes you to die, then He will assemble you on the Day of Resurrection about which there is no doubt. But most of mankind know not." (45:26)[1]

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[1] There are much more verses referring to the fact that life and death are exclusively created by God like: 3:156, 9:117, 10:31, 22:6, 30:4, 50:43, 53:44, 57:2, 67:2.

The Qur'an blames those who attribute death to things like making trips, fighting, illness or to people.

> O you who believe! Be not like those who disbelieve and say about their brethren when they travel on the earth or go out to fight: "If they had stayed with us, they would not have died or been killed," so that God may make it a cause of regret in their hearts. It is God that gives life and causes death. And God is All-seer of what you do. (3:156)

According to the Qur'an, refuting Nimrod's claim of deity, the Prophet Abraham said (to him): "My lord is He who gives life and causes death." (2:258) Nimrod said: "I give life and cause death." (Ibid) Then he asked a prisoner who was supposed to be executed to be released and another prisoner who was not supposed to be killed to be executed. When Abraham saw the depth of Nimrod's ignorance or deception concerning the real meaning of *giving life* and *causing death* and the acceptance of the people who were present he said to Nimrod:

> "Verily, God causes the sun to rise from the east; then cause it you rise from the west." So the disbeliever was utterly defeated. And God does not guide the unjust people. (Ibid)

Now, let us reflect on the real meaning of giving life and causing death. Does it mean that nothing other than God can bear on or get involved in the process of giving life or causing death? Obviously, the answer is no. For example, reproduction is certainly a form of involvement in the process of life. It is also true about feeding and catering. Children feel indebted towards their parents for their life. On the other hand,

a murderer is held responsible for –in a sense- causing death to his victim.[2] It is true that Nimrod or even his agents could have a significant role in death of the victim. However, it is still true that "it is God that gives life and causes death". (3:156). So was Abraham's argument against Nimrod that "My lord is He Who gives life and causes death." (2:258)

The great Shi'a exegete of the Qur'an, Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba'i writes:

> When Ibrahim [=Abraham] mentioned life and death, he meant life and death as we find them in living things. His argument was that the One who was the source of life could only create these living things. Lifeless nature cannot bestow life on others when it has no life itself...
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> If NamrAd [Nimrod] had interpreted Ibr¯h¸m's argument honestly, he could not have refuted it at all. But he resorted to deception, interpreting life and death with an allegorical meaning. "To give life" really means, for example, to create a living foetus; but it may be used equally correctly (but in metaphorical way) if you rescue someone from an extremely dangerous situation. Likewise, "to cause to die" really means the act of God by which a soul departs from a body; but metaphorically it may be used for murder, etc. (1982, vol. 4, p. 184)

Thus, it is possible to suppose that man and natural environment can have role in the process of giving life and causing death. The reason is this: *in this world God usually acts through natural rules and cause-effect system.*[3] It is also pos-

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[2] Even more, whoever can save an innocent life but keeps indifferent and lets the person die is morally responsible.

[3] Of course, there have been miracles and extraordinary acts performed by the Prophets or holy people. These may seem to contradict the general rule mentioned above: "In this world God usually acts through natural rules and cause and effect system". However, it must be noted first that

sible to suppose that natural factors and circumstances may have role in something being created or brought into existence.[4] However, it is only God who truly and genuinely brings into existence or gives life.[5] We humans have no control or even complete knowledge of our existence or life. So how is it possible to suppose that we can grant existence or life to something else?

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miraculous and extraordinary acts do not represent the *usual* procedure, and second that even in the case of such acts there is no exception to the cause-effect system. The only difference is that instead of natural causes supernatural causes are used. Just as there are natural causes, say, for treatment of an ill person, there may be supernatural causes, such as prayer and giving charity.

[4] Muslim philosophers divide beings into two main groups: beings of the Universe of Command (*ʿ̃lam al-Amr*) and beings of the Universe of Creation (*ʿ̃lam al-Khalq*). For the existence of the first group, there is no need for material conditions. This is related to abstract beings (*al-mujarrad ̃t*) whose creation only depends on God's command, that is, "Be!" For the existence of the latter, material conditions are needed. This is related to material beings (*al-m ̃d̠y ̃t*), whether they be material just at the beginning or they remain material forever. Here Divine command for their existence is not issued before completion of necessary conditions, such as the existence of an apple after the existence of natural conditions like water, heat and light or after the existence of supernatural conditions. In other words, for the creation or existence of the first group it is only originating cause (*al-ʿ̃illah al-f ̃ʿ̃il̠yah*) which is needed, but for the creation of the latter group both originating cause and material cause (*al-ʿ̃illah al-m ̃d̠yah*) are needed.

[5] It has to be noted that God may revive something in hand of whom He is pleased with. For example, the Qur'an talks about Abraham who was practically shown *how* God gives life to the dead. (2:260). Another example is Jesus who was able to "bring the dead to life with God's permission". (3:49)

Sanctity of life

All forms of life are precious and are considered as signs (*al-ʾyah*) of God. However, among all forms of life in the material world, human life is the most outstanding and the most precious. Referring to different stages of the creation of mankind, the Qur'an says:

> And certainly we created man of an extract of clay. Then we made him a zygote in a firm resting-place. Then we made the zygote a clot, then we made the clot a lump of flesh, then we made (in) the lump of flesh bones, then we caused it to grow into another creation, so blessed be God, the Best of creators. (23:14)

The above verse refers to different phases of the creation of man. The firs part i.e. creation from soil refers to the creation of first man, that is Adam. The next part refers to the creation of Adam's offspring, generation by generation. Human life is so important that God mentions its development step by step and finally after reference to the creation of spirit - which is considered as "*khalqan ʾkhar*" – says: "Blessed be the Best of creators!" (23:14). If the Creator of man is the best of Creators, man himself must be the best of creatures – at least potentially.

Life is one of the greatest gifts and blessings of God and, therefore, must be appreciated and respected. Killing an innocent person not only is considered as a criminal act (i.e. murder), but also represents an underestimation of and insult to human life as a whole. The fact is interestingly expressed in the following verse:

> For this reason We prescribed to the Children of Israel that whoever slays a soul, unless it be for manslaughter or for mischief in the land, it is as though he slew all men; and whoever keeps it alive, it is as though he kept alive all men; and certainly Our messengers came to

> them with clear proofs, but even after that many of them certainly act extravagantly in the land. (5:32)

One may conclude from the above verse that:

a. Causing death to one person unjustifiably is like causing death to all people. In other words, lack of respect for an individual life demonstrates lack of respect for life as such and, therefore, for all individual lives.[6] This is in addition to the fact that whoever commits a murder is likely to murder more people and endanger all people.[7]

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[6] Commenting on the above verse, 'Allamah Tabataba'i writes:

> The Divine words: "whoever slays a soul, ... it is as though he slew all men", are an allusion to the fact that all men have one single reality, that is humanity in which all are united, and one and all are equal in it; whoever attacks the humanity found in one of them, he attacks the humanity found in all of them". (2001, vol. 10, p. 146)

It is narrated in both *Al-Kāfī* and *Maēānī al-Akhbār* that the fifth Imam of the Shiēa, Imam al-Bāqir, was asked: "How can it be as though he slew all men, while he had slain a single soul?" The Imam replied: "He will be put in a place in Jahannam (Gehenna) where the punishment of the people of the Fire reaches its utmost limit; if he had killed all men, he would have entered the same place." The narrator again asked: "Then if he killed another (man)?" Imam replied: "The punishment will be increased for him". According to the verse, this hadith and other hadiths, 'Allamah Tabataba'i concludes that "equality is in the nature of punishment and difference will be in intensity of punishment and the effect it will have on the killer". (Ibid, p. 152)

[7] According to a hadith from the Prophet Mohammad, heart of man admits aspiration and fear unless he sheds blood unjustifiably. When he sheds blood unjustly his heart becomes upside down and very dark so that he does not recognize the good. Nor does he condemn the evil. (*Kanz al-ēUmmāl*, no. 39951)

b. Giving life to one person or more precisely saving one person out of one's respect for life is like saving all people (from killing dangers).
c. Causing death to a murderer or someone who does mischief on the earth is permitted since it demonstrates respect for the lost life and prevents further dangers and damage to life as a whole. This is why the Qur'an considers legislation of retaliation needed and as a source of life, though prefers pardon when there is no fear of threat to the security of the public.[8]

In Islamic law and morality, murder in general and murder of believers in particular is very severely treated to the extent that the Qur'an sets out an everlasting punishment of hell for those who deliberately commit such an act. We read also in Islamic hadiths that the destruction of the whole (non-living) world is less vicious in the eyes of God than murder of an innocent person.

Animal life

We also find in Islamic hadiths that even killing or destroying animals unjustifiably is very severely treated. For example, Imam Sadiq, the sixth Imam of the Shiēa, has informed about the Divine punishment of a woman who had fastened a cat with the rope so that the cat could not move and died out of thirst.[9] A typical view among the Shiēa jurists can be found in the following passage by 'Allamah Mohammad Taqi Jaēfari:

> Consideration of whole sources of Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*) leads to the conclusion that animals must not be killed unless there is a legal permission (by God) like benefiting from them or being safe from their

[8] For example, see the Qur'an (2:178 & 179).
[9] *Bi˜r al-Anw˜r*, Vol. 76, p. 136.

> harm. There are adequate reasons for prohibiting hunting animals for fun and one can argue from these reasons for prohibition of killing animals without having a permitting cause.[10]

The above idea is part of a broader Islamic perspective on animal life. According to Islamic law, there are many rights for animals that must be observed. Consideration of those rights shows that not only their life must be protected, but also the quality of their life must be observed. For example, animals must not be forced to carry heavy goods or to move faster than they tolerate. Neither can animals be cursed or sworn at. It is reported that Imam Ali said: "Whoever curse an animal he himself will be cursed by God."[11]

Beginning of human life: Human life must not be tampered in its beginning

Due to the high value of human life, Islam attaches a very special attention to it before it starts and this continues after it ends with death. The only proper and legitimate way for having a child is through marriage. In other words, a male and female may have a child only when they appreciate the value of human life and therefore are committed to take the full responsibility of bringing up a child in the sacred institution of family. Marriage is not just a financial or physical arrangement for having sexual relation or living together. Neither is it just a legal contract between a man and woman. Marriage is a sacred covenant between the two and God is the witness of it. Marriage is a gift of God for human beings

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[10] *Rasʾil-e Fiqh*, p. 250. Elsewhere he writes: "Hunting animals for amusement and without need is prohibited. Therefore, if someone makes a trip for such a hunting his trip is a sinful trip". (Ibid, p. 118)

[11] Ibid. cited from *Wasʾil al-Shēah*, Vol. 8, p. 356.

to supplement each other and to console themselves with each other. The Qur'an says:

> Among His signs is [the fact] that He has created spouses for you from among yourselves so that you may console yourselves with them. He has planted affection and mercy between you; in that are signs for people who contemplate. (30:21)
> God has granted you spouses from among yourselves, and granted you children and grandchildren by means of your spouses. He has provided you with wholesome things. So will they still believe in vain things and be ungrateful to God's favour? (16:72)

Violation of this sacred covenant by adultery or by homosexual relations is unlawful and is unanimously rejected by all Muslim scholars. It seems also immoral to use modern biotechnology to bypass marriage and reproduce human beings artificially and out of the context of family. Of course, a married couple may use legitimate biomedical techniques for parenting. The Qur'an says:

> He is the One who created humanity from water. Then he established blood ties as well as in-laws. (25:54)

Human life must be respected from its beginning

On the beginning of life, a typical Islamic point of view can be found in the following statement by Islamic Organization for Medical Sciences:

> **One:** The inception of life occurs with the union of a sperm and an ovum, forming a zygote which carries the full genetic code of the human race in general and of the particular individual, who is different from all others throughout the ages. The zygote begins a process of cleavage that yields a growing and developing embryo,

> which progresses through the stages of gestation towards birth.
>
> **Two:** From the moment a zygote settles inside a woman's body, it deserves a unanimously recognized degree of respect, and a number of legal stipulations, known to all scholars, apply to it.
>
> **Three:** When it arrives at the spirit-breathing stage...the foetus acquires greater sanctity, as all scholars agree, and additional legal stipulations apply to it.[12]

When does human life start?

Islam considers having children as a great gift of God and highly recommends people to get married and establish family ties and have children. However, Islam does not compel people to get married or have children after marriage unless there is an overriding (secondary) reason which makes marriage and formation of family or having children necessary. For example, if the only way to protect one's piety and chastity is to get married or if the protection of the people of faith from the attacks of enemies depend on the increase in the number of the members of the society, it becomes compulsory to get married and have children.[13]

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12 The Full Minutes of the Seminar on "Human Life: Its Inception and End as Viewed by Islam", Held on January 15, 1985 A.D. in Kuwait. (http://www.islamset.com/bioethics/incept.html)
It has to be noted that this organization is not a Shi'a organization. However, what has been mentioned above is in general acceptable to both Sunni and Shi'a Muslims.

13 In his *Marriage and Morals in Islam* Chapter Four, S.M. Rizvi writes:

> *According* to the Shi 'ah *fiqh*, family planning as a private measure to space or regulate the family size for health or economic reasons is permissible. Neither is there any Qur'anic verse or *hadith* against birth control, nor is it wajib [obligatory] to have children in marriage. So basically, birth control would come under the category of *ja'iz*, lawful acts. Moreover, we have some

Thus, Islam allows family planning to prevent pregnancy, but does not allow its termination.[14] Now, naturally the question arises as to when pregnancy starts and whether the beginning of pregnancy coincides with the beginning of human life or not. Regarding the beginning of pregnancy from a religious point of view, the question is whether pregnancy begins (1) With the entering of semen into the uterus, (2) with the fertilization of an ovum by a sperm in the fallopian tube or (3) with the implantation of a fertilized ovum in the uterus.

As we saw above, "from the moment a zygote settles inside a woman's body, it deserves a unanimously recognized degree of respect, and a number of legal stipulations, known to all scholars, apply to it". In other words, it is the combination of the above three things that constitutes religious pregnancy. The Qur'an uses the word "*˜aml*" to describe pregnancy. (See the Qur'an, 19:22; 31:14; 46:15) In Arabic, the term "*˜aml*" means to carry, and this starts when the zygote is implanted in the uterus and not before it. The late Ayatollah Khu'i said: "The criterion in applying the [word] 'pregnant' for a woman is correct only after the settling down (*istiqrar*) of the sperm in her womb because just the entering of the sperm in her womb does not make her pregnant."[15]

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ahadith (especially on the issue of *'azl, coitus interruptus*) which categorically prove that birth control is permissible.

Later he adds that "the majority of our mujtahids believe that coitus interruptus is allowed but *makruh* [disliked] without the wife's consent. (*Sharh al-Lum'ah,* vol. 2, p. 28; *al-'Urwah,* p. 628; *Minhaj,* vol. 2, p. 267) "

[14] Family planning in itself is not forbidden, but there are methods of family planning which are not allowed. The details are discussed by Muslim jurists.

[15] Ibid., cited from al-Gharawi, Mirza 'Ali, *Al-Tanq˜f, Shar˜i al-'Urwat al-Wuthq˜* (notes of the *fiqh* lectures of Ayatollah al-Khu'i), vol. 7, p. 206 (Najaf: al-Adab Press, 1988) S.M.Rizvi adds that in 1987 he wrote to Ayatollah

Thus, from the very beginning of the pregnancy its termination is prohibited and the zygote must be protected. The respect shown to the zygote at this early stage does not necessarily mean that it is a real human being.[16] The zygote is in a state of active potentiality to become a human being with the full genetic code of the human race in general and of the particular individual. As we saw above in the verse 23:13, the implantation of the ovum in the uterus constitutes the first stage of the creation of man. According to a hadith, Is˝˜q b. 'Amm˜r asked Imam al-K˜him whether it is permissible for a woman who fears pregnancy to drink some liquid to abort what is in her uterus or not. Imam replied: "No." Is˝˜q said: "That is the zygote (*nuĀfah*)." Imam replied: "Verily the first thing to be created is the zygote."[17] However, it is only later when the spirit is created that it becomes a real human. For this reason the Shi'a jurists like late Ayatollah Khomeini, Ayatollah Khamenei, Ayatollah Lankarani and Ayatollah Sistani declare that to abort the foetus to save the life of the mother before the spirit of the foetus is created is allowed. But after the spirit is created, to sacrifice the foetus for the sake of the mother is not allowed.[18]

Abortion

As suggested above, Islam prohibits abortion unless there is an exceptional situation in which Shar¸ēah permits it as a

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al-Khu'i asking him whether it is permissible to use a medicine or a device which prevents the fertilized ovum from implanting itself onto the wall of the uterus?" The Ayatollah replied that it is forbidden is to abort the zygote after its settling down, whereas [to prevent pregnancy] before that is alright. (Ibid.)

16 As we saw earlier in the discussion about animal life, the necessity of respect for life is not limited to human life.

17 *Was˜il al-Sh¸'ah*, vol. 19, p.15.

18 *A˝k˜m-e Pezeshk¸*, compiled by M Ruhani and F. Noghani, pp. 107-125.

lesser evil.[19] Abortion especially after the spirit is born is a case of infanticide and the Qur'anic condemnation of killing one's children applies to it. On infanticide, the Qur'an says:

> "Kill not your children for fear of want. We shall provide sustenance for them as well as for you. Verily the killing of them is a great sin." (17:31)
> "Kill not your children on a plea of want. We will provide sustenance for you and for them. Come not near shameful deeds whether open or secret. Take not life, which God has made sacred except by way of justice and law. Thus He commands you that you may learn wisdom." (6:151)
> "The pledge of the believing women that they shall not kill their children." (60:02)
> "And when the female infant who was buried alive is asked for what crime she was killed?" (81:2)

Islam severely condemned the practice of the pagans who killed their children for poverty or for the shame of the birth of a girl. Unfortunately we see that today millions of abortions take place every year. Most of these abortions take place because the "liberated" people of our age would like to enjoy the life of sexual freedom. These are the people "who have taken their religion (way of life) to be mere amusement and play and were deceived by the worldly life". (7:51)

End of life

Islam places great emphasis on the sanctity of life and at the same time on the reality of death. Indeed, to have a better appreciation of life one needs to remember death and that there is no way to escape from it. It is only then that one realizes that it must benefit from one's life optimally. Thus, unlike what many people feel today, Islam considers remem-

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[19] For example, see Article 1.e of OIC (Organization of Islamic Conference) Declaration on Islamic Human Rights, 1990.

brance of death as a source of vitality and spiritual power. About one third of the Qur'an talks about the Resurrection, death and the life after death. For example, we read:

> Every soul shall have a taste of death. (2:35)
> No soul can die except by God's permission. (3:185)
>
> "Everyone is created for a life span and dying is a part of the contract (with God) and the final decision (of term) is up to God. The quality of life is equally or more important than the duration of living."[20]

In his supplication for noble characters (*Makˇrim al-Akhlˇq*) Imam Sajjˇd, the fourth Imam of the Shiēa, asks God:

> Let me live as long as my life is used in serving Thee. When my life becomes a pasture for Satan, be pleased to call me back to Thee before Thy wrath advances towards me or Thy anger be fixed upon me.

It seems to me that one can distinguish between saving a respected life (which is compulsory in Islam) through medical treatment or financial support or otherwise and prolonging the life artificially.[21] For example, if someone is dying because of an advanced cancer and there is no treatment for him. The most that can be done is to use medicine just to keep him alive for few days. The cost of this medicine is so high that the whole family will be greatly troubled. Is it necessary for the patient himself or for his relatives or for others to take this measure? Or if this can be done by a very painful opera-

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[20] Dr. Shahid Athar, "Islamic Perspectives in Medical Ethics" at http://islam-usa.com/im18.html.

[21] This is the author's humble view which he takes to be in compliance with the views of Muslim jurists. However, the issue needs further investigation.

tion is it necessary for the patient to undergo such an operation while there is no possibility of a cure? It seems reasonable to suggest that "the physician and the family should realize their limitations and not attempt heroic measures for a terminally ill patient or to prolong artificially the life (or misery). The heroic measures taken at the beginning of life (i.e. saving a premature baby) may be more justified than at the end of a life span, though each case has to be individualized".[22]

Euthanasia

Islam is against euthanasia (mercy killing). Muslim jurists regard euthanasia as an act of murder. Murder can be performed by a serial killer or by a physician, with a gun or with a syringe, or even by the murdered himself. For example, Ayatollah Khomeini declared that any measure for hastening the death of someone is considered as a murder.[23] Ayatollah Makarim Shirazi declares:

> Killing a human being even out of mercy (euthanasia) or with the consent of the patient is not allowed.[24]

He argues that the main argument for such prohibition is that the verses and the hadiths, which indicate the prohibition of murder (qatl), apply to such cases. The philosophy beyond this prohibition may be the fact that permitting such acts leads to many misuses, acts of euthanasia or suicide may take place for any weak and trivial excuse. Moreover, medical judgements are not always certain and there have been cases in which people who had no hope for life were mysteriously saved from death.

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[22] Ibid.

[23] *A ̃k ̃m-e Pezeshk*, compiled by M Ruhani and F. Nughani, p. 180.

[24] Ibid.

Suicide

If we have not created our life and it is just a gift of God for which we are held responsible it is obvious that we have no absolute power on our lives. Life is a trust of God and we must take care of it to our best. This is the case with all blessings of God, whether they are physical or spiritual. We can benefit from them, but we cannot destroy them or waste them. No one should say I like to burn my property or harm my health or damage my reputation. Our situation in this world is like a guest who is invited to a guesthouse. The host puts whatever is there in the guesthouse for the benefit of the guest. However, the guest cannot burn himself inside the house or destroy the guesthouse or the things put there. This comparison becomes more interesting if we add that our body is also like a guestroom for our spirit and we must observe regulations for using this room set out by God. We must try to please God by preserving life and health, promoting quality of life and alleviating suffering.

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"Peace" as Islam's Essential Soul According to Qur'anic Teachings

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The word "Islam" is derived from the Arabic root words *Silm* and *Salam,* meaning peace, purity, submission and obedience. Islam stands for making peace in relations, and submitting to the will of God - obeying His law and command. Islam is the last and the final religion. A Muslim follows the teachings of Islam, a monotheistic religion characterized by a doctrine of submission to God and to Muhammad as the last prophet of God. Islam is God's final revelation of a prophetic religion, in fulfillment of all that preceded it. Moses was given the Torah; David was given the Psalms; Jesus was given the Gospel. Muslims believe in all of the prophets of the Bible. The Quran itself mentions the Torah and the Gospel as scriptures revealed by God to Moses and Jesus. Islam brings to fulfillment all that Judaism and Christianity anticipated. For the Muslim believer, Islam is perfected Judaism and perfected Christianity. But, as history shows us, the present biblical texts were formed many decades after Jesus, and some changes were made to the actual biblical texts. For these reasons, Muslims cannot rely absolutely on the Torah and the Gospels as sources of revelation, unless the Quran confirms them or they are at least in harmony with it.

Furthermore, as the Quran says, Islam is the authentic religion of Adam, Abraham, and human nature. Islam is not younger than Judaism and Christianity; it preceded both. According to the Muslim faith, every person is born a Muslim.

Islam's Call for Peace

Islam does not allow Muslims to kill people merely because they embrace a different faith or even because they do not embrace any faith, nor does it allow Muslims to fight against those who disagree with them on religious questions. It urges its followers to treat such people kindly:

> GOD does not enjoin you from befriending those who do not fight you because of religion, and do not evict you from your homes. You may befriend them and be equitable towards them. GOD loves the equitable. [60:8]

In another place, God says:

> .....Therefore, if they leave you alone, refrain from fighting you, and offer you peace, then GOD gives you no excuse to fight them. [4:90]

> If they resort to peace, so shall you, and put your trust in GOD. He is the Hearer, the Omniscient. [8:61]

Instructions like these pave the way for the establishment of peace, and go in harmony with the present tendency to set down principles that call for the abolishment of war.

Islam, in fact, makes peace with a special greeting which Muslims exchange whenever they meet, 'Assalamu Alaykum', which means, 'Peace be unto you'. The Muslim also utters this statement at the end of each prayer, at least five times a day.

Islam's relationship with non-Muslims has been guided by Quranic verses such as:

> Let there be no compulsion in religion: Truth stands out clear from Error: whoever rejects evil and believes in Allah hath grasped the most trustworthy hand-hold,

> that never breaks. And Allah heareth and knoweth all things. [2:256]
>
> Allah forbids you not, with regard to those who fight you not for (your) Faith nor drive you out of your homes, from dealing kindly and justly with them: for Allah loveth those who are just. [60:8]

This is Islam as most Muslims understand and follow it.

Peace-building Values in Islam

Islam is a religion of art, science and peace. Islam advocates numerous nonviolent and peace-building values. These values are supported by the Quran and the Hadith (the Prophet's sayings), some of which I mention here:

Justice: The duty to pursue justice.

> O ye who believe! stand out firmly for Allah, as witnesses to fair dealing, and let not the hatred of others to you make you swerve to wrong and depart from justice. Be just: that is next to piety: and fear Allah. For Allah is well-acquainted with all that ye do. [5:8]

Almighty Allah is Just and The Wisest of Judges.

> Is not Allah the wisest of judges? [95:8]
>
> There is no God but He: That is the witness of Allah, His angels, and those endued with knowledge, standing firm on Justice. There is no God but He, the Exalted in Power, the Wise. [3:18]
>
> These are the Signs of Allah. We rehearse them to thee in Truth: And Allah means no in Justice to any of His creatures. [3:108]

> The word of thy Lord doth find its fulfillment in truth and in Justice: None can change His words: for He is the one who heareth and knoweth all. [6:115]

He established the universal system and all that is in it on the principle of balance and justice.

> And the Firmament has He raised high, and He has set up the Balance (of Justice), in order that ye may not transgress (due) balance. [55:7-8]

> We sent aforetime our apostles with Clear Signs and sent down with them the Book and the Balance (of Right and Wrong), that men may stand forth in justice. [57: 25]

> Allah doth command you to render back your Trusts to those to whom they are due; And when ye judge between man and man, that ye judge with Justice: Verily how excellent is the teaching which He giveth you! For Allah is He Who heareth and seeth all things. [4:58]

> Allah commands Justice, the doing of good, and liberality to kith and kin, and He forbids all shameful deeds, and in Justice and rebellion: He instructs you, that ye may receive admonition. [16:90]

Thus the pursuit of justice exists in the very nature of humankind and is the primary objective of the Islamic system in all affairs of human life. It has been made incumbent on those who respond to the call of Almighty Allah.

> Allah doth command you to render back your Trusts to those to whom they are due; and when ye judge between man and man, that ye judge with justice: Verily how excellent is the teaching which He giveth you! For Allah is He Who heareth and seeth all things. [4:58]

Men of conscience throughout the history of humankind have upheld justice.

> Of those We have created are people who direct (others) with truth. And dispense justice therewith. [7:181]

Achievement of justice is the central virtue for the Islamic Ummah, the community of believers.

> Thus, have we made of you an Ummat justly balanced, that ye might be witnesses over the nations and the Messenger a witness over yourselves; [2:143]

A just witness brings the light of reason and is ready to mediate in the cause of justice and this is a duty assigned to the Islamic Ummah by Almighty Allah.
Justice should be dispensed relentlessly, without any selfish interest whatsoever.

> O ye who believe! Stand out firmly for justice, as witnesses to Allah, even as against yourselves, or your parents, or your kin, and whether it be (against) rich or poor: for Allah can best protect both. Follow not the lusts (of your hearts), lest ye swerve, and if ye distort (justice) or decline to do justice, verily Allah is well- acquainted with all that ye do. [4:135]

Furthermore, justice in Islam is based on much more penetrative motivations than any humanly designed system could envisage. This is because it comes from the internalization of God-consciousness – with which we are acting in the presence of Allah, who knows our innermost secrets, actions, and intentions, as nothing is hidden from Him.

Justice is the basis of settling all disputes between Muslims.

> If two parties among the believers fall into quarrel, make peace between them; but if one them transgresses

> beyond bounds against the other, then you fight (all) against the one that transgresses until it complies with command of Allah: But if it complies, then make peace between them with justice (faslehu bainahuma bil adl) and be fair (aqsitu): for Allah loves those who are fair (and just) (yuhebul muqseteen). The believers are but a single brotherhood: so make peace (faslehu) between two (contending) brothers; and fear Allah, that you may receive mercy. [49:9-10]

Good behavior is necessary for doing good - for struggling against oppression and helping those who are in need.

> If any do deeds of righteousness,- be they male or female - and have faith, they will enter Heaven, and not the least in Justice will be done to them. [4:124]

> In most of their secret talks there is no good: But if one exhorts to a deed of charity or Justice or conciliation between men, (Secrecy is permissible): To him who does this, seeking the good pleasure of Allah, We shall soon give a reward of the highest (value). [4:114]

> O ye who believe! stand out firmly for Allah, as witnesses to fair dealing, and let not the hatred of others to you make you swerve to wrong and depart from Justice. Be just: that is next to piety: and fear Allah. For Allah is well-acquainted with all that ye do. [5:8]

> When a (courteous) greeting is offered you, meet it with a greeting still more courteous, or (at least) of equal courtesy. Allah takes careful account of all things. [4:86]

> For them will be a home of peace in the presence of their Lord: He will be their friend, because they practiced (righteousness). [6:127]

Equality: This value means that all humans are God's creation, have sacred lives, and thus are equal. Islam grants no

special privileges based on race, ethnicity, or tribal affiliation. Moreover, all Muslims are to respect and preserve human life

> .....and if any one saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life of the whole people. Then although there came to them Our apostles with clear signs, yet, even after that, many of them continued to commit excesses in the land. [5:32]

Peace and tolerance: Islam also calls for the quest for peace, which is a state of physical, mental, spiritual, and social harmony. Other verses stress the importance of tolerance and kindness to other people.

> Allah commands justice, the doing of good, and liberality to kith and kin, and He forbids all shameful deeds, and injustice and rebellion: He instructs you, that ye may receive admonition. [16:90]

Brotherhood: Islam teaches brotherhood and treats all humans as equal by developing tolerance, love, forgiveness, helpfulness, kindness, patience and the ability to sacrifice for others. Islam does not depend on cast, color, gender and wealth but on TAQWA - that is, consciousness about Allah.

During his time, the Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon him and his descendents) introduced Islam to non-Muslims and showed them the right path by himself practicing the principles of Islam - *kindness, patience, justice, and tolerance,* which resulted in scores of people accepting Islam and becoming Muslim. A true Muslim can be understood by the following Hadith of Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon him and his descendents) who said, "A true Muslim is one from whose sayings and actions others are secure." This means that a Muslim is a peaceful, balanced, considerate,

honest, conscious person who balances society. In general, Islam is a religion of art, science, and peace.

Forgiveness: Another virtue in Islam is forgiveness.

> Repel evil with that which is best: We are well acquainted with the things they say. [23:96]

> Hold to forgiveness; command what is right; But turn away from the ignorant. [7:199]

> Abraham said: "Peace be on thee: I will pray to my Lord for thy forgiveness: for He is to me Most Gracious. [19:47]

> The heavens are almost rent asunder from above them (by Him Glory): and the angels celebrate the Praises of their Lord, and pray for forgiveness for (all) beings on earth: Behold! Verily Allah is He, the Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful. [42:5]

Peace as the Essential Soul of Islam

Islam invites all who believe in one God to develop peace within themselves and in all of their relationships.

> O ye who believe! Enter into Islam whole-heartedly; and follow not the footsteps of the evil one; for he is to you an avowed enemy. [2:208]

Islam means both peace and submission and thus Islam is the peace that is derived by submission to one God. Islam secures peace within one's own self and one's surroundings of nature and humanity, through securing peace with Almighty Allah, the Creator and Lord of the whole universe. An attribute of Almighty Allah is *"As-Salam,"* All Peace.

> [59:23] Allah is He, than Whom there is no other God;- the Sovereign, the Holy One, the Source of Peace (and

> Perfection), the Guardian of Faith, the Preserver of Safety, the Exalted in Might, the Irresistible, the Supreme: Glory to Allah. (High is He) above the partners they attribute to Him.

Therefore, peace in Islam is the heart and soul of all relationships in humankind. Any person familiar with the history of Islam as a political force in history and a philosophical-moral framework for human action knows well that Islam does not teach Muslims to kill innocent people in the name of a political agenda. According to the Quran, the taking of one life is like the killing of all humankind. Added to this rule are the other verses that set down the rules of engagement if Muslims are forced by their circumstances and conditions to fight their enemies. The Quran is the guide to the ways of peace for those who consult it.

> Wherewith Allah guideth all who seek His good pleasure to ways of peace and safety, and leadeth them out of darkness, by His will, unto the light,- guideth them to a path that is straight. [5:16]

> For them will be a home of peace in the presence of their Lord: He will be their friend, because they practiced (righteousness). [6:127]

> But Allah doth call to the Home of Peace: He doth guide whom He pleaseth to a way that is straight. [10:25]

As-salam alaikum, 'Peace upon you, or be in peace' is how Muslims greet. One of the names for Paradise is Dar-us-Salam, the Abode of Peace. The greeting used by those living in Paradise is 'salam alaikum', 'peace be upon you'. You see different forms of this word in the Quran such as:

> (This will be) their cry therein: "Glory to Thee, O Allah." And "Peace" will be their greeting therein! And the close of their cry will be: "Praise be to Allah, the Cherisher and Sustainer of the worlds!" [10:10]
>
> "Peace unto you for that ye persevered in patience! Now how excellent is the final home!" [13:24]
>
> (Namely) those whose lives the angels take in a state of purity, saying (to them), "Peace be on you; enter ye the Garden, because of (the good) which ye did (in the world)." [16:32]
>
> Their salutation on the Day they meet Him will be "Peace!"; and He has prepared for them a generous Reward. [33:44]
>
> And those who feared their Lord will be led to the Garden in crowds: until behold, they arrive there; its gates will be opened; and its keepers will say: "Peace be upon you! Well have ye done! Enter ye here, to dwell therein." [39:73]
>
> "Enter ye therein in Peace and Security; this is a Day of Eternal Life!" [50:34]
>
> Only the saying, "Peace! Peace".[56:26]

Thus, as you see, Salam or "peace" becomes the heart and soul of Islam and Muslims, either in this world or in heaven.

Peace is a permanent basis of human relations for Muslims and must be secured by all possible means. Muslims are required to grasp any inclination for peace in war with non-Muslims, even if it is not genuine.

> "But if the enemy inclines towards peace, do you also incline towards peace, and trust in Allah: for He is the One that hears and knows (all things). Should they intend to deceive you – verily Allah suffices you: He it is

> that strengthens you with His aid and with (the company of) believers". [8: 61-62]

Even with our enemies, we must deal justly, for such an act is made equivalent to piety and is deserving of salvation in the Hereafter.

> O ye who believe! stand out firmly for Allah, as witnesses to fair dealing, and let not the hatred of others to you make you swerve to wrong and depart from justice. Be just: that is next to piety: and fear Allah. For Allah is well-acquainted with all that ye do. To those who believe and do deeds of righteousness hath Allah promised forgiveness and a great reward. [5:8-9]

> It may be that Allah will grant love (and friendship) between you and those whom ye (now) hold as enemies. For Allah has power (over all things); And Allah is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful. Allah forbids you not, with regard to those who fight you not for (your) Faith nor drive you out of your homes, from dealing kindly and justly with them: for Allah loveth those who are just. [60: 7-8]

However, the above verses on kind behavior do not pertain to those who fight us because of our faith and drive us out of our homes and property, or support others in doing this. In this case it would be wrong to extend our hand of friendship or seek protection from them.

> Allah only forbids you, with regard to those who fight you for (your) Faith, and drive you out of your homes, and support (others) in driving you out, from turning to them (for friendship and protection). It is such as turn to them (in these circumstances), that do wrong. [60:9]

Obviously, this is because it is against the very dictates of justice.

Finally, I would like to mention an important point. There is a difference between terrorism and extremism, which may be mixed. Often extremists who hold that the end justifies the means resort to violence and thus violate the basic peaceful arche of their religion. None of the three religions - Islam, Christianity and Judaism - have clean hands in terms of absolute peace and equality. In a speech, Hitler said: "My feelings as a Christian point me to my Lord and Savior as a fighter. They point me to the man who, once in loneliness, surrounded by few followers, recognized these Jews for what they were and summoned men to fight against them..." As a Muslim, I am sure that these aren't the teachings of Jesus Christ (peace be upon him). But this shows that no religion should be judged by the deviation of a few. Islam, Christianity, and all other religions can co-exist peacefully when the true followers control the few haters among them. It is important to recognize that there *is* a rising threat, not only to Western interests alone, but to the whole world. This threat is the rise of religious extremism: Hindu extremism in India, Islamic extremism in the Alqaedeh, Jewish extremism in Israel, Christian extremism in Serbia and even in the U.S. As for the Christian record, millions who died in the last century were killed by governments and people who belonged to the world of the Christian West.

Therefore, extremism is not unique to any particular religion. In December of 1999 the United Nations reported "No religion is free from extremism." Islam does not carry the responsibility for the actions of the extremists any more than Christianity bears the responsibility for the genocide in Bosnia and Kosovo.

Comparative Reflections

Reflections on Peace and War

John Brademas

President Emeritus, New York University
and Ex-Majority Whip, U.S. Congress (D.-Ind.)

I am honored that my friend, Professor Parviz Morewedge, invited me to participate in this conference on "Philosophies of Peace and Just War".

That we live at a time of war—of wars—in Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel and Palestine, Sierra Leone, the Ivory Coast, the Congo, Colombia and Chechnya, makes such a discussion not only appropriate but compelling.

There are various approaches one could take to a consideration of the theme of our conference. Indeed, to illustrate my point, only next Wednesday I shall moderate a symposium at New York University's Center on International Cooperation on the theme of "America's role in the World: Security Options for the United States". We shall base our discussions on the recent publication by the Council on Foreign Relations of a study by Lawrence J. Korb, *A New National Security Strategy in an Age of Terrorists, Tyrants, and Weapons of Mass Destruction.*

What I shall do today, however, is take a different tack. I should like to offer some observations, based on my own experience, about the contributions, in the search for a more stable, just and peaceful world, that can be made by cultural and educational institutions.

I insist at the outset that I am not so naïve as to think that what Joseph Nye, Dean of Harvard's John F. Kennedy

School of Government, has called "soft power", the power of ideas, sufficient to solve conflicts among nations and peoples. But given what's been happening in recent months, especially as those of us who are Americans look at how people of other societies look at us, I believe it is worth considering the impact of learning, especially about other lands and languages, to cope with some of our challenges.

Please permit me some words about my own background so that you will better understand what I have to say to you. A native of the American Midwest, son of a Greek immigrant father and a Scots-English-Irish schoolteacher mother, I graduated from Harvard in 1949 and that summer, I worked at Lake Success as an intern at the United Nations, when the Secretary General was Trygve Lie. I then went to Oxford University where I wrote a Ph.D. dissertation on the anarchist movement in Spain.

Nine years later I was elected to the Congress of the United States and was ten times reelected, serving, therefore, for twenty-two years and during the Administrations of six Presidents: three Republicans — Eisenhower, Nixon and Ford; and three Democrats—Kennedy, Johnson and Carter. In Congress I was active in helping write laws to support schools, colleges and universities; libraries and museums; the arts and the humanities; and to provide services for children, the elderly, the disabled.

A Democrat, I was defeated in Ronald Reagan's landslide victory over President Carter in 1980, and shortly thereafter invited to become president of New York University, now the world's largest private university, in which position I served until 1992 when I became president emeritus. While president emeritus of NYU I have been engaged in a number of pro bono activities relevant to our conference today. For seven years I chaired the National Endowment for Democracy, which makes grants to non-governmental organizations

working for democracy in countries that either do not enjoy it or where it is struggling to survive.

I continue that interest as one of the founders of the Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe, headquartered in Salonika, Greece, with the purpose of encouraging democracy in the region. Our signature project brings together professors of Balkan history to produce history textbooks that are not so nationalistic in content.

I served as well, by appointment of President Clinton, as chairman of the President's Committee on the Arts and the Humanities. Our mission: to recommend ways of winning more support, government and private, for these fields in American life.

I shall not here recite a litany of other activities in which I have been involved but rather make this point. As both legislator and university president, I have been deeply committed to encouraging colleges and universities in the United States to undertake teaching and research about countries and cultures other than our own. At the same time I have been a champion of strengthening educational and cultural exchanges between the United States and other countries. So let me speak very personally today about the great importance I assign to the role that cultural and educational institutions can play in the search for peace in a troubled world.

In Congress, I was author of the International Education Act of 1966, which authorized grants to American institutions of higher learning for study of other countries. To cite but one other example, I was also co-author, with Senator Claiborne of Rhode Island, of the Arts and Artifacts Indemnity Act of 1975, which enables museums in the United States to borrow art from museums abroad without having to pay expensive commercial insurance. Under this law, if any art is lost or damaged, the United States Government will pay the cost. In over a quarter of a century, with 713 exhibitions

indemnified, American museums have saved $157 million in insurance premiums while our taxpayers have lost less than $105,000. Indeed, we could not mount a major exhibition of art from abroad in the United States without the Indemnity Act. The Matisse-Picasso show at the Museum of Modern Art and the forthcoming El Greco exhibition at the Metropolitan Museum of Art are both protected under our statute.

I turn to New York University where we established during my presidency, a Center for Japan-U.S. Business & Economic Studies; an Onassis Hellenic Studies Program; the Skirball Department of Hebrew and Judaic Studies; and, of particular interest to me, the King Juan Carlos I of Spain Center, for the study of the economics, history and politics of modern Spain. Six years ago, in the presence of Their Majesties, the King and Queen Sofía, and of the then First Lady of the United States, now Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, I dedicated the Center.

Beyond such centers at NYU—and I have not named all of them—our university is global in two other respects. In the current academic year, 4,600 students from other countries have been on our campus—over half from Asia, nearly a quarter from Europe and the others from the rest of the world. NYU also has centers in Madrid, Prague, London and Paris and we hope to set up ones in Africa and Latin America. Both my successors as president of NYU, L. Jay Oliva and John Sexton, share my commitment to a global university. As I have spoken of students from abroad at Washington Square, I note that a recent report said that for the year 2001/02, there were nearly 600,000 exchange students in the United States from just ten countries.

Although no longer in Congress or leading a university, I continue my interest in matters international. In the last few years, I have delivered speeches in Havana, Moscow, Saigon, Madrid, Athens, Istanbul, Buenos Aires, Berlin and Oxford

and in almost every address have urged more investment by the United States and other countries in education about nations other than their own. The urgency of such investment takes on new meaning, I believe, after the war in Iraq.

I'm well aware that this action of the United States met—and continues to meet—strong disapproval in many countries. Here I note the report, issued last June, by The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, *Views of a Changing World.* Based on a highly respected survey, the Pew report found that:

> *...[I]n most countries, opinions of the U.S. are markedly lower than they were a year ago....*

The report continued:

> ...[T]he war has widened the rift between Americans and Western Europeans, further inflamed the Muslim world, softened support for the war on terrorism, and significantly weakened global public support for the pillars of the post-World War II era-the U.N. and the North Atlantic alliance.

On the other hand, said the authors of the report:

> While the postwar poll paints a mostly negative picture of the image of America, its people and policies, the broader *Pew Global Attitudes* survey shows wide support for the fundamental economic and political values that the U.S. has long promoted. Globalization, the free market model and democratic ideals are accepted in all corners of the world. Most notably the 44-nation survey found strong democratic aspirations in most of the Muslim publics surveyed.... (*Views of a Changing World*, p.1)

In the United States and Europe, scholars, journalists and political leaders have been engaged in all manner of symposia on the tensions between the United States and Europe as well as on the sharpened hostility toward America in the Islamic world. And, as all of you are certainly aware, public opinion in the United States is increasingly divided over President Bush's actions in Iraq, especially, in light of the killing of American and British soldiers, the failure of the Administration to plan effectively for the aftermath of the war and the President's request for nearly $90 billion for military operations and rebuilding Iraq.

Last June I attended a conference at Ditchley Park, outside Oxford, on "New Approaches to International Relations". The theme running throughout our discussions was how could the rest of the world relate to, cope with, the overwhelming economic, military and political power of the United States? The most thoughtful responses to this question that I heard at Ditchley and I'm finding as I read such journals as *Foreign Affairs*, *Foreign Policy*, the *New York Times*, *Washington Post* and the *Financial Times* and listen to analyses by leading authorities in and out of public office, in the United States and elsewhere, is that in the war on terrorism and in meeting other challenges to civil and democratic societies, military power, even when exercised by the strongest nation in history, is not enough.

It has become more and more obvious that not only does the United States need partners in postwar Iraq as well as in other places of danger but that our country must also give far more attention to investment in what, I have earlier noted, by way of contrast to hard power, "soft power".

"U.S. military power is essential to global stability and is a critical part of the response to terrorism", said Joseph Nye. But it is not enough, he added. "Soft power arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideas and poli-

cies". Significant components of "soft power", I would argue, all the more crucial, again to cite Nye, in light of the "transformation of world politics brought about by globalization and the democratization of technology", are institutions of learning and culture. ["U.S. Power and Strategy After Iraq", *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2003, pp. 65, 66, 72].

Today we are seeing more and more attention being paid to the contributions of cultural and educational institutions to dealing with the wide range of problems—disease, drugs, poverty, terrorism, religious and ethnic conflict—problems confronting us all, in both the developed and underdeveloped world. I cite only a few examples, from my own observation, of such constructive responses. I myself am now engaged in discussions with Federico Mayor, the distinguished former Secretary General of UNESCO, and several of his colleagues for the purpose of creating an organization the mission of which, inspired by the legacy of the respected former Secretary General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, is, succinctly put, "humanizing globalization". This initiative will focus on the links among peace, development and democracy. Progress on any one of these fronts will facilitate advance on the others. For example, development is not solely a matter of economic growth, although that is essential. Yet as Federico Mayor has often asserted, such social factors as literacy, education and public health are as integral to development as solely market matters. [*Humanizing Globalization: A Message of Hope* (draft outline, 2003), Federico Mayor and others, École des Haute Commerciales, Montreal; p.2]

Only last January former President Bill Clinton chaired a conference at New York University where he spoke eloquently of "how to make the process of globalization work better for the people who have been left out and left behind". Said Clinton:

> Throughout human history people have always found self-definition by positive reference to their crowd and negative reference to the other.

He continued:

> ...[T]his conflict about what makes us important, and how we derive meaning in our lives is very significant.... [Transcript of remarks by the Honorable William J. Clinton, "Progress and Paradox: The Future of Globalization in the Twenty-First Century", January 14, 2003, pp.1, 17-18].

To my mind, understanding how others, those people different from us, "derive meaning" in their lives is an indispensable purpose of education and culture. Learning and the arts, the humanities and the sciences are the activities that enable us to understand men and women from other societies and, indeed, men and women in our own.

It was this conviction of the crucial role of education and culture that caused my colleagues and me on the President's Committee on the Arts and the Humanities, in our 1997 report to the President, *Creative America*, to call for significant expansion of efforts by the United States, both public and private, to see the arts and the humanities "as . . . crucial component[s] of American foreign policy".

Our Committee urged Congress to vote more government funds for international education and exchanges, in particular the Fulbright and Arts America programs, even as we encouraged corporations and foundations to increase their sponsorship of international scholarly and cultural programs. We were especially critical of reductions in the Fulbright Exchange programs, which "have brought future presidents and prime ministers, university presidents and scholars, influential

journalists, and business leaders to the United States at crucial stages in their careers".

Only a few days ago, here in New York, I heard the Foreign Minister of Jordan tell an audience that fifteen of the twenty-nine members of the Cabinet of his country were graduates of American universities. He warned, however, that with the restrictions on student visas now being imposed by the Administration in Washington, there would undoubtedly be a drop in such figures in the future.

As one who enjoyed the opportunity to study abroad—at Oxford half a century ago—I have a deep personal conviction about the value of study in another country. And as I seem to be offering recommendations for policy—you must remember that I was a Congressman for twenty-two years!—I have still another suggestion. It is that at least a few major universities—in Europe and elsewhere in the world—develop centers, or at least substantial academic courses, on the political system of the United States.

As you know, the American Constitution is based on separation-of-powers. This structure means that when it comes to the making of national policy, Congress, unlike the legislature in a parliamentary system, has great power. But with 100 Senators, two for every State, and 435 Members of the House of Representatives, and lacking the disciplined political parties common in Europe, the U.S. Congress is not easy to understand.

Indeed, many Americans, even well educated ones, have only a superficial knowledge of how Congress works. And that's why my own major project now is to create, at NYU, a Center for the Study of Congress, of Congress as a policy-making institution. And if we in the United States need to learn more about our own Congress, what of citizens and leaders of other countries, countries directly affected by policies of the American government? It is, I assert, greatly in

their interest to learn more about how our political system works.

When I was a student at Oxford, from 1950 to 1953, the study of the United States terminated with the League of Nations, and it is only recently that Oxford established the Rothermere Institute of North American Studies. I know that several universities abroad offer courses on American art and literature and I applaud that fact but I'm pressing for broadening that interest to include more attention to our politics. Citizens of other countries should be aware, for example, that President Bush is not the only actor on the American political scene!

I'll cite yet one other opportunity for cultural and educational institutions in all our countries, especially in Europe and North America, to make a constructive contribution to the search for peace. I speak of the Islamic world.

Last year, in New York City, at the invitation of Parviz Morewedge, I spoke to a group of Ambassadors from Islamic countries assigned to the United Nations. I observed that most Americans had never met a Muslim and that most of us were quite ignorant of the traditions of Islam. Accordingly, I told the Ambassadors, unless you want Americans to think that Osama Bin Laden represents Islam, you must give more attention to teaching the best in your religious faith. On the other hand, those of us who are not Muslims have a similar obligation to listen and to learn.

In fact, one now finds a burgeoning interest in Islam in the United States. One cannot go into a serious bookshop in New York City without seeing new volumes on Islam. In New York City alone, New York University, the Council on Foreign Relations and other institutions are sponsoring session after session on foreign policy issues related to the Islamic world.

Only a few days ago, an Advisory Group named by Secretary of State Colin Powell published a report with the relevant title, *Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World.* Indeed, next week I shall see Dr. Noah Feldman, the brilliant young American scholar who teaches at the NYU Law School and is author of *After Jihād*, an analysis of the possibilities of democracy in Islamic societies.

I add that I'm a trustee of the International Council of the World Conference on Religion and Peace, which brings together leaders of nearly every major religious tradition for dialogue and action to resolve conflict. The Council, of which Prince Hassan of Jordan is co-chair, with Richard Blum, husband of US Senator Diane Feinstein of California, recently sent a mission to Baghdad to encourage interfaith discussion there.

Ladies and gentlemen, I've not today attempted to give you a comprehensive survey of cultural and educational programs abroad supported by the United States, either through government or private funds. Yet I have no hesitation in saying that in view of the position of the United States in the world, our country should be giving far more support, political and financial, to such activities.

I realize that there will always be a fine line, accurate or perceived, between the "propaganda" dimension of United States international programs and those that genuinely reflect the two-way nature of international cultural relationships. I am nonetheless convinced that, as President Carter once said in a letter to Congress, we should "tell the world about our society and politics—in particular, our commitment to cultural diversity and individual liberty". Moreover, said Carter, we want "to tell ourselves about the world, so as to enrich

our own culture as well as to give us the understanding to deal effectively with problems among nations". [1]

Ladies and gentlemen, let me summarize what I've tried to say to you today. I have spoken, from my experience as legislator and university president, as an American whose father was born in Europe and as a student who enjoyed the privilege of three years at a great university in another country, of my profound belief in the contributions that institutions of learning and culture, of education and the arts and the humanities, can make not only to elevating the quality of our lives as individuals and enabling us to be more effective citizens of democratic societies but also as significant forces in the continuing struggle to build a just and peaceful world.

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[1] See two publications of the Center for Arts and Culture, Washington, D.C., Milton C. Cummings, Jr., *Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government: A Survey*; and Juliet Antunes Sablosky, *Recent Trends in Department of State Support for Cultural Diplomacy: 1993-2002*; 2003.

The Need for Religious Cooperation

William F. Vendley
Secretary General, Religions for Peace

Any of us who have been in situations of war know how brutal they are, how imprecise they are, and how deep the suffering is for the people that we call non-combatants. I'd like to tell you briefly about an image of where these three speakers' comments would take us, and the possibilities for collaboration.

I bring our attention to a war that was before us, for only a short while. It was there because it was so particularly brutal. But there were hidden features that were also really quite remarkable. I am speaking of Sierra Leone, a small, poor country in West Africa. The war there lasted for about ten years of intermittent intensity, and it achieved a degree of brutality. That degree of widespread terror finally made our newspapers here.

Little boys and little girls were conscripted as child soldiers. They were typically captured and forced to commit crimes in their own villages - maybe kill someone in their village - so they would be too frightened to go home. Once so conscripted, the children were forced to wage war by terror. Those terrors included widespread amputation throughout the civilian population, and that's why the war in Sierra Leone became news.

What you probably don't know is that Muslims and Christians (and if there had been Jews, Rabbi, I'm sure there would have been Jews) were very much at the center of stopping that war. It was actually Islamic and Christian women who went across the rebel lines, secured child prisoners from

the rebels, and brought the children back to give them to President Kabbah. This act set into motion a kind of dynamic that led to peace talks, and ultimately to a peace treaty.

That's an example of different religions beginning to do something extraordinarily practical, in terms of their respective understandings, not only of war, but more topically today, of terror, and beginning to take action. There are many other current examples that are not yet really deeply before us.

I would suggest the agenda we have today is two-fold. First, all of our traditions on 'Just War' now need to be refocused by the situation of terror. It's a very different situation. It's a technically different situation and it demands a very careful interpretation, a real interpretation, of these traditions. Here, I think, is the second remarkable thing. We simply have to do this together. We simply have to do this as different religious traditions in relationship, one to another. The arguments that we can make for this are simple and yet profound. Today, the problems that really matter to us as religious people are problems that cut across our respective boundaries. They are simply not Islamic problems, Christian problems, Jewish problems, Hindu problems or Buddhist problems. They are all of our problems.

Working practically with religions, I have found that two questions are always posed. One is pathology. Every religion makes its own attempt to understand what has gone wrong, how we account for what is ill. Corresponding to this question is the notion of soteriology. By what means do I adjust my personal practice as a human being in my community to, with divine help no doubt, address this deep seated pathology?

A simple way of understanding the unfolding tradition that all three speakers spoke to is to recognize that our religious traditions again and again have to try to rehear their

foundational experiences. When they rehear them, in light of new events, they have to try to re-say them. That's a simple way of saying that we are all engaged in traditioning. I'm one who has the greatest appreciation for tradition, but tradition is, in my judgment, the product of enormous creativity, no doubt faithful creativity, and there is no evidence that we have exhausted the needed creativity.

Surely the revelation of the holy Koran has not been exhausted by any particular culture or moment in history. That is also true of Judaism and Christianity and other religions. So today I think we are all challenged, and challenged equally. We finally have to do this together - to rehear our own heritages in light of the problems that cut across all of our boundaries. It is here that I would suggest that we have a collective creativity that stands before us.

The title of today's talk, Philosophy of Peace and Just War, is suggestive. The word philosophy joined with our topic, which really is theological, points to the fact that all three of these traditions have at key moments in their history turned to systems of rational thought. They have turned to philosophies often not coming from that tradition itself, to try to make sense of what their respective revelations would be or are. Today, we are facing something similar but in a very contemporary situation.

Here, Mr. Ambassador, I pose a religious metaphor that is not dissimilar to the kinds of services that you render in the international community. If I think of you, Mr. Ambassador, one who is a man from a particular tradition, inspired by a particular faith, you nevertheless function in a plural, international context. You are, in my way of speaking, necessarily bilingual. Your primary language may be a religious discourse, a creative religious discourse, and yet when you walk into the United Nations and you need to represent the deep moral concerns that are rooted in your original religious primary

language, you simply cannot quote the Koran to that body. Nor can you simply repeat the Hadith, or other remarkable traditions. You have to make a translation. You have to transpose your religious sensibility into what is for you perhaps a secondary, or public, form of speech, with public warrants, no matter how deeply those concerns are rooted in your own religious heritage. You become bilingual, and that second language is the language of your multilateralism.

I would suggest that today we have to be religiously bilingual. As each of our three speakers illustrated, we have to try to attend to our own traditions, to rehear them on the bases of the challenges of our own hour, so that we can resay them. I think of you, Rabbi, or I think of you, Professor Nasr, both of you speaking in your respective religious communities. You would speak a creative primary speech. You would speak as a Rabbi. You would speak as an Islamic teacher. It is good and will always be necessary, but it is not enough.

Today we have to do something analogous to what you are doing, Mr. Ambassador. We have to speak a secondary language as religious people. We have to find deeply held and widely shared concerns that are rooted in our respective traditions and find a way to prosecute those together. Then, public language becomes an enriched form. It is not just what we have historically called "secular" language - that's too thin, too modest, and too non-utopic as it has evolved thus far. We have to find a way to both own and honor, and be creative and struggle honestly with our religious heritages; to be creative within our respective religious communities, but at the same time find language that we can share. That, I would suggest, is what all of us are struggling with at this moment in history.

The issues of poverty, social inequality, and disease seize us. All of these cut across our boundaries. Issues of war seize

us and issues of terror seize us. We need a religious analysis to get to the depths of these challenges, but we also need a public analysis that we can build together, that is honest and maps out the deeply held and widely shared concerns we can have as religious persons.

The question of terror - the way it is misunderstood, how horrific it is, and how it can become itself a source of justification for violence – is the work that stands centrally before us. We need, the world needs, faithful, honest, creative, and intelligent Jews, Christians, Muslims, and the other religious spokespersons to come together to analyze this phenomena and how we might extend our own traditions of restraint in the use of violence. There is a need for a profound updating in our respective traditions, and that's the way we honor tradition.

Today there is a kind of political failure to understand terror in terms of widely held agreements that translate into consensual political instruments. This is tragic, but we hope that that will proceed. But we as religious people have to do the analogous work. We've got to come together and bring our traditions into a creative engagement to find mutual understandings of what terror really means. We've got to find clear ways we together can reject terror, reject and dissociate terror from very legitimate forms of self-defense. We need to stand together and reject any religious warrants for terror. We've got to disarm the dynamic that legitimates the most crude, self-justifying militant behaviors of those who look at acts of terror and say, "See, there is the enemy. This allows me then to do violence in the name of self-defense." We need, as religious communities, to come together around the foundational grounding issues of justice, issues that directly relate to the tragic rise of terror in our world.

When I think personally about terror and when I have come close to it in different parts of the world, I find one

common denominator: fear. It is not poverty per se. It is not any number of conditions that humiliate the human condition. Those no doubt are deeply relevant, but the common element is fear.

What is this fear; how can we analyze it? As religious people, we have to discriminate between the deep, existential causes of fear and other more obvious causes. We are creatures and we do not have control of our own destiny. It is not surprising that there is fear within us - fear that is conquered by faith.

To the deep, existential cause of fear over our finitude, however, are added other contributing factors. With these, we have to be tough and unflinching, and analyze them together. We know that even our religions can be abused and that our religions so abused become a source of fear. We need freedom for our beliefs and we need the capacity to cooperate together. We know that our societies, at their best, nurture us into the fullness of being a person; but at their worst, constrain us, hold us back, and alienate us. We have to work together in solidarity to support the authentic forms of self-expression that ennoble the human person and the human family.

We know that there are governmental forms of tyranny. These exist, unfortunately, in all lands in differing degrees. We have to find the solidarity to work together for the kinds of freedom that are profoundly respectful of the way men and women have organized themselves as states around the world.

Complicating this sphere is the history that we know too well. From my background, it's the history of crusade, the history of colonization, and the history of neo-colonial activities. These histories augment and complicate the deep sources of fear that we suffer in our own communities.

We have to collaborate with a special wisdom. All of our traditions know something of the grammar of forgiveness. We know this grammar in its most personal and intimate terms. We know that when we are wrong, we have to acknowledge that we are wrong. We know that we have to request forgiveness. We know that we have to try to make restitution, even if it is only symbolic. We know that we have to have the humility to accept being welcomed back into relationship. If our religious traditions have the most intimate grammar of that most sublime experience of the human being, to know that they are wrong and to find that they can be forgiven, we have to do something to honor this grammar in the situation when communities need forgiveness. The states themselves, the governments, are not particularly good at this; it's really not their mandate. We have to find ways across tradition, to be faithful to this rich history of acknowledgment of fault and acceptance of forgiveness, to begin to heal collective memory, to begin to heal history. Surely Muslims, Jews, and Christians can be faithful to their traditions, their traditions of acknowledgment of fault and acceptance of God's forgiveness, by finding ways to transact that publicly and honestly in terms of the way our traditions have injured one another. That would be stunningly powerful and transformative for all of us.

I conclude my brief remarks by saying we have this as a challenge before us. Very shortly after the terror attack here in New York City, about 150 religious leaders came here to New York from all around the world. They began the work of examining their own traditions honestly and faithfully. They came forward with a beginning of an acknowledgement of historical hurts and a commitment to become bilingual in their creative faithfulness to their own religious traditions. I think we have just begun that challenge. I think we have just begun to build the globalization of solidarity, the solidarity

rooted in those deeply held and widely shared cares that our religions would lead us to. Thank you.

Peace, Religion, and Humanity

Dr. Charles Randall Paul
President of The Foundation for Interreligious Diplomacy

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An Explanation of *The Foundation for Interreligious Diplomacy*

Contestare Ex Bona Fide

A Summary Explanation

THE MISSION: The mission of the foundation is to improve the way people engage in irresolvable conflicts over religion in their families, communities and societies. It promotes practical methods for changing hateful enemies to trustworthy opponents. It acts to prevent harmful coercion and prompt humanitarian collaboration between those in serious religious conflicts.

THE PROBLEM: In a world of diverse believers no universally acceptable authority is available to resolve religious conflicts about ultimate reality, the purpose of life, and the correct way to live. Inevitably, intelligent, well-meaning people believe their chosen religion or ideology to be superior to less appealing alternatives. This judgment is not an act of arrogance, but an authentic expression of conscience. Nevertheless, advocating one superior truth calls into question other contradictory traditions by which families, communities, and societies establish purpose and order. Thus, sincere religious differences can threaten family unity and social solidarity, and bring people to clash in distrust, ill will, and even violence.[1] Is it

[1]Conflicts of belief inspire very practical conflicts occur over marriage (celibacy, trial, same-sex, divorce), family size (population policy, adoption), sexual relations (when, what, with whom), gender role expectations, charitable giving imperatives, who one befriends, where one lives, schooling arrangements and curriculum, one's choice of career, entertainment,

possible for people to be honest about their critical religious differences without eliciting an offensive response? Is there a way to improve our ability to peacefully sustain inevitable tensions from interreligious conflicts?

THE RATIONALE: The foundation members advocate the following beliefs: 1) Every person has valuable power to influence others and a responsibility to deity and others to use that power to improve the world. 2) Interreligious conflicts over important beliefs and practices are inevitable among intelligent people of good will. 3) Dignified interreligious discussion that includes appreciative listening, forthright criticism and persuasive advocacy can elicit respect and trust. 4) It is healthy for families, communities, societies and religions to engage in honest, respectful interreligious communication that is both appreciative and critical of religious differences.

THE VISION: The foundation envisions a day when serious conflicts over religious belief and practice will be engaged forthrightly as healthy persuasion contests without recourse to coercion or violence. Then families, communities and societies will be able to sustain interreligious relationships of peaceful tension that allow for enriching differences and useful collaboration.

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games, vacation days and places, one's voting behavior and national allegiance, one's beliefs about other nations, world government, disarmament and weapons policy, what and when one eats, drinks, and medicates, if one fights (by violent force or civil disobedience), approves capital or other punishments, how one treats the poor, the rich, the dead, the aged, the handicapped, the unborn, animals, plants, the environment, what one censors, and much more.

THE STRATEGY: The foundation's programs all aim to build interreligious trust by facilitating forthright interreligious communications that include both critical contestation and appreciation of serious religious differences.[2] It brings together opposing religious advocates in ways that build personal trust and respect, and dispel beliefs that religious adversaries are demons or idiots. Replacing coercion with persuasion in all interreligious encounters is one main strategy for building a world of religious integrity and peaceful coresistance.

The foundation promotes ethical methods of interreligious criticism and cooperation. It does not support or oppose specific religions or ideologies, nor worldwide religious unions, multi-religious councils, parliaments, or ecumenical movements. Foundation members will likely disagree on many serious religious or ideological matters.

THE ORGANIZATION: The Foundation for Interreligious Diplomacy is a private charitable foundation established in 2000 as a 501(c)(3) non-profit, tax-exempt corporation. Religiously diverse trustees from various cultures and professions will direct the work of the Executive Committee, program directors and staff. The current Board of Directors consists of Randall Paul, Daniel Peterson, and Gerald Snow.[3] Randall

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[2]*Contestation* is sociologist Peter Berger's term for contests of persuasion over serious religious or ideological differences. Ethical contestation, unlike angry contentiousness, dignifies participants.

[3]Randall Paul, Harvard (MBA) and University of Chicago (Ph.D.), specializes in methods of improving relations between people involved in irresolvable interreligious conflicts. His recent book, *Contesting Our Deepest Differences: A Theory for Improving Interreligious Conflicts*, is pending publication. Daniel Peterson, UCLA (Ph.D.), is a scholar of Arabic and Islamic studies. Gerald Snow, Harvard (JD), is a practicing

Paul is the initial Executive Director. Several analysts, scholars, diplomats and mediators with distinguished professional and religious credentials have advised the director in organizing the foundation. These are listed as the founding advisors on the last page of this explanation. Generous grants from two private foundations have provided seed funding for the foundation, but major funding is still needed.

The Programs and Projects

The foundation's three programs are the program for interreligious research, the program for interreligious learning, and the program for interreligious diplomacy. Each program consists of several projects, implemented in stages, as resources are available. The first program for research supports the second for learning, and these, in turn, support the third program for diplomacy. These programs will be annually measured against specific goals and budgets, and adjusted to improve their effectiveness.

The projects, logically grouped within each program area, are explained in more detail on the following pages. The projects will actually proceed as funding is obtained. Sufficient funding has currently been acquired to establish a web site, to organize several interreligious colloquia between religious groups in conflict, and to produce a video that tells a story of how to better manage conflicts over religion and ideology encountered in American public schools. When more funds are available the next project will be to establish the research institutes at appropriate religiously affiliated universities.

I. The Program for Interreligious Research

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attorney specializing in negotiating, tax law, and foundations. Contact the foundation at 801 763 1440.

This program is designed to 1) discover and clarify the religious factors that lead to interreligious conflicts and 2) to develop practical ways people and organizations can cope with their interreligious conflicts without violence, coercion or compromising integrity. Interreligious conflicts will be studied at three social levels: within families or friendships, between groups in local communities, and between international organizations or cultural blocs. Research results will be disseminated to scholars, peace practitioners, religious groups and the general public.

Field research will play an important role in this program. Through exchange programs that expose traditional religious opponents to one another's religious communities, the foundation will help develop 'religiously bilingual' diplomats who have developed cordial relationships with knowledgeable and influential members of religious communities who can act as diplomatic colleagues as well as interreligious critics. This program consists of three project listed below.

Effectiveness Measurement: The measure of this program's research effectiveness will be in the increased amount of scholarly or practical research that is available to improve current or potential religious conflicts. This will be monitored and reported by the foundation staff.

1. RESEARCH INSTITUTE: Cross disciplinary research and teaching regarding interreligious conflict and diplomacy will occur at *The Research Institute for Interreligious Diplomacy* which will be established in branches at various universities interested in problems of interreligious conflict. Funded by the foundation and supported in part by the hosting university, the institute will sponsor studies that focus social scien-

tists, religious scholars, and actual participants in religious conflicts on cases of interreligious conflict. Both theoretical and applied research will be done both by scholars of various disciplines and religious persuasions. It will provide comparative results interpreted from viewpoints of parties inside and outside the religions involved in the research program. It will also sponsor meetings that allow scholarly participants to civilly listen to, explain, advocate and criticize differing religious views on vital issues.

2. FOREIGN INTERNS: As a field research project, the foundation will arrange and fund exchanges that provide interns an experience for learning and observation of another religious tradition for six months to a year. Hosting religious groups will provide living accommodations and serious teaching of its religious history, sacred texts, doctrines, rituals, and social practices. This can occur at a religious university. To the degree integrity will allow, interns will attend the host's religious meetings and social events. Cordial relationships between hosts and interns will form a basis for future diplomatic communication between participating religious groups.

3. LOCAL INTERNS: The foundation will promote and provide an easy plan for local congregations to exchange research interns for six months to a year where religious groups desire to increase their knowledge of one another. Interns will live at home, but meet regularly with the host community. Hosts will provide monthly teaching to interns of religious history, sacred texts, doctrines, rituals, and social practices. To the degree integrity will allow, interns will attend the host's religious meetings and social events. Cordial relationships between hosts and interns will form a basis for future diplomatic communication between congregations.

II. The Program for Interreligious Learning

This program has the practical goal of helping people learn how to engage in interreligious and ideological conflicts with integrity and without rancor or violence. This is not a program for learning generally about different religions from second hand accounts. It focuses on the practical methods that different religious traditions can use to deal with their interreligious conflicts over beliefs and practices. It allows those in actual religious conflicts to learn more effective ways of respectfully communicating their non-negotiable religious beliefs and practices that are often cause for offense.

The ten projects listed below include various media forms that allow learning through sharing of personal religious belief and experience that requires careful interreligious translation. This occurs through patient interreligious conversation and observation that exposes important differences and similarities that are the major causes for conflict. Interreligious learning will appropriately lead to respectful resistance as well as cooperation between religious groups.

Effectiveness Measurement: To measure interreligious learning effectiveness, the foundation will poll participants to gauge increases in respect for those who remain religious opponents.

1. Internet Website: The site will be the first place to learn what different religions advocate and oppose on various important social and doctrinal topics. The site will be a source for comparative learning in the authentic voice of each religion. It will provide links to the home sites, sacred texts, meeting places, contact persons, etc. of the participating religious groups. Questions from site visitors will be addressed

to authorized religious contacts. The site will include a directory of religious leaders and interreligious diplomats who can be contacted personally. Links to allied organizations and serious critics of the foundation will be listed.

2. VIDEOS: The foundation will oversee production of short video films. Each video will be a story showing people having experiencing interreligious conflicts, and then working through them using the particular religious resources of their traditions. The videos will be distributed for television, and for the comparative religious education of adults and older children in schools and religious groups.

3. MAGAZINE ARTICLES AND NEWS COLUMN: Articles will be written jointly by two authors from different religions and published in widely read magazines dealing with religion and/or public affairs. They will also be published on the web site and in the annual report to foundation members. The same format would be used in a widely syndicated op-ed page newspaper column. Articles will present an exchange of opposing and agreeing religious views on topics with sacred and social ramifications. The dignified tone of the articles will show *how* opponents can engage in peaceful interreligious contestation and useful collaboration.

4. QUARTERLY JOURNAL: *Religious Persuasion: A Journal of Interreligious Discussion* will be published by a board of editors from the Research Institute. All articles will be co-authored by those of differing religions in a discussion format whereby writers will present their opposing views on lively and momentous social and theological topics. The journal will be a forum to propose and discuss possible interreligious collaborations that might improve religious or societal condi-

tions. Available in print and on the Net, the journal will be for educated readers.

5. SOURCE BOOK: A *Source Book of Interreligious Information* will be published as a compilation of the information available on the foundation's web site, and some of the most popular journal articles.

6. FILMS: The foundation will co-produce full-length movies showing stories of difficult conflicts of between ideological or religious opponents who engage with integrity and without violence. Other themes will include imaginary meetings of the ancient world religious founders in their historical periods juxtaposed with modern situational meetings of their contemporary followers. Ethical dilemmas and difficult everyday problems will drive the plot lines. We ill produce a movie telling of Roger Williams' struggle to advocate his own faith while protecting others' 'right to be wrong' about religion.

7. RECOGNITION AWARDS: *The Bow and Lyre Awards.*[4] The foundation will make periodic awards to outstanding works of art, drama, cinema, dance, music, and to excellent interreligious diplomatic efforts that display peaceful engagement in religious conflicts or useful collaborations between religious opponents.

8. CHILDREN'S BOOK SERIES: A series of illustrated children's books will tell stories of characters (perhaps animals or humans) who learn to how to forthrightly engage their unsolvable differences (analogous to irreconcilable religious differ-

[4]The Greek philosopher, Herakleitos, used examples of the bow and the lyre to show how opposing forces cooperate. The Bow Award is for effective diplomacy, the Lyre Award for fine artistic work.

ences) with respect and patience. The characters in the tales become serious opponents and trustworthy friends at the same time.

9. INTERRELIGIOUS LEARNING CENTERS: Where the need is not met by local religious or private organizations, centers for interreligious engagement and learning will be established. These may be permanent in some places, temporary in others.

10. TELEVISION SHOW: A periodic television program called *Religious Persuasions* will present diverse religious ways of responding to life's difficult and interesting problems. Panelists or commentators from different religious groups will address cases from current news stories or typical family problems, difficult questions of ethics or politics, or classic theological questions. Participants will be interreligious diplomats who demonstrate how to engage in honest and peaceful discussion of controversial religious topics.

III. THE PROGRAM FOR INTERRELIGIOUS DIPLOMACY

This is a program to improve relations between people in conflict over their religious beliefs or practices. It provides for safe contestation of religious differences under ethical diplomatic conventions. It also promotes the possibility for more interreligious collaboration in humanitarian causes. It includes the four projects listed below.

Effectiveness Measurement: The measure of this program's effectiveness will taken by numbering the increase in peaceful relationships between previously belligerent religious groups or persons, and the increase in humanitarian service jointly accomplished by rival religious groups. The foundation staff will measure this by taking written surveys of responses from the religious groups or persons participating.

1. INTERRELIGIOUS COLLOQUIA: In particular situations where the foundation sees a need for its positive intervention to build interreligious trust that inhibits harmful conflict, it will initiate, organize and fund small group discussion meetings between influential religious persons. Held in locations remote from the attendee's homes, the colloquia will encourage participants, who would not normally meet together, to engage in private discussions criticizing and appreciating their religious similarities and differences. Areas of conflict will be explored. Only two religious groups will be included at a time. Approximately fifteen persons with appropriate translators, and a foundation discussion leader would form a typical colloquium.

2. DIPLOMATIC MEETINGS: When leaders of particular religious groups desire bilateral discussion about current or potential interreligious conflicts or collaborative projects, the foundation will facilitate safe and private interreligious meetings. Normally the meetings will be initiated, organized, and funded by the religious organizations involved. Religiously bilingual diplomats, trained by the foundation programs, would help their leaders arrange diplomatic meetings. If a 'neutral' host were needed, the foundation would be available to organize meetings. A commonly used system of candid, private interreligious diplomacy is the goal.

3. PERSONAL COUNSELING: The foundation will assist professional therapists and religious counselors who work with personal relationships and families that are strained by religious differences. The foundation will distribute literature and role playing videos dealing with the ways particular religions treat religious conflicts in families and groups. These

different views will be included in a book, *A Therapist's Guide for Interreligious Counseling.* This book will also suggest methods for simultaneously using counselors from different religions to help certain situations. A directory of counselors who specialize in interreligious conflicts will be included.

4. DIPLOMACY GUIDEBOOK: The foundation will publish *A Guide for Interreligious Diplomacy.* Based on the initial years of the foundation's experiences, this guidebook will instruct leaders and individuals in practical methods for building interreligious trust that allows useful diplomacy in personal, community, or international religious conflicts. It should become the most important book ever published for practically improving interreligious relations.

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Methodological Reflections on Conflict Resolutions through Interreligious Diplomacy

Charles Randall Paul
President, The Foundation for Interreligious Diplomacy

Studying religious conflict, one quickly faces the enormity of scope that is involved, and the uncanny dilemma between gaining precision by analytical reduction and losing the real sense of inexhaustible vastness that both the terms, religion and conflict, connote.[1] I have employed traditional power/interest negotiation theory and more recent conflict resolution theory where appropriate in this study.[2] Both

[1] Thematic multi-disciplinary studies like this one resist the precision of scientific controls and accurate prediction. Inter-personal experiences of religious people in religious conflicts, the focus of the historical portion of this study, also resist easy consistent, comparative measurement, and allow little room for reliable prediction. I, therefore, seek mere coherence of plausible concepts that will allow new ways of grasping, if not understanding, religious conflicts in our time.

[2] The typical model of interest negotiation theory, whereby parties work willingly to disclose interests that might be adequately measured and creatively mediated to achieve mutual acceptability (Rapaport 1960; 1966; Fisher and Ury 1981; Raiffa 1985; Saaty and Alexander 1989, 1-8), has not applied well to conflicts where compromised mutual agreement is undesirable to participants. Religious conflict often evades adequate analysis under the conflict resolution (peace studies) category, because the latter typically focuses on political systems in which religion is considered a force requiring stable containment or repression by other more 'rational' forces. Convincing a potential suicide to step back from the ledge is the model for the political diplomat in dialogue with a religious fanatic. A polite example of this method is Kelsay, Little and Sachedina 1988. Conflict resolution, a field of its own now, began with the theory that claims

theories are inadequate for studying fundamental religious conversion contests because they are based on the comparative scarcity of resources, the former assuming that humans naturally seek an advantage over each other, the latter assuming that with mutual understanding fairness in sharing is the natural human position. I have tried to construct a synthetic theory for conflict engagements that assumes humans are neither naturally selfish nor naturally fair, but free creators of desire from desire, collaborative persuaders in relations of inter-personal conversion that can never actually be selfish or fair. This new theory of conflict engagement is based on the

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conflicts have both destructive and constructive elements (Coser 1956, 18, 31), and that conflicts can be engaged from either a cooperative or competitive stance, or both (Deutsch 1991, 26-31). However, resolution theorists, the descendants of consensus theorists (Bernard 1983, 191-215), assume that resolution is the goal of all intelligent people. Further, they usually assume that social homeostasis, psychologically perceived as peace, "is more natural than conflict—no original sin here!—and that, if only we can get parties to talk with one another, the level of 'mistrust' will decline and mutual understanding increase, until at some point the conflict will subside" (Kristol 1997, 12). In practice, instead of a mediator bringing a compromise of interests, a facilitator brings trusting change in attitudes. A peaceful status quo (through understanding) has more weight than a troublesome, factional fight for improvement of some social, political, economic or spiritual condition (Kriesberg et. al. 1989, 2-8; Saaty and Alexander 1989, 1-9). By contrast, contemporary conflict theory assumes that the tension between the social needs for both order and change is best expressed in the social need for individual freedom which requires limited order for unlimited possibilities (ibid., 224-225). Specifically, this study casts doubt on the adequacy of either negotiation theory, or conflict resolution theory, to work effectively with religious conflicts in which the conflict is viewed as necessary until one's adversary willingly admits defeat by conversion, or is destroyed. I here employ conflict theory as a subcategory of what might be termed contrast theory, in an effort to find an elusive middle path (Turner 1982, 442) between mere empirical description of differences/similarities, and the affirmation of metaphysical claims of ultimates (the latter being a favorite activity of those I study).

observation that any difference brings an evaluative comparison, and a rivalrous desire for relative supremacy. In religious or ideological modes it leads rivals into conversion contests. However, not being based on conflicts over scarce resources that can be compromised, or shared via revised power relations, nor on conflicts that can be resolved via new contextualizing and translating that leads to new mutual understanding, this theory assumes that some conflicts are *best* continued in an unresolved manner.[3] These conflicts are often beneficial for ideology or religion, where at times neither compromise nor resolution is desirable, but where the dramatic engagement of contesting doctrines, practices, and charismatic leaders is of prime interest.[4]

The desire to convert another to one's own superior way is often the basis for intractable conflict. We desire to evalu-

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[3] James Duke lists the following ways conflicts can be terminated: a) disappearance of the object (of conflict), b) complete victory and defeat (annihilation, exile, forced absorption) c) compromise, or d) conciliation (Duke 1976, 111). My theory adds a new termination category called conversion. It is a mutual victory of the vanquished and the victor. However, it is only a temporary termination, as it gives rise to new intra-group conflicts of heretical persuasions.

[4] "We may think that a situation has too little conflict because it is dull and lacks drama. Drama is an important value in practically all cultures, and conflict is one of the most important sources of dramatic interest. Most religious and national ideologies, for instance, conceive of the universe as involving a dramatic conflict between the forces of good and evil played out on the stage of the world. In personal life also, the absence of conflict is identified with a dull, featureless existence. The institution of games and sports [including all sorts of violent 'entertainment' from Nintendo, to movies, to distant wars on television] is evidence that, where a situation does not have enough conflict in it, . . . people really want trouble, and if they do not have enough of it, they will create it artificially" (Boulding 1988 [1962], 306).

ate (and in the process be evaluated) that which we know we cannot fully grasp, let alone completely understand, namely, the uniqueness of another person or group. I posit that the agony of interpersonal or inter-group engagement over unique originality is frequently sensed as a struggle of personal influence, a battle of persuasion to determine whom will have supreme influence granted by his or her peers—at least for this round. The struggle to convert others cannot end because the supremacy is only manifest as a result of contest. A proselytizing engagement creates out of a superabundance of possible alternatives, new conflicts that can be persuasively made more appealing than the status quo. The high God of influence is always under pressure to come up with new creations.

Ordinary power conflicts are compromised when interests are measured to mutual agreement. Conflicts of misunderstanding are resolved when parties are mutually aware of each other's sincere needs and values. But proselytizing conflicts are only ended (and then only temporarily) with uncoerced conversion, whereby at the instant one loses, i.e., one 'gives in' to conversion, one wins, at the same instant, the pearl of great price. There are complex determinants for religious conflicts. They cannot be simply reduced to fights over social-economic status, colonialist power struggles, or linguistic/cultural misunderstandings of theological positions. Indeed, neither justice nor dialogue are apt prescriptions for parties who feel that to even have contact is to risk mortal contamination, yet if contact is inevitable, (where neither violent annihilation, nor forced exile, nor bullying absorption is possible) un-coerced conversion of the other is the only hope of surviving the plague. New methods that grasp the benefits of agonistic proselytizing will meet the reality of the unique problem of unavoidable conflict between mutually exclusive religious hegemonies.

While aware that some religious conflicts can be usefully engaged by way of open dialogue (Swidler 1993), I do not espouse dialogue as the method of choice for those who are convinced that proselytizing is a true, divinely sanctioned way of authentic interaction. For the latter group, an exploration of new modes of mutual proselytizing is potentially worthwhile. This study is based in an actual history of proselytizing, or more accurately, counter-proselytizing; but its theoretical foundation is a multiplex of socio-psycho-theological hermeneutics including, as mentioned above, David Tracy's use of analogical imagination in conversation,[5] Lee Yearley's prescription for the virtue of spiritual regret, Raimundo Panikkar's pragmatics of convincement, and Mohandas Gandhi's way of mutual conversion in *satyagraha* (holding to or grasping for truth)[6].

My prescriptive thesis for engaging religious conflict, *per se,* is not to find or found a new universalism, over-religion, meta-language, or meta-praxis that will replace other useful modes of principled proselytizing, apologetics, or even polemics. I urge the use of new methods and attitudes that

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[5] Tracy used Gadamer's notion of engaged conversation with texts to expand a method that assumes both commitment to the authority of a text (or person) *and* openness to the possible changing meaning of that commitment. Thus, in speaking of Biblical interpretation, he says, "It is not our present answers, but our questions which are risked when we enter a conversation with a classic text [or other person]. There is no way, prior to the conversation itself, to determine the 'correct' theological interpretation of the Biblical text" (Grand and Tracy 1984, 173) This is hermeneutical *satyagraha.*

[6] Gandhi was familiar with the sacred texts of several religious traditions including the New Testament. *Satyagraha* has an affinity with the openness and fidelity implied in the Pauline injunction that requires a dexterous act of experimentation with the new, without abandoning the old, "Prove all things; hold fast to that which is good" (I Thess 5:21).

promote both interreligious contestation and collaboration that will prevent coercive violence, and build trust and friendship. I appreciate the desire of many for social-spiritual convergence in a non-apologetic philosophical, hermeneutical, religious universalism;[7] and yet I sense the very hope for peaceful community that such universalism implies would be better placed in new forms of peaceful yet agonistic engagement of serious conflicting differences.[8] I now turn to elabo-

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[7] This study is iconoclastic amid religious pacifistic diversifiers and pluralists. *Diversifiers* who praise unending religious diversity as a major creative expansion in human identity, quickly limit their support to pleasant situations only, where "our differences are occasions of celebration rather than sources of fear and self-righteousness" (Wiggins 1996, x). This seems to me rather like promoting rugby matches or mountain climbs where no one can ever get hurt. Though I believe opponents should not engage violently, if the differences between religions did not potentially provoke life or death human conflicts, they would be academic exercises, not religious contests over everlasting 'life or death.' The *pluralists*, on the other hand, are usually monistic harmonists who prescribe a methodical solution that takes people beyond exchanging traditional apologies of religious and secular ideologies to a "transcendent conversion experience through non-violent openness (dis-closure) to others' truths" that ultimately disclose *The New Universalism: Foundations for a Global Theology* (Krieger 1991, 162). Such pluralists seek that which not only fulfills their own religious need for unity, but "an inner need of thought itself"(ibid.,). I confess that I grasp at times a sense of wholeness that might be what pluralists call a universal inner need for ultimate convergent unity or final resolution of conflicts, but I do not sense it as a need, nor even a desire. The wholeness itself is a particular experience. I enjoy the particular and the compelling, and see no way (so far) to enjoy anything interesting and important that is not a differentiated entity, eliciting multiple emotions and ideas.

[8] William Blake sets the tone for positive conflict. From Blake's *Milton* we learn that Contraries are Positives. A Negation is not a Contrary. From *The Marriage of Heaven and Hell* we learn that reality consists never of One and the Other in Complete Harmony, but always One or the Other in Free Necessity to Love or Not. For a reading of Blake's

rating theories to better grasp problems of interreligious conflicts.

The Violence of Conflict Avoidance

Homer's *Iliad* became in the west the archetypical epic form: the Great Story of Hierarchal Power.[9] The Trojan War's mythic genesis set the foundation for the poem, and it set the foundation for intractable conflicts in general. The Trojan War derived from *a heavenly conflict with conflict itself* that predated the wrath of Achilles. The Gods on Olympus mistakenly believed they could avoid the pain of conflict by ignoring it, and ironically, it was this false assumption that led to a heavenly quarrel, a bloody ten- year siege, and the downfall of a grand civilization.

It was time to celebrate the unusual marriage of Thetis and Peleus, Goddess and man.[10] The issue from this marriage

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ironic disparagement of Eternal Harmony, and his celebration of the 'eternality' of marriage of contraries that has influenced my study see Robert Gleckner (1987, 103, 114-117).

[9] For a classic reading of the *Iliad* as an expression of the mere desire to feel force that can only be experienced in agonistic testing see Weil 1986 [1941], 153-183.

[10] This is not the only classic source of divine-human sexual relations that are implicated with violence to humanity. Though much less clearly illustrated, the Genesis story and especially the apocryphal Enoch literature also mention the marriage of Gods and humans from which issued mighty man-Gods of renown, who were implicated in the pervasive human depravity and violence that was ended by the most violent, flood (Genesis 6:1-13; I Enoch chpts. 6-36 in Charlesworth 1983, 15-29). In the later story of Jesus, we find a reversal: a God-man born to end violence with a genetic atonement marriage of divinity and humanity preceding the experiential atonement, worked out by the things which the Son of Man suffered (Luke 1:26-38; Hebrews 5:5-9). Even prior to the fully Christian reversal, however, the pseudepigraphical I Enoch also displayed a caring, compassionate God in a theodicy that described many God-inspired

would be a super-human soldier, Achilles, and a war that became (along with Genesis) the founding epic myth of the West. The Olympian Gods invited all divinities to the wedding except for Eris, the Goddess of strifeful conflict. Angered at the snub, Eris rolled a golden apple into the wedding hall on which was inscribed "For the Most Beautiful." Hera, Athena, and Aphrodite each claimed the orb, and seeing the impossibility of determining the question of greatest beauty by any empirical measurement, resorted to the highest divine judge, Zeus.[11] The head of the Gods, knowing these God-

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warnings for repentance before the flood, and claimed that humanity's continued debasement and abuse of future children justified a merciful new start for the earth. Further, more than just Noah's eight, many more righteous souls were spared the flood by their obedient gathering into the city of Enoch which was taken up to avoid the disaster (Nibley 1986, 66-85).

[11] The term empirical derives from the Greek *peira*, meaning trial, experiment, or experience. If there were *a priori* knowledge that was self evident to all, no trials of experience would be required. From Robert's "Trial by Existence" on a soul's pre-mortal dilemma: "But always God speaks at the end: 'One thought in agony of strife / The bravest would have by for friend,/ The memory that he chose the life; But the pure fate to which you go/ Admits no memory of choice,/ Or the woe were not earthly woe/ To which you give the assenting voice.'. . Tis of the essence of life here/ Though we choose greatly, still to lack/ The lasting memory at all clear/ That life has for us on the wrack/ Nothing but what we somehow chose;/ Thus are we wholly stripped of pride in the pain that has but one close/ Bearing it crushed and mystified" (Frost 1967, 29-30). Defendants, plaintiffs, juries, and all humans are reduced to their own interpretive judgements in the fog. The trial of and for a human life at the center of Achilles shield (*Iliad*, Book 18) reminds of both the prior trial of Paris and the subsequent trial of Hector and Achilles, and marks the fated force of freedom, judgement's choice, at the center of Greek culture. Add to Homer Yahweh's classic command, "Choose ye this day whom ye will serve!" (Joshua 24:15), and Jesus's demanding question, "Whom say ye that I am?" (Matthew 16:15). With these foundations for Western culture, there is little wonder that front of Sistine Chapel presents the epitome of decisive judgement.

desses well, was careful to eschew retaliation from any of them and declined to participate in a judgement that was objectively impossible. He suggested instead that handsome Paris of Troy might be a fine judge of beauty. But even Paris diplomatically declined to decide. So the Goddesses, assuming that their true beauty was beyond human assessment, decided to offer material bribes to Paris. Aphrodite's promise of Helen's person bought the beauty prize, and as material bribery was involved, allowed the losers some divine face-saving on the question of beauty *per se.* The two losers were still angry, of course, to have their powers snubbed by Trojan lust, and they vowed to punish Ilium (and embarrass Aphrodite) from that moment. The Greeks went to war over Paris' breach of hospitality and honor in kidnapping and/or seducing—only Helen knows—their king's sister-in-law. The whole mythic theme of impossible judgement is underscored by the fact that Helen was to be wed to the most worthy male suitor in Greece. Now a male beauty contest would be required. Knowing the envious strife this would cause between the suitors, Helen's mortal stepfather (Helen, too, was actually a child of a God, Zeus, and a mortal) required all the suitors to take an oath to defend the winning man from the attack of anyone else. All hoping to win, they took the oath, and Menelaus of Sparta was given the prize. Thus the oath taken to avoid conflict led to the ten-year epic war at Troy. Eris' revenge escalated quickly from a beauty contest into Olympian contention and human carnage of epic proportion: When the Greeks and Trojans wisely came to terms early in the struggle, the Gods, like wanton boys killing flies for sport, intervened to insure that Achilles would be honored, and that Troy would fall, only after major carnage on both sides. The *Iliad* describes vengeance, horror, and nature itself torn apart

by heroic war[12]—all because conflict was not invited to a wedding.

Now, as noted earlier with reference to *Paradise Lost*, most find the idea of conflict in heaven distasteful. Where, if not there, can one go to relax in peace? But this counter-intuitive wisdom from the myth remains: Conflict must be accepted as part of any peaceful community. Beneficial conflict engagement can defuse acrimonious contention and socially useful change.[13] As the myth presented massive violence ultimately irrupted because the Gods, unwilling to disrupt their pleasant lives, unwisely avoided including conflict within their peace. Note that Homer's primal source of conflict derived from a disagreement over the best of the best, not over good and evil. Their rationally unresolvable problem was finding an obvious, undeniable way of measurement for superlative beauty, but their social-psychological problem was an extreme intolerance of tension inevitably caused by the outsider's critical presence. The outsider calls into question, and this stirs up troubling issues, the fundamental, unresolvable cultural issues that insiders have blissfully covered with traditional wisdom. Social-psychologically, Eris is the

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12 The poem does conclude by showing alternatives to violence in the Greeks' competitive "Olympic Games" played for Patroclus' funeral, and the compassion of Achilles for Priam (*Iliad*, Books 23 and 24).

13 On the practical results of beneficial eristics one analyst notes, "Microsoft Corporation, one of the largest businesses in the world, is a postmodern culture well suited for rapid change and conflict. Neither purely individualistic (The American Way) nor consensus driven (The Japanese Style) but it uses a third way: Armed Truce, in which employees are encouraged to challenge everybody, even the chairman. Conflict is at the heart of every significant Microsoft decision. This is a company constantly at war, not only with outsiders but with itself" (Zachery 1994, 3).

Goddess of the other, the trouble-making outsider,[14] and the intruding disrupter.

Now instead of beauty, suppose the question is the truth of ultimate reality, the realm of religion (at least in its doctrinal mode). Religious opponents often avoid confronting their intractable religious differences because they seem impossible to resolve, impossible to measure clearly. The opponents' negative criticism stands as an unresolved question that threateningly challenges claims of religious superiority. In such cases, some opponents find other non-religious differences that can be used as a justification to aggressive or violent counter-attack. If an opponent can be faulted for some unjust or illegal secular matter, this allows for righteous annihilation or punishment of an evil critic whose troublesome criticism can, incidentally, be silenced at the same time. Once violence has commenced on measurable justified grounds, then vengeance can become a mutual and cyclical justification to attempt to eliminate the underlying religious conflict. Like Zeus deferring to Paris, the unmeasurable question of beauty, so humans avoid the unmeasurable religious questions of truth and purpose, goodness and beauty, in order to settle matters using other criteria that can be measured such as social standing, legal justice, material property, political power, and military might. Intractable religious conflicts, are not vicious vengeance cycles at the beginning. No matter what the apparent material issues at stake, these are fights over truth measurement with no ruler. Underneath the contested sacred real estate is unmeasurable holy

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[14] The ancient world's system of mutual hospitality was the social/political counter force that allowed for safer trade and travel. Nevertheless, the stranger was always an equivocal character who could bring both curses and blessings. Sophocles' Oedipus cycle and Homer's *Odyssey* are prime examples of the problem of being open to the outsider.

ground.[15] Religious conflict is a function of disagreement over that which is best, just, and most beautiful. And the stories show that Gods have never settled it for themselves, let alone man. As we learn from the mythic prologue to *The Iliad*, and *Paradise Lost* books I and VI, even the Gods resort to coercive means to attempt to rid themselves of the strain of competitive claims for ultimacy. Will such claims ever be finally settled? How? Would it be good to agree on good, beautiful to agree on beauty, truthful to agree on truth?

Freedom of Repression

In any analysis of psychosocial dynamics, religious or otherwise, it is useful to delve into the psychological from time to time, to understand how the social-psychological works. Note that my theory of conflict implicates envy as the villain, because it hides itself and stores up resentments that can latter explode into violent deeds, often unrelated to the original issue of conflict. Freud imagined dynamic psychology, the motion of the soul, using a physical analogy of the steam engine. He claimed humans feel uncomfortable pressure from unexpressed, unfulfilled desires. The conflict of soul was be-

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[15] Martin Marty has criticized the use of rigid spacial metaphors in describing religious conflicts. Though there are religious and secular functions that occur in separate spaces, the religious and secular tend to pervade all aspects of life, not sitting tight in spacial compartments. A wall between church and state, or the private and public square, or holy and secular land, or sacred and profane buildings—none of these expresses the more profound subtlety of metaphors distinguishing modes of *experience* with others and the world ('IUPUI Project Explores Public Expressions of Religion,' 1994, 5). The very fundamental notion of contrast devolves from bodily life which is profoundly prejudicial toward physical space. However, I will later explore Marty's useful insight in discussing new methods of engaging religious conflicts.

tween the outer shell that remained firm like a boiler wall, and the inner energy that pressed for release.

Perhaps the most common American cultural artifact of Freud's imaginative brilliance is the near ubiquitous self-analytical usage of the engineering term, stress. It stands for the complex linkage between Freud's metaphysical term, sub-conscious, the physical term, pressure, and the psychoanalytic coinage of the personal/political term, repression.[16] Mere contrast does not imply adverse feeling or pressure, but conflict, especially in contests, expresses and engenders stress. Indeed, for something as beneficial as Simmel claimed conflict could be, it is nonetheless, like a doctor's needle, often deferred or uncourageously avoided.

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[16] Though I will use the term repression in this study, I do not mean to adopt a purely Freudian psychological model of hydraulic pressure which is a common fundamental assumption to many conflict theorists (Folger and Poole 1984, 11-16). Rather than likening a human person to a steam engine, it is more accurate to avoid such a steep (temptingly elegant) reduction in favor of multiplex, ambiguous reductions. Human conscious purposes and "sub-conscious motives" (if any exist) are better ambiguously described as desires: diversely influenced, complexly intertwined, cognitive, emotional, free-willed desires (Csikszentmihalyi: 1990, 270-79). Thus repression does not inevitably, mechanistically lead to eruptive violence or neurosis; repression is rather a willful act of confession-avoidance, a self-deceptive hiding from some conflict, or intuitive conscience. Confession to one's adversary (rather than to one's therapist) is more an act of social psychological desire for influential change, than a release of personal psychic pressure (Coser 1956, 84-85, 171 n. 27). It does not dissipate destructive desire; it increases constructive desire. After years of analyzing pychoanalysis, researchers agree that the personal acceptance (forgiveness and appreciation) of the therapist (caring listener) has more to do with personal change than the self-revelation of the client's old hidden history. For practical psycho-social-spiritual approaches to repression in terms of life wasting cowardice or self-betrayal see Macy 1983, 21-37; Warner 1992, 1:1-3, 7; and the Bible, Matthew 5: 23-26.

Freud's splendid myth of human hydrology—the psyche being a three part mechanism of counter-influencing forces (id, ego, and superego)—is compatible with a mechanistic/deterministic view of reality, but not with this study which assumes that the soul's radical freedom can substantially trump any pre-determined influence.

William James said that the question of free will is insoluble on strictly psychological grounds since there is no way of getting outside either the determined or free universe to make a controlled (or free!) measurement of the difference freedom or determinism makes (1985 [1892], 323-324). However, he added at the end of his classic work on psychology a commentary on the personal ethical importance of free will efforts, saying that if there is freedom for the soul, its only possible act of free volition is the personal *effort* to continually resist or accept any thought, to sustain thinking one way as distinct from another.

> Of course we measure ourselves by many standards. Our strength and our intelligence, our wealth even our good luck, are things which warm our heart and make us feel ourselves a match for life. But deeper than all such things, and able to suffice unto itself without them, is the sense of the amount of effort that we can put forth. Those are, after all, but the effects, products, and reflections of the outer world within. But the effort seems to belong to an altogether different realm, as if it were the substantive thing which we *are* and those were externals which we *carry*. If the 'searching of our heart and reins' be the purpose of this human drama, then what is sought seems to be what effort we can make. . . Some of [life's] tests we meet by actions that are easy, and some of the questions we answer in articulately formulated words. But the deepest question that is ever asked admits of no reply but the dumb turning of the will and tightening of our heart-strings as we say, *"Yes, I will even have it so!"* . . . (ibid., 325-326)

James' finale then shifts from the question of independent personal effort to role of an inspiring model for life's efforts. (Who would dare write the following at the end of a text on psychology today?):

> Neither in the theoretic nor in the practical sphere do we care for, or go for help to, those who have no heart for risks, or sense for living on the perilous edge. Our religious life lies more, our practical life lies less, than it used to, on the perilous edge. But just as our courage is so often a reflex of another's courage, so our faith is apt to be a faith in some one else's faith. We draw new life from the heroic example. The prophet has drunk more deeply than anyone of the cup of bitterness, but his countenance is so unshaken and he speaks such mighty words of cheer that his will becomes our will, and our life is kindled at his own. Thus, not only our morality but our religion, so far as the latter is deliberate, depend on the effort which we can make. "Will you or won't you have it so?" is the most probing question ever asked . . . We answer by *consents or non-consents* and not by words. What wonder that these dumb responses should seem our deepest organs of communication with the nature of things! What wonder if the effort demanded by them be the measure of our worth as men! What wonder if the amount which we accord of it were the one strictly underived and original contribution which we make to the world! (ibid., 327)

For purposes of this study of religious conflict, it matters not whether the human soul is a confined pressure cooker that stores up explosive repression, or an open pot containing a bubbling stew that need not boil over. In either case, humans, like Hamlet, are alive with internal debates; internal

conflicts felt as battles of desire and counter-desire.[17] Often the conflict is kept within, repressed until the battle is decided, or until it is thought practically useful to express it aloud, either violently or passively.[18] However, rather than predetermined repressed explosions of soul, conflict analysis still needs a concept to reflect the personal freedom to select behavior, i.e., a freedom to repress or express, to engage or avoid conflict, to escalate or diminish emotion of anger, fear, sadness, gladness, to exaggerate or understate, to interpret as important or trivial. A concept of radical freedom undergirds my theory. It is the freedom to act on the desire for new desire. It is the crucial irreducible influence (the *I* and the *Me*) in any analysis of souls in conflict.[19] In sum, the dynamics of conflictual human interaction are, like other aspects of the human person, unamenable to tight modeling and accurate

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[17] Two cogent critics of desire in conflict, especially as dramatized by Shakespearean depth of character expressed in soliloquy, have informed my views from quite different perspectives. Harold Bloom (1994, 67-71) reads the bard as the greatest demonstrator of human nihilistic desire, desire for no reason; while René Girard (1994) lauds him for disclosing mimetic desire, desire for another's desiring. These can be viewed as complementary interpretations.

[18] In his analysis of case studies of latter 20th century Hindu/Muslim conflicts in India, psychoanalyst, Sudir Kakar (1996, 25-81) employs Freudian terms such as repression and projection to explain how individuals in a powerless position represses vengeance desires when offended until a sympathetic powerful group is available. Then "stored" hatred is projected on those who represent the original offenders.

[19] I admit here a fundamental bias for analyzing religious contests. Though it is possible that human freedom is merely a psychological illusion, and that all that occurs is a result of chance, fate or divine fiat, I still believe in radical human freedom to change desires and actions. I further think that the way conflicting parties' address their conflicts can differ substantially, if they believe they are either completely fated or determined in their behavior, acting by chance, or out of freedom. We will discuss this soon in respect to conflicts of love

prediction. Nevertheless, persons can be *expected* to express and repress desire freely, and that often means surprisingly—especially if there is serious religious risk involved.

Supreme Counterfeiters

My main interest here is the conflict of ultimate purposes espoused by religions. William James noted what he thought to be a strange human proclivity toward monisms (James 1909, 310-11). This study will emphasize the flawed monism of supreme teleology.[20] For any purpose of life to be supreme, it requires contending alternatives.[21] Henoteleology, not monoteleology, coheres with comparative supremacy.

Though one might seek repose in having found the answer to one's question of ultimate purpose, one finds that this response is soon troubled by those with different ultimate purposes. Though there may be some who claim to have no

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[20] On this point, Simmel observed a human proclivity to bestow on constantly changing life, if not an all embracing monism, at least a frame of origination and telos even if no such frame is verifiable in the infinite regression of life. By rank ordering periods from derivation toward explanation a meaning is given to dynamic process. "Man is too much of a discriminating, valuating, purposive being not to articulate the uninterrupted flow of alternating periods by means of such accents" (1964 [1908], 107-108).

[21] Sharing local ethno-sociological evidence for this position is irresistible: This writer's father-in-law, a kind Seventh-day Adventist missionary serving orphans in Bangladesh, wears a militant sweat shirt with a Christian cross set over a Satanic trident like dueling rapiers. The large caption in front reads, "SOONER or LATER, You'll Know Who Is GREATER" with a subscript reference to Colossians 1:15-20, and Romans 14:11. (The scriptures read, in part, "By him [Christ] were all things created . . . whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers: all things were created by him and for him . . . *that in all things he might have the preeminence*" and ". . . every knee shall bow, and every tongue confess to God." On the back of the shirt the crossed, dueling symbols of God and the Devil accompany a simple subscript, "Choose."

purpose beyond daily biological survival, this study concerns those who are so convinced of the truth and ultimacy of their purpose that any other claim for ultimacy is judged counterfeit. The closer the resemblance of claims, the more egregious the counterfeit. Perhaps the greatest irony of religious conflict occurs when different parties agree on the same noble ultimate concern or purpose such as creating a peaceful society. The agreement itself often becomes the impetus for passionate disagreement about the means of attaining that purpose. Thus it is often not the massive chasm between religions that causes religious conflict, but the proximate similarity.[22] Henoteleological conflicts are analogous to climbers competing to be the only ones to attain a permanent camp on a small lofty summit.[23] Such contests exhibit (like much inter-

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[22] Echoing the earlier thinking of Georg Simmel (1964 [1908], 43) and William James (1956a [1891-1898], 294), Mark Anspach agreeing with René Girard's analysis of conflict simply claims, "Two desires converging on the same object are bound to clash. . . Differences keep peace" (Juergensmeyer 1992, 9, 11). James Wiggins (1996, 13), paraphrases J. Z. Smith, saying that the distant differences seem not to be as important as the proximate ones. Those we think of as very close or even identical to us, when differences arise, shock us most severely. Enmity between those closely connected either by marriage, kinship, or faith community seems to cause the greatest strain.

[23] William James in a critique of Hegelian philosophy, made these comments about conflict that support this major theme: First, paraphrasing Hegel, "Without the *same* as a basis, how could strife occur? Strife presupposes something to be striven about; and in this common topic, the same for both parties, the differences merge. . . into one." Then, denying the merger of differences into one, James states, "Elements mutually contingent are not in conflict so long as they partake of the continua of time, space, etc.,— partaking being the exact opposite of strife. They conflict only when, as mutually exclusive possibilities, they strive to possess themselves of the same parts of time, space, and ego. That there are such real conflicts, irreducible to any [master] intelligence, and giving rise to an excess of possibility over actuality, is hypothesis, but a credible one." (James 1956a [1891-1898], 294-95).

religious conflict) a character of intra-group fighting.[24] Blaspheming heresy is a mark of intra-religious conflict where opponents charge each other with the treasonous sin of intentionally polluting a sacred purpose. Georg Simmel explains this aspect of my thesis well:

> This sociological sense of discrimination and the accentuation of conflict on the basis of similarity have a special nuance in the case where the separation of originally homogeneous elements occurs on purpose. Here separation does not follow from conflict but, on the contrary, conflict from separation. Typical of this is the way the renegade hates and is hated. The recall of earlier agreement has such a strong effect that the new contrast is infinitely sharper and bitterer than if no relation at all had existed in the past. Moreover, often both parties realize the difference between the new phase and the similarity remembered (and the unambiguousness of this difference is of the greatest importance to them) only by allowing it to grow far beyond its original locus and to characterize every point which is at all comparable. This aim of securing the two respective positions transforms theoretical or religious defection into the reciprocal charge of heresy in respect to all moral, personal, internal and external matters—a charge not necessarily ensuing where the same difference occurs between strangers. *In fact, the degeneration of a difference in convictions into hatred and fighting ordinarily occurs only when there were essential, original similarities between the parties. The (sociologically very significant) 'respect for the enemy' is*

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[24] In discussing modern religious conflicts, Harvey Cox has emphasized that simply sharing common cultural/linguistic symbolic systems does not mitigate conflict; indeed, "often the most acrimonious battles of the Gods take place not *between* different traditions but *within* the same one. . . [seeing] *our* saints and stories used in repellent ways enrages and sickens us" (Cox 1981, 301; author's emphasis).

> *usually absent where the hostility has arisen on the basis of previous solidarity.* And where enough similarities continue to make confusions and blurred borderlines possible, points of difference need an emphasis not justified by the issue but only by that danger of confusion. This was involved, for instance, in the case of Catholicism in Berne, mentioned earlier. Roman Catholicism does not have to fear any threat to its identity from external contact with a church so different as the Reformed Church, but indeed from something as closely akin as Old-Catholicism (Simmel 1971 [1908], 95); (His emphasis)

Heresy does not describe outsiders' ignorance, superstition or barbaric infidelism, all of which might be understandable evils (if not excusable) for the ignorant. Heresy is treachery of an insider, like the poisoning of a community's water supply in a desert, or the disorienting of a boat's compass in a storm on a rocky coast. Ironically, the heretic believes she is cleaning the water or fixing the compass to save the town or ship. The orthodox know the heretic is committing suicide and taking all the rest down too. Heresy-as-treason has been prevalent among peoples of The Book: Jews, Christians, and Muslims whose common textual heritage makes them all insiders. Their 'common' heritage is so radically and differently interpreted that each respectively reads the other as a traitor, having perverted the clear truth.

Christian history—Protestant history especially—exhibits the heresy-treason form of conflict. An infidel will say of another's religion that it is naive, wrong from the foundation up. In turn, believers can disregard infidels' criticisms as ignorant or naive. However, a heretic often becomes a hyper-fideist, saying of his own religion that it has strayed from the originally sound foundation. Heretics are extremely difficult to quickly force out to the margins of power, because they often know (and care!) more about the

religion than the orthodox. Unlike the infidel who is in a contest of suspicion from the start, the heretic is in a dynamic contest of interpretive retrieval that only moves from ultra orthodoxy toward ultra infidelity in the final stages. Of course, depending on the point of view, a given person or religious group can psychologically and theologically be all three: orthodox, heretic and infidel. I will explore in future chapters the dynamic forces (as distinct from systematic structures) manifested when ultimate purposes collide in heretical religious disputes; when, in Kiekegaardian terms, several pure hearts "will one thing"—differently.

Loyalty □ Heresy □ Apostasy vs. Loyalty □ Heresy □ Loyalty

Recalling Simmel, conflict is an integrating force bringing together groups of similar interests or causes to fight over differences. He further notes that the appearance of polar opposition in and between groups is often a differentiating device created by those who feel so similar that their unique group identity and power is threatened by confusion or dilution (Simmel 1964 [1908], 38-44). Using this insight on religious conflicts, one sees that conflicts usually result not from complete indifference nor complete rejection, but from mutual concern and similar critical interest. It is therefore the *heresy* (meaning choice in Greek) of "insiders" not the infidelism of "outsiders" that best models inter (and intra) religious conflicts over correct interpretations of divine methods and purposes. Said another way, once persons discover that they believe in similar things, they begin to differentiate their unique beliefs and practices, to demonstrate their differences, their heresies, in an attempt to be the most correct, or most influential, or at least a unique interpreter of the ultimate real-

ity.[25] Indeed, in any human interaction, neither 'completely same' nor 'totally other' can be at all interesting, for there is no comprehensible referent for either comparison. In matters of religious conflict, same and other have little impact, but close counts a lot.

In relations of deep import, there are troubling limits to human integrity and loyalty. Faithfulness, a continual decision for loyalty, provides a feeling of peace and confidence to lover and beloved. Unfaithfulness, a decision to be disloyal, engenders a loathsome feeling of guilt and fear in lover and beloved. So, if religious conversion is a *change* of loyalties, is it finding true love *at last* or promiscuous adultery until a more attractive alternative appears?

The apostate-traitor renounces prior loyalties after finding greater enlightenment. The heretic-adulterer wants to stay in the organization, claiming to have been truly loyal while the leaders maintained their adulterous heresy under the name of orthodoxy. Apostasy from one faithful position by converting to another mutually exclusive one, knowing all the inside information, is a threatening act as it casts doubt on old faith. It is seen from the prior organization's point of view as evil treachery—since ignorance or naivete are not possible defenses. Heresy is not so black and white. Ambivalence of heresy ensues from the claim of dual loyalties. The heretic claims to remain faithful to past loyalty by choosing a new more inclusive one; but there is no way for the heretic to avoid suspicion of disloyalty. Therefore, Shakespeare's adulterous Antony is chided for too easy disloyalty to the memory of his dead wife, Flavia, by Cleopatra, who was

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25 Recall that the thematic questions generating this dissertation were Milton's implied questions in *Paradise Lost*: Why would anyone created by, acquainted with, and near to the High God of Love *choose* to resist, rebel, and remain miserable forever? Why would Lucifer become Satan? Why does heresy lead to disloyalty?

the very impetus to his infidelity, and who had always wished Flavia dead so she could legitimately marry Antony. Neither lover could trust the other's constancy in love (*Antony and Cleopatra*, Act I, sc. iii). So 'religious adultery,' heresy, though it be sincere, can never fully satisfy anyone. Heretics are always suspect of closet apostasy. There may be some honor among thieves, but 'honor among traitors' seems impossible.

Heresy is not yet apostasy. A convert in a new religion decided to become an apostate from the old one. But a heretic wants, if possible, to remain in the old religion. The ambiguous dance between loyalty and apostasy is heresy. Heresy is the choice to criticize old orthodoxy from within the community, because it has strayed from the true way or become polluted by outside influences. Heretical energy is the practical social power that has historically driven change in any established organizations.[26] If a heretic is influential enough,

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[26] Though appreciative of Peter Berger's distinction between pre-modern fate cultures and modern choice cultures, it seems that historically fate caused many to be heretics (choosers). I noted above that Berger has suggested the need for modern religious heretics to enter contestations between themselves in "an open-minded encounter with other religious possibilities on the level of their truth claims . . . to enter into interreligious contestation . . . prepared to change one's own view of reality" (Berger 1979, 167). Though I urge honest biased contests, I do not see open—minded preparation for change as compatible with fervent contestation. Dialogue is fine for heretics who want to criticize their own heresy, but for the classic "I've found It!" heretic, the desire is not to be converted but to convert others. I study here religious contestants who are proselytizers unabashedly closed to self-conversion (though it might occur by unnoticed osmosis in some cases). I believe post-modern religious conflicts will benefit from new methods of persuasive engagement, that are not in the mode of open, seeking dialogue. Berger's and many others' (see these strong examples: Knitter 1985;1996; hick and Knitter, eds. 1987; Pannikar, 1978.) open dialogue leading toward a serious new view of reality seems unrealistic on three counts: 1) If one is convinced strongly

the heresy can be a matter of social or mortal life and death for the individuals or institutions involved, particularly if they are political and/or religious.

> As Simmel suggests, the reaction may be stronger under these conditions because the 'enemy' from within, the renegade or heretic, not only puts into question the values and interests of the group, but also threatens its very unity. . . if not its actual existence. . . . In the religious sphere, for example, apostasy strikes at the very life of a church, hence the violent denunciation of the apostate. . . [More precisely] the heretic presents a somewhat different problem to the group than does the apostate. At times the reaction of the group against the heretic is even more hostile than against the apostate. Whereas the latter deserts the group in order to go over to the enemy, the heretic presents a more insidious danger: by upholding the group's central values and goals, he threatens to split it into factions that will differ as to the means for implementing its goal. . . . The heretic proposes alternatives where the group wants no alternative to exist. As Roberto Michels wrote, 'The hatred of the party is directed, not in the first place against the opponents of its own view of the world order, but against the dreaded rivals in the political field, *against those who are competing for the same end*.. . . The heretic continues to compete for the loyalty of the member of his former group even after he

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to know a superior truth, then one feels obligated to sustain it against other inferior views, and engages dialogue as a closet proselytizer. 2) If one is seeking a truth superior to one's own, then one is looking to become a convert, and is engaging dialogue as a closet proselyte. 3) If one believes there are no superior truths that can be known sufficiently to elicit a life commitment, then one is not teaching nor seeking reality changing views, but learning as a non-religious student of human thought. Thus, dialogue is only possible as a vehicle for quiet proselytizing or religious seeking or secular learning.

> has left it. The [apostate] renegade will fight them, the heretic will proselytize. (Coser 1956, 70-71)

The above analysis can be applied to those of different religious persuasions, who believe that the external enemy is irreligion and the internal threat is incorrect religion that fools the honest seeker with counterfeit truth. Those who stand up for God against those who only pretend to are saving the truth from corruption. There is a continuum of heresy that starts very close to home and extends to the farthest claimant to ultimate truth. The common cause is the ultimate truth itself. True, heretics are more threatening the closer to home they reside and proselytize, but the dynamic of resentment for diluting the truth with fraud, is subtly there for anyone who competes *as orthodoxy* with orthodoxy. Perhaps the most interesting events in the on-going history of any group occur as it attempts to absorb its heretics without diluting the cohesive power that formed the group. Unless the group decides to expel its heretics as apostates, the group must expand its orthodoxy in some way to maintain continual solidarity and identity.

The forms of religious conflicts called apostasy and heresy, as with treason or adultery fully carry a question about a cheating, disloyal character that taints the person who defects—even if one agrees fully that the apostate heretic (adulterer, traitor) has come to the true side. If there were a way of achieving ambifidelity (or omnifidelity at the limit), then there would be no need to desert one to show concern for another, nor any more social relations based on exclusivity.[27]

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[27] Emmanuel Levinas said, "If I am alone with the Other, I owe him everything; but there is someone else. . . It is consequently necessary to weigh, to think, to judge in comparing the incomparable" (Levinas 1985 [1982], 90). The true problem of ethics begins with three. In matters of the heart, it is impossible to measure accurately what is given or taken.

However, there seems to be no alternative to incompossible particularities in human relations that assume individual persons are real. Choice itself is a positive exclusion of infinite possibilities in any instant.[28] Loyalty is more a virtue of continual re-choosing, than of deciding once-and-for-all.[29] It is a

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However, only two persons might conceivably give *all* their time, talent, and care to the other; in which case each would receive all with no sacrifice, no tension, no loss. Three persons requires a 'measured' choice because one cannot give all to two. Even if each gave all to one of the others, there would remain no ethical relation with at least one of the three. The choice is either to snub one completely, or to share between the two in partial amounts that are never verifiable. Even those who might want to share all *equally* are preoccupied with the issues of inaccurate sharing and resentment avoidance over split loyalties. There can be no psychosocial equality, in any case, between persons who are always nonidentical.

[28] This insight in the ethical mode means love requires exclusionary action—help for one means neglect for another. This reality was disclosed Biblically in Adam's choice between Eve and God, in God's choice between a living tainted generation and others yet to come at the time of the flood, in Abraham's choice between God and Isaac, or between the one Son's suffering and others.' Jesus came with a sword to split families by a forced religious choice (Matthew 10). This, the heart and trial of particularity, was exploited dramatically by Kierkegaard (1983 [1843], 59-67), and by James (1972 [1896], 285-290), and as a principle of rational/empirical incompossibility (simultaneous mutual exclusivity) by process philosophers generally, and certain Buddhist thinkers. Each instant there is a choice that kills the past and all current possibilities except one. This is reflected in theology by Paul Ricoeur's and David Tracy's hermeneutical analysis of revelation, as both unveiling and concealing of some particular that is not an other (though related). Its latest incarnation is given life in *The Gift of Death* by Derrida (1995 [1992], 53-81).

[29] Josiah Royce's philosophy of loyalty (1908) derived from a logical extrapolation of the desire for unity in a world of divergent particulars. Rather than claim (in Eastern fashion) that each is really in All, he chose (like Charles Hartshorne later) to see the virtue in creating limited unities, loyalties of each for the other, not the All. These loyalties might expand, however. Socially, this would eventuate in the possibility of a loyalty to the society of Earthlings, but not to (presumably) Martians. Loyalty re-

continuous tragedy of "no", coupled with a continuous comedy of "yes". Human vitality itself ensues in a trial of faithful desire. The trial itself is the mechanism that creates the relative value of every person or ideal in life. Like cloistered virtue, loyalty that is not tragically tested with counter-loyalty (as opposed to mere disloyalty) is no loyalty to brag of. It is the ubiquitous contest of good and better, of loyal and more loyal that the religious soul in the contest of conversion understands quintessentially. William James:

> God himself, in short, may draw vital strength and increase of very being from our fidelity. For my own part, I do not know what the seat and blood and tragedy of this life means, if they mean anything short of this. If this life be not a real fight, in which something is eternally gained for the universe by success, it is no better than a game of private theatricals from which one may withdraw at will. But it feels like a real fight—as if there were something really wild in the universe which we, with all our idealities and faithfulnesses, are needed to redeem. . . Who knows whether the faithfulness of individuals here below to their own poor overbeliefs may not actually help God in turn to be more effectively faithful to his own greater tasks? (James 1990 [1902],468)

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quires an outside alternative to whom less, or no, loyalty is granted. In the Christian theological realm, Jesus' validation of two great commandments that are like each other, but prioritized (Matthew 22: 36-40), forces a conundrum of questioning: Does one love God solely by loving man? If so why was not the second commandment the first and only? Does one always love God first, and man second? How does one love God first? Forcing the hearer to think about his or her tragic or incompossible choice between ultimate love loyalties, Jesus left little room for legalistic finality in ethical questions or in interpreting the divine word. (Some theologian might claim an esoteric reading, saying the two commandments were really one because of the divinization of man.)

Life and death, envy and love, treachery and loyalty, heresy and solidarity are the psycho-social structures of religious conflict. What one says with regard to divine powers has never been tamely innocuous. Many in secular and religious leadership have attempted to soften religious clashes by linguistically using the fact/opinion or truth/value dichotomies in a way that describes religion as mere preference, a decision of opinion and value not founded in 'real facts and truth.' There is no discourse among any tribe (be they sociologists or Baptists) that is not subject to some blasphemy that would bring the pious to tear their note pads, and shout down the offender. There is a limit to orthodox largesse for any group, so the question is only this: What words and deeds would desecrate the group's highest values, and would jolt its members' souls to lively counter-attack? One's religious persuasion is still one of the most powerful factors in the major life choices of billions. Persuasive proselytizing for secularisms and religions are on-going all the time in efforts to bring hegemonic 'reality' to the world. The modern parochial sophisticates who naively ignore their own religious stances usually feel superior to the fanatical low-brows (and vice versa). But no one avoids the effects of their own and others' persuasions. They are the basis for all cultural life and might even have ramifications beyond this mortal world.[30] No one

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30 Given that religion is a social organization with teleological focus, it is expressed as an artful rhetoric of persuasion to make a difference in this world and beyond. David Tracy (1990, 15; Burke 1970, v) has cited Kenneth Burke on this subject: ". . . [R]eligious cosmogonies are designed, in the last analysis, as exceptionally thoroughgoing modes of persuasion. To persuade men toward certain acts, religions would form the kinds of attitudes which prepare men for such acts. In order to plead for such attitudes as persuasively as possible, the religions always ground their exhortation (to themselves and others) in statements of the widest and deepest possible scope, concerning the authorship of men's motives."

alive can ignore the questions to do with how life and death should be engaged.

In this regard, William James understood what I will call the tragedy of particularity,[31] the mutual exclusivity (or for

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[31] The tragedy of particularity is the foundation for the Christian scandal of the bodily resurrection of the God-man, Jesus, and the final judgment of each resurrected person. Two millennia of embarrassed spiritualizing by all the king's horses and men still cannot resist Humpty Dumpty's coming together again. If the God-man had only dissolved into omnipresent 'spirit,' the whole incarnation could have been considered a brief anomaly. The mystery of the incarnation was still rationalized by many as symbolical; though the anthropomorphic handle-me-and-see texts flaunting the resurrected body of God-the-Son (e.g., Luke 24: 36-43, John 20: 27; Acts 1: 3, 9-11) and others (Matthew 27: 52-53) seemed to require a sentimental doctrine of the immortal continuity of particular persons in social relations. Heaven had to make uncomfortable room for particular (you, not me—this, not that) exclusion/inclusion which defied notions of perfect unity. The human tension between particular love and universal equality, or between the tragic ecstasy and final rest is nowhere more evident than in Christian struggles with the "good news" of resurrection, and the eschatological return of Christ to rule forever with the saved. The Sistine Chapel, the central icon of all Western culture, has two central foci: On the center ceiling a man-like God incarnate escorts Eve out of Adam's body, and then out of the Garden; and above the alter, a resurrected God-like man judges each human soul at the end of the world. The neo-platonic and Eastern notion of non-differentiated oneness is absent amid the myriad faces of unique human and divine persons. Judgement and consequences for freely made choices is the theme from the garden to eschaton. At the center of Achilleus' shield, the first icon of Greek culture, Homer placed a murder trial (*Iliad*, Book 18). Plato's great corpus is enveloped with the *Apology*, the final trial of Socrates. Tocqueville's cultural analysis maintained that political sanctions were founded on penal sanctions: "For that reason the man [or jury] who is judge in a *criminal* trial is the real master of society" (Tocqueville 1988 [1848], 272). Historian F. W. Maitland said, "If some fairy gave me the power of seeing a scene of one and the same kind in every age of history of every race, the kind of scene that I would choose would be a trial for murder, because it

Hartshorne, incompossibility) of simultaneous particularly desired outcomes, which, in the uniqueness of particular persons or events provides the condition for the very possibility of valuable difference (James 1956a [1891-98], 202). Friedrich Nietzsche also ironically understood this tragedy: "Love of *one* is a barbarism; for it is exercised at the expense of all others. The love of God, too" (1989 [1887], 79). Kierkegaard understood the inevitable pressure of the ethical temptation to love one more than another inherent in the great commandments to love God *and* others. He noted the conflict between teleologies of universal ethics and particular love, and concluded, "Faith is namely this paradox that the single individual is higher than the universal" (1983 [1843], 54-55). Jacques Derrida, expanding on the writings of Kierkegaard and Levinas, adds his gloss on the problem of persons in particular: "I cannot respond to the [universal ethical] call, the request, the obligation, or even the love of another without sacrificing the other other, the other others" (1995 [1992], 68).

The Tragic Question of Violence Is 'to Whom?'

In respect to the above subject, I offer a short critique of the supposed moral high ground of a life without violence—of

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would give me so many hints as to a multitude of matter of the first importance" (Stern 1973, 29). However, the life or death result of the trial should not over-shadow the deeper human interest in decisiveness itself. The crisis of judgment makes man and God more interesting than the condition of mortality and immortality. In many religious myths, especially in American religious myth, life is a mythic trial for humanity (Greeley 1972, 170), a continual crisis of critical judgement. This study is adopts James' critique of the claim that critical judgement regarding religion can be avoided. Judgment is a forced option between incompossible alternatives. Humans are being judged and judging with every decisive act that must include and exclude—often tragically.

living without harming another. Of course humans survive by killing plants and animals that they ingest, and every resource employed for self could have prolonged the life of another. Strict ahimsa is impossible in principle. It is a violent world. I have mentioned above the ethical problem of three that requires a tragic choice between loves, and the condition of particularity that provides no ethical ground of pristine equality that evades the radical selection of one, different from the other (footnote 216). I will now briefly comment on the selection of what or who must be violated in order for another to survive. Leaving the food chain's selective consumption and distribution problem that implicates all of us in a passive violence as we might share more to prolong the life of another, I will focus on direct social violence. Social pacifism, at the limit, allows violence full sway. Mortal force is not the only form of violence. To forcefully exile or incarcerate is also violent action. Even Gandhi's way was one that provoked violence in order to attain justice—though the violence was self-sacrificial. There is no action or inaction that is free of potentially violent effects. Humans move to the peril of whatever is in the way. A moral/ethical selection is always unavoidably linked to each physical/psychological selection.

The basic matter is who will be helped most, and hurt most. Traditionally most have constructed some type of 'just war' theory that might be invoked when consciousness of violent outcomes is raised. However, it is not so much the conditions that warrant violence, nor their strategic limits that are ethically important here because pacifism or belligerence both lead to violence for someone in a world of motion. The interesting question for individuals and groups is who or what will be defended at the cost of someone's life sustaining resources or simply, someone's life. Need it always be in defense of immediate attack (shooting a killer attacking one's child), or can it be pre-emptive of assured total disaster (quar-

antining a person with an incurable plague to solitary confinement for life)? The most religious thought is perhaps that thought that thinks about the purpose of death. Either the personal, what would one die for? or the normative, what should one die for? comes quickly to what would one kill for, what should one kill for? After all, is healthy longevity (no one *survives*) more important than anything else? It all depends on *whose* healthy longevity, and why one would or should have more life than another. 'I would give my life for you, but I would not kill even to save you.' Is this an ethic of perfection, or a rule that limits the highest expression of love? Those who know they would rather die or kill than promote or allow some event—they know enough to live with verve and purpose that will usually cause problems for those who are agnostic about mortal limits for themselves and others. In social life generally, in religious life particularly, what is often resented, if not silently envied, is the 'fanatical commitment' of those who have decided for what they would give and take life.

Monolatry, Polylatry and Henolatry

> If there were more than one God, each would govern his own creation holding each above the other. (Koran, *The Believers*, 23: 90-91)

For many, plural ultimates seem inimical to social order, if not impossible to rational comprehension; but consider this practical perspective: Conceivably, monolatry is a form of relative absolutism, polylatry a form of absolute relativism, and henolatry a hopeful, loyal perspectivalism. Here monolatry and polylatry are subsumed under henolatry in actual psycho-social behaviors of different religious persons and groups. The possibility that there are multiple High Gods of Different Orders in a contest for cosmic hegemony seems to

many moderns unthinkable.[32] Yet the conceptual form of much religious conflict resembles henotheistic competition, as advocates for different Gods vie with each other to establish their form of ultimate gravity. After analyzing testimonies regarding various religious experiences, William James said,

> The ideal power with which we feel ourselves in connection, the 'God' of ordinary men, is, both by ordinary men and by philosophers, endowed with certain of those metaphysical attributes which in [my] lecture on philosophy I treated with such disrespect. He is assumed as a matter of course to be 'one and only' and to be 'infinite'; and the notion of many finite Gods is one which hardly any one thinks it worth while to consider, and still less to uphold. Nevertheless, in the interests of intellectual clearness, I feel bound to say that religious experience, as we have studied it, cannot be cited as unequivocally supporting the infinitist belief. The only thing that it unequivocally testifies to is that we can experience union with *something* larger than ourselves and in that union find our greatest peace. Greek philosophy, with its passion for unity, and mysticism with a mono-ontological bent, both 'pass to the limit'

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32 John Whittaker (Runzo 1993, 126) states that religious beliefs are teleological, and God is to be "evaluatively construed." However, many contemporary theologians who want to save the value-laden, normative character of God, find no way of bridging the gap between their value-neutral metaphysics, and an ethical axiology. This gap might be bridged, I believe, by a henolatry in which various foundations for reality are instituted by the persuasive interpretations of various Gods vying for supremacy of influence. Metaphysical reality is ethically, teleologically formulated by a consensus of worshipers of a particular God. The metaphysics of the given (the past) is thus inextricably linked with the metaphysics of the possible (the present/future). Neither is foundational. What is given up is theistic or atheistic universalism—what is gained is freedom to be saved into different "heavens" by worship of different divinities or ultimate truth sayers who have interpreted heaven their separate ways.

and identify the something with a unique God who is the all-inclusive soul of the world. Popular opinion, respectful to their authority, follows the example which they set.

Meanwhile the practical needs and experiences of religion seem to me sufficiently met by the belief that beyond each man and in a fashion continuous with him there exists a larger power which is friendly to him and to his ideals. All that the facts require is that the power should be both other and larger than our conscious selves. Anything larger will do, if only it be large enough to trust for the next step. It need not be infinite, it need not be solitary. It might conceivably even be only a larger and more Godlike self, of which the present self would then be but the mutilated expression, and the universe might conceivably be a collection of such selves, of different degrees of inclusiveness, with no absolute unity realized in it at all. Thus would a sort of polytheism return upon us—a polytheism which I do not on this occasion defend, for my only aim at present is to keep the testimony of religious experience clearly within its proper bounds.

Upholders of the monistic view will say to such a polytheism (which, by the way, has always been the real religion of common people, and is so still today) that unless there be on all-inclusive God, our guarantee of security is left imperfect. In the Absolute, and in the Absolute only, *all* is saved. If there be different Gods, each caring for his part, some portion of some of us might not be covered with divine protection, and our religious consolation would thus fail to be complete. It goes back to what was said [before]. . . about the possibility of there being portions of the universe that may irretrievably be lost. Common sense is less sweeping in its demands than philosophy or mysticism have been wont to be, and can suffer the notion of the world being partly saved and partly lost. The ordinary moralistic state of mind makes the salvation of the world conditional upon the success with which each unit does its

> part. . . I think, in fact, that a final philosophy of religion will have to consider the pluralistic hypothesis more seriously than it has hitherto been willing to consider it (James 1956a [1891-1898], 214-215).

James conceived of monolatry as worshiping a motionless notion of Absolute Finished One, No More. He tended toward polylatry as his hope was in More—ever expanding supreme goodnesses, of particular beings. (James 1990 [1902], 454-57, 468-69; 1981 [1907], 132-34). A telos of adventure More vs. a telos of restful No More marks the poles of ultimate religious purpose.[33]

William James (1956 [1897], 286-298) conceived of monolatry as reverence for that which is All with no More. This seemed too him like adulation for a has-been divinity—perfectly still, finished. The problem with monism (even if it could quiet empirical traffic) was its lack of interesting contrast . . . after All. To remedy this in religious organizations, various forms of monism have been developed. For example, the monotheistic religion of the Hebrews, allowed for

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[33] At the same time that William James was philosophizing and theologizing polytheistic openness, Max Weber was conceiving a social theory of human polytheism, whereby a naturally valueless world is invigorated by Gods of human creation. Ideological, religious, and aesthetic systems of thought provided the positive reasons for ordered living. Due to differences in human perspectives, these Gods would always be in collisions with each other, so no ultimate end to social conflict of values was foreseeable (Beilharz 1992, 228-229). Robert Wuthnow (1992, 86) notes that the 20th century (after a few hundred years of Enlightenment myopia) returned to a realization that, as Weber said, we come face to face with the question of God(s) in relation to others' competing God(s). Though we try to cover the embarrassment of unassertive Monodivinity with unifying rhetoric, the fact remains we are not only responsible for moral choices, but for the choice of which God(s) we worship—the lawgiver as well as the law.

great diversity in the "personality" of God as manifest in the ever-changing historical world; and the mono-equanimity obtained in Buddhistic enlightened emptiness, allowed for the return of *bodhisattvas* fervently into the differentiated world to lead others to emptiness in variations of the eight-fold method. But the religious desire for interesting contrast is not a desire for sheer diversity.

Manyness craves oneness without total absorption, and has attained a monistic tone, if not ontology, by an appeal to the supremacy of uniqueness. This is another form of mono-worship that might have appealed to James: It is the adulation of the singular, the unique, as in the highest mountain, the deepest thought, the best love.[34] This supremacy needs particular comparative referents for its high status whereas the One, the Total, or the All are axiomatic generals above all "thats." Indeed, there are innumerable possible simultaneous supremes, each unique, revealed by creation of innumerable categories. In the end, one thing is sure, whether mono-, poly-, or henolatry, monism or pluralism, no 'latry' or 'ism' is without conflict, nor is that a bad thing for humanity.

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[34] The term singularity, used in physics, typically refers to The Paradoxical Event: the commencement or end of four dimensional space/time as we observe it (Hawking 1988, 49-51). Technically, "a point in space-time at which the space-time curvature becomes infinite" (ibid., 186). I use the term here to refer to the inexplicable presence of originality in unique human persons that, at the limit, commence from and end in infinity.

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